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THE CONCEPTION OF THE STATE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FREUD'S GROUP THEORY.[1]

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I

Like all other social groups, the state, the most significant of them all, is the specific unity of a multitude of individuals, or at any rate of individual activities, and the inquiry into the nature of the state is fundamentally an inquiry into the nature of this unity. The problem is in what manner, according to what criterion, is this multitude of individuals welded into what we are wont to assume to be a higher unity? How do the separate individuals forming the state, or their individual activities, combine into a super-individual whole? This inquiry is, however, also identical with that concerning the peculiar 'reality' of the state, the specific nature of its being. And if, as is almost taken for granted by modern sociology, in order to consider the state, as also other social institutions, as a natural reality, the same reality or kind of existence is attributed to it as to natural phenomena, then this presupposes that the sociological data by means of which the unity of its object or objects (the social institutions)

[1] See the following: Freud, *Totem und Tabu*, 2nd Edition, 1920, and *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, 1921. Also my own work: *Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff*, Tübingen, 1922, from which some parts of this paper are taken.

is established are strictly scientific in character, that is to say, must obey the laws of causality. In so doing one is apt—erroneously—simply to identify reality with a natural phenomenon, and to believe that an object, in so far as one wishes to assert its real existence, must be regarded as an object in nature to be defined by natural science. Hence the tendency of modern sociology to appropriate the laws of biology and especially of psychology, and to see in the unifying relation that welds the multiplicity of individual activities into social institutions a causal sequence under the category of cause and effect.

Accordingly sociology founded on social psychology endeavours to determine the nature of social phenomena in general and of social institutions in particular, and especially of the state, in two respects. In the first place all social facts are defined as mental processes, as originating in the human mind, and distinguished from bodily movements due to 'nature' in the narrower sense. Then however the social factor is seen in a specific union, a coalescence of individuals, an association of some kind, and this union is believed to exist in a psychic reciprocity, that is to say, that the mind of one individual influences and is influenced by the mind of another. Society exists, i.e. is real, so Simmel maintains in characteristic fashion, 'where several individuals react reciprocally. This reciprocity always arises from definite impulses or for the sake of definite purposes. . . . These interactions demonstrate that a unity, a "society" is formed of the individuals in whom these impulses and purposes exist. For, in the empirical sense, unity is nothing but the interaction of elements. An organic body is a unity because its organs have a closer reciprocal interchange of energy with one another than with those of any other outside individual; a state is one because a corresponding relationship of mutual influence exists between its citizens. The world itself could not be considered one if each of its parts did not in some way influence every other part, if the ever-present reciprocating relationships were interrupted at any point. Every unity or association may vary greatly in degree according to the nature and kind of the reciprocity, from the ephemeral companionship of a walk to that of the family, from all relationships that can be terminated at will to that of state citizenship, from the transient contacts of an hotel gathering to the close corporation of a mediæval guild.'[2]

This definition of the nature of society, which avowedly aims at

[2] *Soziologie*, 1908, S. 5, 6.

the understanding of so-called social institutions, is however problematical in more than one respect. It is so at least in so far as it is supposed to explain the reality, the specific kind of existence that is the characteristic criterion for the unity of the state. For if it is to be understood that the association of people called the state is based on psychic interaction, it must not be overlooked that by no means every mutual interaction connotes a union of social elements. Every sociological investigation opposes to the creative association of society as a unity a dissociation destructive of society. These disintegrating forces, however, manifest themselves entirely as action and reaction between psychic elements. The fact that people reciprocally influence one another does not by any means demonstrate the existence of that specific association which creates a society out of a multitude of individuals. The state, as moreover all other social institutions, is obviously only a unity of individuals brought into existence by a common bond of mutual interaction. It depends above all on this common bond, the peculiarity of which obviously distinguishes the state from other social institutions, such as nations, classes, religious communities, etc. If no other criterion than that of associative interaction is available, it is utterly impossible to distinguish, from amongst the innumerable groups into which mankind is divided in this way, the particular association that is called the state. The family, the nation, the working-class, the religious community would all be unities bound together by reciprocal reactions, and if they are to be distinguished from one another and contrasted with the social unity of the state, then a conception of these unities that is entirely beyond the scope of sociology or of psychology would have to be presumed.

There can be no doubt that modern sociology approaches the assumption of social reality equipped with some such conception of the state derived from another order of speculation. The train of thought involved is probably the following: Who belongs to a state? What people compose the state? But this is to begin by presupposing the unity of the state, as do those sociologists who endeavour to investigate and determine the social unity of the state empirically. The unity of the state, presupposed by the sociologists, is, however, also established by jurisprudence, and membership in the state is determined wholly legally, according to the uniform application of a legal code presumed to be valid. This legal or state code, however, represents a specific association of elements according to

peculiar laws of its own, differing entirely from the laws of natural causation. All those for whom the legal or state code is assumed to be valid are considered as belonging to the state. Membership of a state is not determined on the grounds of empirical psychological investigation into the interactions between people—for how could this be done? At best it is only possible to investigate whether those people who are considered legally as belonging to a state also stand in the reciprocal relation to each other that is held to constitute the essence of the real unity of society. The error of this method is obvious. Peculiarly so when, as constantly happens, it leads to the fiction that the empiric causal, sociological unity coincides with the specific legal unity of the state. Or has empiric sociology ever asserted that any individual soever belonged indeed sociologically, but not legally, or legally but not sociologically, to a particular state? That the individuals classed together for the legal unity of the state, among them children, lunatics, sleepers and such as entirely lack any awareness of their membership, stand in a reciprocal psychic relation representing the intimate association of a sociological bond, is as much an assumption taken completely for granted by the prevailing sociology, as it is an entirely unreliable fiction. The only marvel is that its result, the complete coincidence of the causal sociological with the normative legal points of view, has not occasioned any perplexity, and that the possibility that the sociological reality called the state might differ very greatly in content from the legal state has not even been mooted. For in that case grave doubts must have arisen whether it is possible to consider two unities arrived at by such differing methods, with such differing contents, to be one and the same thing under the same name.

If, however, the dissociating forces, the disintegrating interactions, are taken into consideration, it is quite incomprehensible how people who are associated by economic, national, religious and other interests into social groups by reciprocal interactions, but who apart from these groups are divided by just these very disintegrating interests, and who could of course be classed together theoretically as a legal or economic unity, can be said really to be united in spite of these disintegrating divisions. If sociological investigation discovers within the community of the state (the legal, be it noted, not the empiric causal state) a division according to economic classes, then the assertion of a simultaneous state unity of the persons known to be in economic opposition forms an irreconcilable contradiction. Because

psychological realities, conscious processes, are being dealt with, it cannot be asserted that employers and workers are divided by their consciousness of class-antagonism and at the same time united by their common consciousness of the state. Class-antagonism must disappear from consciousness if the community of the state as a real sociological, psychological unity is to come into being. The significance of an appeal addressed to political parties within the state in times of danger is that it forces back from consciousness the antagonisms that are fundamental for political group-formation in order to make room for a state consciousness, so that those belonging *legally* to the state may also form a real *psychological* unity, an association. How far such a demand is realized in concrete instances, or indeed is realizable at all, must remain very doubtful. How could it be seriously maintained that the legal delimitations of the state also co-extend with the empirical view of the network of associative interactions that alone make of the state a real sociological unity? May class, national, and religious interests not prove stronger than state consciousness? May they not extend their group-forming activities across the legal frontiers, thus bringing into doubt the existence of a group coinciding with the legal limits of the state? Especially on the assumption, indispensable for the constitution of a social unity on the basis of psychic reciprocity, that a multitude of individuals forms an empirically real unity only when, and in so far as, the reciprocal interactions uniting them are more powerful, more intense, than those uniting them to others outside the group, and if they are related to one another like the organs of the living body, or as Simmel would say, 'are in a more intimate reciprocal interchange of energy than with any outside individual'. For who could seriously question that a racial bond between members of different states forms, or at any rate can form, an infinitely closer tie than legal membership of the same state? Is the sociological theory of psychic interaction determined to draw the conclusions that would ensue for the state from its teachings, which, if the state were actually founded on them, would cause it inevitably to fall headlong into a bottomless pit of economic, religious and national antagonisms?

If the nature of social reality (and therefore also of the state as a part of social reality) is perceived as a psychic bond, to be more closely defined in some fashion, then it is not superfluous to recognize clearly the entirely figurative character of this idea which ascribes spatial relationships to non-spatial psychic phenomena. The ambiguity

of describing psychic processes in terms adapted to the physical world is felt here with peculiar force. The difficulty is further increased by the fact that the full significance of social phenomena is evidently not exhausted by the recognition of a merely psychic bond, but that somehow a spatial corporeal aggregation of human bodies upon a part of the earth's surface is also regarded as inherent in it. The conception of the state may be mentioned here merely as an example. Indeed if, as is assumed but not acted on by the newer sociology, social phenomena are considered as purely psychic processes, it is quite impossible to get at those organizations, those social unities, that finally force themselves upon every sociology as its specific objects.

If the psychological significance of a social combination be analysed, its meaning is shown to be the statement that A is associated with B, not perchance that both as bodies are confined in the same space, no external—as the newer sociology is wont to phrase it—but an ' inner ' relation. As a psychic fact union is an idea or feeling in A's mind who knows or feels himself bound to B, thus the essence of a love-bond between two people is that the idea of the one occurs to the other with a specific feeling-tone only to be expressed in a physical spatial figure: A is fettered to B, is inseparably chained, bound, to B. The state too as a social bond is manifested in the idea of a certain community, of common organization, of common territory, etc. Here again an extra-psychological conception of the state must be assumed whose psychic reflex—its precise nature is irrelevant—may create this feeling of fellowship in the minds of the people forming the state. Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to talk of a bond ' between ' individuals; if society is a psychic phenomenon then this bond which we call society is complete within each individual. To assert that A is connected with B is merely hypostatizing an entirely intra-individual relation erroneously transposed into the external physical world. The idea of B is associated, that is, has a definite feeling-tone, in A's mind. Again, a completely analogous association in B's mind in respect to the idea of A, a reciprocity, however, that is not at all necessary for the assumption of a bond between A and B, can in no way affect the wholly intra-individual character of the social bond. Reciprocity indeed is entirely irrelevant to the discussion. That the feeling of this bond should exist in A has doubtless many causes and amongst them the attitude of B may play its part, but the bond does not consist in the influence exercised on A by B.

Further, an assumed interaction between individuals need not necessarily be merely psychic, for the causal sequence under consideration must, in order to travel from A's mind to that of B and back again, pass twice through both bodies. The problem of such a psychophysical causal sequence, and the no longer psychic but psychophysical nature of the social unity which it establishes, will not be dealt with further here. Only it must be regarded as understood that, even on the basis of a theory of reciprocity which is a purely psychological conception, sociological investigation cannot be confined within the psychological sphere implied by the conception of society as a psychic reciprocity. This tendency, discernible, though mostly unconscious, in all sociologists, to break out of psychological bounds, is chiefly due to the fact that ultimately all psychological investigation is only possible considered as individual psychology; once it penetrates into the individual mind no road leads out again. From the point of view of psychology the individual mind is really a windowless monad. Yet all sociology aims at a goal beyond the individual because essentially all social phenomena stretch beyond the individual, indeed sociology seems to connote something wholly different from the individual, his very subjugation and negation.

II

To see a multitude of individuals as a form of social association or social unity, a community, simply because some significant correspondence can be assumed among their wills, feelings or thoughts, is to imagine one is keeping within the province of psychology although grasping at the super-individual. One might speak here of a *parallelism* of psychic processes, as is always possible when a 'common will', a 'common emotion', a common or collective consciousness or interest, is under discussion. Indeed it is this that is described as the 'folk-spirit' (*Volksgeist*) by folk-psychology so-called. So long as it is not meant to express more than a certain common consciousness the conception is harmless. At the same time there is a distinct tendency to declare this folk-spirit to be a psychic reality differing from the individual psyche, whereby this conception of the folk-spirit acquires the metaphysical character of Hegel's objective spirit.

When it is desired to characterize the state as a social-psychological reality, it is usually considered as a community formed upon the scheme of the parallelisms of psychic processes, and particularly as

one based upon the general will, upon the unanimity of the volitional actions of a multitude of people. Nevertheless on closer examination it is apparent that a purely psychological interpretation of these ' communities ' does not by any means permit of their being accepted as social, super-individual, unities. For the criterion of a social unity (also accepted by every sociologist) is that this conception shall represent not only the mere abstraction of similar characteristics from a number of individuals, but a combination of some kind, an association of these individuals into a higher unity. The idea of a nigger as an abstraction for all people possessing a black skin implies a social unity or a society as little as that all gill-breathing creatures form one organism. The *tertium comparationis* valid in all circumstances between a society and an organism is just that a synthesis of elements surpassing mere abstraction is, here as there, the factor constituting unity out of multiplicity. To project, so to say, this synthesis upon the object itself, to represent society as a unity held together by interaction between individuals, is an error the correction of which will be attempted later in another connection. There is, at any rate at first, no more fellowship in the fact that a number of people wish, feel or think alike, than is occasioned theoretically by the conception of a common physical character. If, however, each individual is further endowed with a consciousness or feeling of fellowship, the conception gains nothing essential, no inner bond between the individuals is thereby established, quite apart from the contradiction implied in the idea of an inner bond between individuals, that is to say a bond secluded in the depths of the individual psyche, acting between objects external to one another. Neither is there any foundation for basing such a community of will, feeling or imagination solely upon reciprocities, nor even for describing them as a kind of reciprocity. The church congregation that is transported into similar states of pious ecstasy by the priestly evocation of certain ideas which are shared in common, the members of a crowd whom the inflammatory words of a leader inspire with revolutionary ardour and a similar desire, e.g. to destroy a government building, are perfect examples of a real community of feeling, thought or will that is not created by reciprocal interaction between the individuals concerned, but by a common influence upon them from without, that is to say, by a third party. Compared with this influence the consciousness that others feel, think or will like oneself plays a secondary part. This consciousness in separate persons, due to an

understanding shared amongst individuals, can in certain circumstances intensify the basic psychic sensations of each. The patriotic fervour roused by any cause is strengthened by the consciousness of the same sentiment in others, and may increase in the individual in proportion to the extent of its manifestation in the group. At the same time the reverse is possible, as is recognized in proverbial wisdom, ' a sorrow shared is a sorrow halved '. As regards this point, however, considering the very marked variations of individual disposition and of the accompanying circumstances which, as being decisive for the reinforcing or weakening of a common consciousness, must never be left out of account, no generally applicable rule could possibly be laid down.

The law of the intensification of affect in the group, which is assumed by the representatives of group-psychology, i.e. that every extension of the affect signifies at the same time an increase of emotion in the consciousness of those already affected,[3] is only correct within very narrow limits. In any case the view that the common will, a common feeling, or a common idea are psychic quantities obtained by the summation of individual wishes, feelings or ideas, and proportionately intensified, must be refuted. It is only because such a view is held by social theorists amongst others that we must again expressly state that the psychic elements of different individuals do not admit of summation, and that such a sum, even if it could be cast up, would not be the expression of any psychic reality whatsoever. Common emotion, common volition and common idea can never mean anything more than a description of the coincidence in the content of consciousness of a number of individuals.

If one really wished to consider the state as consisting of a community of consciousness such as this, and as a matter of fact such a realistic, empirical psychological meaning is often attributed to what is called the collective will or the collective interest of the state, then, in order to avoid inadmissible fictions, one would have to be consistent enough really to consider the state as formed only by those the contents of whose consciousness had shown the necessary agreement. One would be bound to realize that community of will, feeling or thought, as a psychological group manifestation, fluctuates tremendously at different times and places. In the ocean of psychic

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[3] See Moede, ' Die Massen- und Sozialpsychologie im kritischen Überblick ', *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie*, 1915, S. 393.

happenings such communities may rise like waves in the sea and after a brief space be lost again in an ever-changing ebb and flow. The usual idea of the state as a clearly delimited permanent institution would no longer find acceptance. And finally, strict account would have to be taken of the question what exactly the specific content of that will, feeling or thought is, the parallel experience of which by a multitude of people constitutes precisely the community of the state, since not every and any group manifestation formed upon the parallelism of psychic processes is able to constitute that community. Thus it might well result that the state was simply the specific content of a consciousness which in psychological aggregation is still of problematic significance for a conception of the state.

The same principle applies to the view that would characterize the state as psychologically a sum of *dominating* relationships. It is psychologically impossible to regard the state, whatever may be meant by that term, as a single dominating relationship, since unity among the rulers actually exists as little as among the ruled. To assume this for the state is just to take for granted what ought only to be attained by psychological investigation, and thus the presupposed unity of the state evidently becomes extra-psychological and, as is always demonstrable, legal in character. From the psychological point of view there exists merely a number of dominating and dominated individuals whose unity cannot be psychologically determined otherwise than by the similar content of the domination-relationship, that is to say, by means of an abstraction. The specific content therefore of this dominating relationship is involved here too. And since, psychologically, domination is nothing else than *motivation*, the will, the expression of one person's will becomes the motive for the will or the action of the other persons upon whose behaviour the will of the former is directed. On closer consideration probably every relationship between individuals will prove to be a domination-relationship, or at any rate a domination-relationship will be seen to be also present. Even in relationships that seem to exclude this, such as love and friendship, closer analysis will probably not find complete equality of the elements, but always distinguish a leader and a led, a stronger and a weaker. If, however, every human relationship is one of domination, then the psychological impression of it at our disposal is so remote and indefinite that not even the framework of psychic processes supporting the content of the state is adequately characterized by it.

Beside the two conceptions of the *parallelism* of psychic processes and *motivation*, a third possible form of social bond—so far as such a bond is sought for on psychological lines—can be seen in the peculiar relationship that consists in one individual making another the *object* of his wishes, will or desires, which are thus directed upon him. While up till now this specific psychic attitude had been considered as constituting the bond between two only of a friendship or love relation (in the strictest sense), Freud endeavours to employ the 'libido' theory, which is the basis of his psycho-analysis, for the solution also of the main problem of social psychology, for the answer to the inquiry concerning the nature of the social bond. In this attempt Freud apparently starts only from a particular problem of social psychology, the phenomenon of what is called group psychology as described by Sigheles [4] and Le Bon.[5] But the least scrutiny shows that the problem of the group must be the problem of social 'unity' or of the social 'bond'. And this is precisely the tenor of Freud's argument, the outcome of which is a conception of the state as being also a group, even if a complicated one, or as a phenomenon of group psychology.

Le Bon designates a group 'in the usual sense of the word' as 'an association of any individuals, of any nationality, occupation and sex with any ground for association'. It is clear that this is not an ultimate definition. For the inquiry is precisely wherein the nature of this 'association' consists. The problem that Le Bon sets himself is this: What psychic changes result in the individual from the fact of his association with others? For him a 'group' is first of all the expression of a specific condition coincident with which certain similar individual psychic effects occur in a number of persons. Immediately, however, this conception undergoes a characteristic change of meaning. 'From the psychological point of view the word "group" signifies something quite different. Under certain conditions and only under them a collection of people acquires new characteristics quite different from those of the individuals forming this society. The conscious personality disappears, the feelings and thoughts of each individual are oriented in the same direction and a group mind is formed that, although of a transitory nature, has however a perfectly definite character.' Further, Le Bon

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[4] *La coppia criminale*, 2nd edition.

[5] *Psychologie des Foules*, 3rd edition, 1919.

speaks of a ' psychological group ' which the aggregation of individuals has become, and says of it, ' it forms a single entity and obeys the law of the psychic unity of the group (*loi de l'unité mentale des foules*) '. ' The psychological group is a provisional entity consisting of heterogeneous elements that have united for a moment, exactly as the cells of the organism by their union form a new creature with entirely different qualities from those of the individual cells.' If a ' group ' was originally the term used for the specific condition, it is now the term for the consequences that ensue in the assumed circumstances. At the same time the fact that these consequences occur equally for a number of individuals is simplified by the group itself regarding the specific qualities and functions of the individuals included in the group as a subject differing from the subjects constituting the group. Alongside the minds of the individuals constituting the group there suddenly appears a ' group mind '—the group *is* in fact this mind. Indeed Le Bon says : ' The chief characteristics of the individual in the group are, therefore, disappearance of the conscious personality, domination by the unconscious personality, orientation of thoughts and feelings in one direction by suggestion and contagion, the tendency to immediate realization of the suggested ideas. The individual is no longer himself, he is an automaton devoid of will. Further, merely by membership in a group man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization. In isolation he was perhaps a cultured individual, in the group he is a barbarian, that is, a creature of impulse. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings. He also approximates to these by the ease with which he lets himself be swayed by words and illustrations that would be entirely without effect on each single individual, and lets himself be beguiled into actions that are opposed to his direct interests and recognized habits '. But from this proposition of a number of similar characteristics in the individual minds within the group are evolved finally assertions of a group mind differing from the individual mind. It is stated ' that the group is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual ', that ' the group is often treacherous but also often heroic '. The emotional life and the morality of a group is discussed, etc. Because individuals when in a group have other characteristics than when in isolation, ' the peculiarities of groups ' which individuals do not possess are discussed and thus a non-existent antithesis between the individual and the group is called up. This hypostatizing of

a merely abstract unity, this bestowal, by the assumption of a ' collective psyche ', of reality upon a relationship of agreement between the content of many individual psyches, is often quite consciously stressed and the assumption that one is dealing only with a clear and concise expression for a number of similar individual phenomena is directly refuted. ' In contradiction to a view which it is extraordinary to find held by so acute a philosopher as Herbert Spencer, there is by no means in the aggregate forming a group a summation and an average of elements, but a combination and formation of new elements ; exactly as in chemistry certain elements, as for instance alkalis and acids, combine in contact to form a new substance whose characteristics differ entirely from those of the substances concerned in its formation.' Because the individuals within the group show new characteristics, the group is hypostatized as a ' body', as a new individual who is the bearer of these characteristics !

While Freud takes Le Bon's description of the group mind as his starting-point, he certainly does not fall into the error of this hypostasis. At the very beginning of his investigation he denies with praiseworthy acuteness all contradiction between individual and social psychology, and explains that the antithesis of social and non-social (' narcissistic ' or ' autistic ', i.e having no reference to another person) psychic actions falls ' wholly within the domain of individual psychology.' [6] Freud accordingly formulates absolutely correctly what is for Le Bon the decisive fact when he says that the individual feels, thinks and acts under a certain condition quite differently than was to be expected of him, and this condition is his insertion into a collection of people that has acquired the character of a psychological group. For Freud there is nothing but the individual mind and his is in all circumstances an individual psychology. The characteristic thing about his method is precisely that he demonstrates the phenomena of the so-called group mind as manifestations of the individual mind.

But in other respects too Freud's researches show a distinct advance upon those of Le Bon. The latter after all is content with the description of a psychological fact ; his assumption of a ' collective psyche ' as an attempted explanation need not be further considered. Freud, however, penetrates to the heart of this problem

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[6] Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* Translation by James Strachey. International Psycho-Analytical Press. p. 2.

when in reference to Le Bon's statement of the unity of the individuals collected in the group (and to express this unity there at once crops up the hypostatized metaphor of the collective psyche) he asks the question, unconsidered by Le Bon: 'If the individuals in the group are combined into a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond might be precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group.' [7] Le Bon of course does not confine himself to describing the group merely as the fact of similar psychic reactions on the part of a number of individuals, that is, as a case of parallelism of psychic processes. He also speaks constantly of an 'association' of the individuals behaving similarly, and the metaphor of the 'organism' and of the 'collective psyche' is evidently intended to indicate something beyond this mere identity of orientation. But he does not inquire into what exactly constitutes this 'bond'. Freud, however, precisely with this question, not only rends the veil of the hypostatized 'collective psyche', but also translates the problem of the 'group' into the problem of social unity and of the social bond in general.

In the following brief sketch of Freud's attempt to employ the fundamental idea of his theory of psycho-analysis (that of the 'libido') in the elucidation of group psychology, and to look upon an association of individuals into a social unity (too narrowly defined as a 'group') as due to an *emotional* bond, as an instance of 'libido' action, it must first of all be made clear that such a sketch can give only a very incomplete picture of Freud's social psychology. The theory of the 'libidinal structure of the group' is so intimately associated with Freud's whole psychological teaching that it cannot be formulated apart from the background of general psycho-analysis without becoming extremely difficult to understand or without a danger of its being misunderstood. Nevertheless, in this connection it is not so much a matter of the special value of psycho-analysis for the elucidation of the phenomena of group psychology; but much rather whether, and in how far, this endeavour to achieve a psychological definition of social reality can be rendered fruitful for the conception and nature of the state; whether the state can be regarded as a 'psychological group' of the structure that Freud's psycho-analysis has revealed. For this purpose, however, a statement of the principal points of view will suffice and a closer scrutiny

[7] Freud, op. cit., p. 7.

of the fundamental assumptions of general psycho-analysis is not necessary.

When Freud makes the assumption that 'libido', 'that love-relationships (or, to use a more neutral expression, emotional ties) also constitute the essence of the group mind' [8] he understands 'libido' or 'love' in the widest sense of the word, not merely as including sexual love but as having the same significance as Plato's 'Eros'. Freud says he bases his anticipation that love relationships form the basis also of the social bond primarily upon two 'passing thoughts'. 'First, that a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, who holds together everything in the world? Secondly, that if an individual gives up his distinctiveness in a group and lets its other members influence him by suggestion, it gives one the impression that he does it because he feels the need of being in harmony with them rather than in opposition to them—so that perhaps after all he does it "for love of" them'.[9] But even though the essence of group formation, of the social bond in general, does consist in 'libidinal ties' between the individuals constituting the group, yet at the same time it is also expressly emphasized that it is impossible this should involve love instincts 'pursuing directly sexual aims'. 'We are concerned here with love instincts which have been diverted from their original aims, though they do not operate with less energy on that account.' [10] Psycho-analysis is concerned in many ways with such a diversion of this instinct from sexual aims. As psycho-analysis teaches, this manifestation is associated with a certain detriment to the ego. The supposition that the social bond may consist in such a libidinal tie is at once strengthened by the fact that the disappearance of self-consciousness is stated to be an essential characteristic of the individual absorbed into the group. 'So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends'—this recognition of the purely ephemeral, transient existence of social groups and of their varying extent is of the utmost importance—'individuals behave as though they were uniform, tolerate other people's peculiarities, put themselves on an equal level with them, and have no feeling of aversion towards them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself

[8] Freud, op. cit., p. 40.
[9] Freud, op. cit., p. 40.
[10] Freud, op. cit., p. 58.

knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects.'[11] Even previous to its investigation of the social psychological problem, psycho-analysis discovered 'identification', so-called, as an emotional tie with another person that is not sexual love. It is neither possible nor necessary to examine more closely here the complicated psychic mechanism of this 'identification' discovered in its own peculiar way by psycho-analysis. Here it need only be stated that according to Freud's teaching, identification is the earliest form of emotional tie with an object (possible even before the choice of any sexual object, as for instance when a little boy identifies himself with his father by wishing he were like him and might take his place in everything, when in short he takes his father for his ideal); and further that according to psycho-analytic experience there are typical cases in which identification occurs through one individual becoming aware of a significant analogy, of an identity in some important respect with himself, in another who is not the object of his sexual instinct. The first individual henceforth identifies himself—of course only in part, only in one particular respect—with the second in whom the decisive analogy was apprehended. 'The more important this common quality is the more successful may this partial identification become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new tie'.[12] This common quality may especially be of an affective nature, may consist in the affective bond uniting both individuals to the same object. And here Freud declares 'that the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional common quality, and we may suspect that this common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader'.[13]

According to Freud this tie with the leader also depends upon a love instinct which is diverted from its sexual goal. Freud rightly rebukes social or group psychology with having hitherto overlooked the extraordinary importance of the factor represented by the leader. A group, in the wider sense of a social group, is according to Freud psychologically utterly impossible without a leader, whether that leader is an actual human being, as in the original natural primitive group, or an idea acting as substitute for the leader. 'Many equals, who can identify themselves with one another, and a single person

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[11] Freud, op. cit., p. 56.

[12] Freud, op. cit., p. 65.

[13] Freud, op. cit., p. 66.

superior to them all—that is the situation that we find realized in groups which are capable of subsisting.' [14] Man is no herd animal, as is wont to be declared; he is much rather 'a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief'. The understanding of the relationship to the leader presupposes, however, the knowledge of an important phenomenon which psycho-analytic investigation discovered to be connected with the replacement of direct sexual aims by goal-inhibited ones—namely the splitting of the ego-consciousness into an ego and an ego-ideal. The latter is distinguished from the former in that it performs the functions of self-observation, of self-criticism, of conscience, of the moral standard. The peculiar relationship to the leader is the immolation of the ego before the object of his inhibited sexual instinct, the complete abeyance of the functions appointed to the ego-ideal, the absence of criticism exercised by the moral standard in so far as the behaviour of the object is concerned—everything done or demanded by the object is impeccable; conscience has no scruple about anything that favours the object. 'The whole situation can be completely summarized in a formula: the object has taken the place of the ego-ideal'.[15] A group, even a primary, original group, is therefore according to Freud a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego-ideal, who have surrendered their own ideal in exchange for the group-ideal embodied in the leader, and have consequently identified themselves one with another.[16]

The characteristic lapse of an individual within the group into a state of psychic primevalism, and indeed of barbarism, portrayed by Le Bon is explained by Freud by means of his hypothesis of the development of human society. In connection with a conjecture of Darwin's, Freud assumes that the primitive form of human society was that of the horde under the absolute dominion of one powerful male.[17] This male who acts as leader is the domineering jealous father who keeps all the females for himself but prevents the males, that is to say the adolescent sons, from gratification of their direct sexual impulses towards the females. He forces them to abstinence, and consequently also to those emotional ties to himself and to one another

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[14] Freud, op. cit., p. 89. [15] Freud, op. cit., p. 75.

[16] Freud, op. cit., pp. 80 and 102.

[17] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*. Translated by A. A. Brill, pp. 207 et seq. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 90 foll.

that are the outcome of goal-inhibited sexual impulses. The exclusion of the sons from the females of the horde leads to their expulsion from it. One day, however, the expelled brothers join together and kill and eat the father and thus put an end to the paternal horde. The place of a paternal horde is taken by a clan of brothers. I shall return later to this hypothesis which provides us above all with an astonishing explanation for the hitherto puzzling phenomenon of so-called totemism. Here it is only necessary to note Freud's statement that the fate of the primal horde ' has left behind it indestructible traces in the hereditary history of the human race '. [18] The ' group ' in particular seems to Freud to be a revival of the primal horde. ' Human groups exhibit once again the familiar picture of an individual of superior strength among a troop of similar companions, a picture which is also contained in our idea of the primal horde. The psychology of such a group, as we know it from the descriptions to which we have so often referred—the dwindling of the conscious individual personality, the focussing of thoughts and feelings into a common direction, the predominance of the emotions and of the unconscious mental life, the tendency to the immediate carrying out of intentions as they emerge—all this corresponds to a state of regression to a primitive mental activity, of just such a sort as we should be inclined to ascribe to the primal horde.' [19] ' The uncanny and coercive characteristics of group-formations, which are shown in these suggestive phenomena ' must ' be traced back to the fact of their origin from the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father ; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force ; it has an extreme passion for authority ; in Le Bon's phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father

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[18] At this point reference must be made to Heinrich Schurtz, who in his book *Altersklassen und Männerbünde*, 1902, maintains the thesis that all higher social combinations, particularly therefore the state, are derived from the associations of men that are to be observed among all primitive races in the form of ' men's houses ', societies resembling clubs, secret societies, etc. These men's guilds originate, according to Schurtz, in a specific social impulse which though akin to is nevertheless different from the sexual impulse, and is indeed directed against it. The only condition for social differentiation and cultural progress is a repression of the fundamentally anti-social sex impulse.

[19] Freud, op. cit., p. 91.

is the group-ideal, which governs the ego in the place of the ego-ideal'.[20] 'Thus the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde. Just as primitive man virtually survives in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out of any random crowd; in so far as men are habitually under the sway of group-formation we recognize in it the survival of the primal horde.'[21]

On the assumption that Freud's teaching that the social bond is of the nature of an emotional tie, and that his theory of the libidinal structure of the group and of the double tie of the individuals one with another (identification) and also with the leader (substitution of the object in the place of the ego-ideal) are correct, then the question (crucial for the problem of the sociological conception of the state) whether the state also is a psychological group, becomes the question whether also the individuals within the state, bound together by the state and constituting the state, stand in this double relationship, whether the state considered as a social group, as a social psychic reality, also shows this libidinal structure? Freud himself seems inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. He says: 'Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego-ideal upon the most various models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds—those of his race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc.—and he can also raise himself above them to the extent of having a scrap of independence and originality.'[22] Hence the state appears to Freud as a 'group mind', though doubtless of a somewhat different kind from those groups in which the primal horde comes directly to life. 'Such stable and lasting group-formations, with their uniform and constant effects, are less striking to an observer than the rapidly-formed and transient groups from which Le Bon has made his brilliant psychological character-sketch of the group-mind. And it is just in these noisy ephemeral groups, which are as it were superimposed upon the others, that we are met by the prodigy of the complete, even though only temporary, disappearance of exactly what we have recognized as individual acquirements.'[23] But the distinction between 'transient' and 'stable' groups is, according to Freud's own statement, so significant that to describe the latter as 'groups' or indeed as 'group

[20] Freud, op. cit., p. 99.
[21] Freud, op. cit., p. 92.
[22] Freud, op. cit., p. 101.
[23] Freud, op. cit., p. 101.

minds' must be rejected as misleading. What is called the state is something quite different from the phenomenon that was described by Le Bon as the 'group' and explained psychologically by Freud.

From the mere fact that along with the regression of the individual mind manifested in the group 'manifestations of the group formation which operate in a precisely opposite sense' are also observed, and that as well as the disparaging pronouncements of Le Bon a 'much higher opinion of the group mind' is also found, Freud assumes that a number of very different formations have probably been merged under the term 'group,' and may require to be distinguished.[24] 'The assertions of Sighele, Le Bon and the rest relate to groups of a short-lived character, which some passing interest has hastily agglomerated out of various sorts of individuals. The characteristics of evolutionary groups, and especially those of the great French Revolution, have unmistakably influenced these descriptions. The opposite opinions owe their origin to the consideration of those stable groups or associations in which mankind pass their lives, and which are embodied in the institutions of society. Groups of the first kind stand in the same sort of relation to those of the second as a high but choppy sea to a ground-swell.'[25] Striking though this illustration may be, it is nevertheless adapted to obscure the main distinction between 'transient' and 'stable' groups embodied in 'institutions' a distinction that Freud indeed felt but did not recognize sufficiently clearly.

In the definitive differentiation of the two kinds of groups, Freud agrees with the account given by the English sociologist, McDougall,[26] who distinguishes between primitive 'unorganized' and 'organized' artificial groups. As the phenomenon of regression and particularly the fact of the collective lowering of the intellectual level is only observed in groups of the former type, he attributes the absence of the regressive effect to the factor of 'organization'. We are not concerned here with the individual elements in which McDougall believes he may perceive this 'organization'. In any case the decisive thing is the fact that there does exist in the members of the group a consciousness of an order regulating their relationships, that is to say, a system of norms. According to McDougall, the psychic drawbacks to group-formation are overcome by this 'organization'.

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[24] Freud, op. cit., p. 25.

[25] Freud, op. cit., p. 25.

[26] *The Group Mind*, Cambridge, 1920.

Freud is of opinion that the condition described by McDougall as 'organization' should be differently described. 'The problem consists in how to procure for the group precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual and which are distinguished in him by the formation of the group.' He means self-consciousness, self-criticism, the sense of responsibility, conscience, etc. 'Owing to his entry into an "unorganized" group, he had lost this distinctiveness for a time.' The aim of the development into an 'organized' group is 'to equip the group with the attributes of the individual'. [27] McDougall's view of 'organization' certainly requires modification. Freud's also, however, is somewhat surprising. Although he himself strongly emphasizes the principle of individual psychology and consistently maintains it throughout the psychology of the primal group, yet at this point he makes a statement that seems to betray a failure in his system of individual psychology. The 'group' is to achieve certain attributes of the individual. But how is this possible, as we are still after all only dealing with attributes and functions pertaining to the individual mind? This is not merely a metaphorical figure with which we are dealing here; it is a conceptual error. For if the figure of the 'group with the attributes of the individual' is dissolved, it becomes evident that no group whatsoever —not even one differing from the primal group—exists! The nature of the group consists—this is the culminating point of all Freud's investigation—in the specific bond which proves to be a double affective tie of the group members to one another and to the leader. It is precisely upon this psychic character of the bond that the spontaneous ephemeral nature, the varying extent of this manifestation which Freud himself repeatedly stresses, depends. Freud is only consistent when he says: 'We should have to start from the ascertained fact that a mere collection of people is not a group, so long as these ties have not been established in it'. [28] He traces the characteristic manifestations of regression entirely to these ties, and on their account explains the group as a revival of the primal horde!

But it is precisely these ties that are *lacking* in the individual who is a member of the groups called 'organized' or 'artificial' by McDougall and Freud, since in them the characteristic regression, for whose sole explanation these affective ties, this libidinal structure, had to be adduced, is *wanting*. Had it been realized that behind the

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[27] Freud, op. cit., p. 32.

[28] Freud, op. cit., p. 52.

apparently positive assertion of a 'group equipped with the attributes of the individual' there stands the wholly negative statement that the individual—as a member of the social 'institution' under discussion—does not enter into this tie which occasions the specific group-action of regression, that the individual here possesses all the attributes that are his individually and whose absence is precisely the specific problem of group or social psychology, then it would never have been necessary to describe the social 'institutions' in question also as 'groups'. It might also then have been recognized perhaps that the qualities attributed to these 'groups', and in consequence of which they were described as 'stable', permanent', 'established' groups, must contradict the nature of the objective laid down for all psychological investigation. For which reason too Freud confines his psychological definition of the group—'a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego-ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego'—expressly to the 'primal', that is, to such a group as has not been able by means of too much 'organization' to acquire secondarily 'the attributes of an individual'.[29] If the conceptual definition of the group does not apply to the 'artificial' group, then precisely the latter is not a group in the sense of a social, psychological unity. And that the characteristics of a psychological group cannot apply particularly to the state requires no further demonstration. For methodological reasons, however, it is perhaps not superfluous to indicate the following points. Were the state a psychological group in the sense of Freud's and Le Bon's theory, then the individuals belonging to a state must have identified themselves with one another. The psychic mechanism of identification, however, presupposes that the individual must perceive an analogy with the other with whom he identifies himself. One cannot identify oneself with an unknown person of whom one has never been aware, nor with an indeterminate number of individuals. Identification is restricted from the first to quite a limited number of people who are aware of one another, and therefore—quite apart from any other objections—it is unavailable for a psychological characterization of the state.

Nevertheless a relationship does certainly exist between the social institutions erroneously described as stable 'groups' and

[29] Freud, op. cit., p. 30.

psychological groups in the true sense. What exactly is the nature of the latter? An indication of an answer to this question that seems to point in the right direction, and particularly to permit of a correct statement of the relationships between fixed and variable groups, is supplied by Freud himself. Freud distinguishes 'between groups which have a leader and leaderless groups,' and says: 'We should consider whether groups with leaders may not be the more primitive and complete, whether in the others an idea, an abstraction, may not be substituted for the leader. . . . This abstraction, again, might be more or less completely embodied in the figure of what we might call a secondary leader.' . . .[30] Unless all the indications are misleading, the distinction between the primitive variable and the artificial stable groups is that between groups with an actual leader and those where the leader is replaced by an idea, and this idea in turn is embodied in the person of a secondary leader. The state in particular seems to be a 'group' of the latter kind. On closer scrutiny, however, the state is not this 'group' but the 'idea', a 'guiding idea', an ideology, a specific meaning-content that is only distinguished by its peculiar content from other ideas such as those of the religion, of the nation, etc. The realization of this idea, the act of realization which—as distinguished from the idea itself realized by this act—is a psychological process, undoubtedly involves those psychic phenomena of group psychology, those libidinal ties and their associated regressions, so admirably depicted by Le Bon, which Freud has endeavoured to explain in terms of individual psychology. Only the state precisely is not one of the numerous transient groups of very variable extent and libidinal structure, but is the *guiding idea*, which the individuals belonging to the variable groups have put in the place of their ego-ideal in order thereby to be able to identify themselves with one another. The differing combinations or psychic groups that are formed on the realization of one and the same idea of the state do not by any means include all those individuals who, in quite another sense, belong to the state. The wholly legal idea of the state can only be understood in its own specific judicial conformity, but not psychologically, as may the processes of the libidinal ties and associations which are the material of social psychology. The psychic processes by which the formation of leaderless groups is achieved (that is, of groups in

[30] Freud, op. cit., p. 53.

which the individuals who are reciprocally identified substitute an abstract idea instead of the idea of the concrete personality of the leader for their ego-ideal) is, however, similar in all cases, whether it involves the idea of a nation, a religion, or a state. Were the ' psychological group ' the social institution being inquired into, then, as only the psychological process comes under consideration, there would be no relevant difference between nation, religion and state. These social phenomena appear as *differentiated* institutions only from the misleading point of view of their specific content, only in so far as they are conceived of as ideational systems, as specific thought-trends, as *mental contents*, and not as psychic processes maintaining and realizing these contents.[31]

III

In its attitude towards the so-called stable, organized groups, sociological investigation achieves a striking change of direction. The direction in which this change leads has, however, already been indicated in the assumption by group psychology, referred to above, that ' organization ' is the characteristic of the so-called stable groups, and that they are embodied in ' institutions '. ' Organization ' and institution are, namely, complexes of norms, systems of precepts regulating human behaviour, which as such, that is to say, in their specific peculiar sense, can only be apprehended on a consideration of the economic validity of these norms, not of the ' self-efficacy ' (*Seins-Wirksamkeit*) of the human ideational and volitional acts of which these norms are the content.

This definitive change of direction, to be observed in all psychologically oriented sociology, arises without exception at the point where the theory passes from the general sphere of the interaction of psychic elements to deal with those social ' institutions ' that arise somehow from this interaction and finally become the specific objects

[31] Tarde, the French sociologist (*La logique sociale*, 1895, and *Les lois de l'imitation*, 2nd edition, 1895), starts, as is well known, from the fact of suggestive imitation as the fundamental social phenomenon, and characterizes the social group as an aggregate of beings who imitate one another. It is clear that the state cannot be regarded as a social group in the sense of Tarde's definition. But that such group-formation can occur in the realization of the idea of the state may in the main be granted.

of sociology. One chief change of direction must be discussed, because a grasp of these objects opens up an entirely new method of scientific investigation differing from that hitherto employed. Although unconsciously on the part of most sociologists, who are under the impression that they pursue the old path, the sphere of psychological empirical investigation has been deserted, and a domain entered where concepts undergo the most extraordinary falsifications because an attempt is made to burden them with a meaning—the psychological one, namely—which is entirely and essentially foreign to them.

This leap beyond the limits of psychology which is typical of psychological sociology is shown in the psychologically irreconcilable qualities that are and must be claimed for social 'institutions,' if one wants to grasp even in part those ideas of social entities, of *collectiva*, that are present to our consciousness. Above all there is the statement, repeated by every sociologist, that social 'institutions' are 'strengthened', 'crystallized', 'compacted together' by the interactions of psychic elements and have a 'super-individual' character. As psychic processes are only possible in the individual, that is, in the mind of each separate person, then anything super-individual must be of a metapsychological nature, outside the individual mind. Even 'interaction' *between* individuals is just as super-individual as it is metapsychological and only in so far as one is unaware of this is it possible to believe that super-individuality, as a kind of higher form of psychical manifestation, can be attained to by means of the intervention of 'interaction' without quitting the sphere of psychology. Truth to tell, this is a complete instance of *μετάβασις εἰς τὸ ἄλλον γένος*. In which case, as well as the individual mind, one would have to assume another collective mind occupying the space between the individual ones and embracing them all; a conception which, as has already been shown, is not so remote from the newer sociology; and which, consistently thought out, must lead—since a mind without a body is empirically impossible—to the assumption of a collective body just as different from the individual bodies as the collective mind is from the individual mind, and into which the collective mind can be incorporated. It is along this path that psychological sociology is led to the hypostatization, verging on the mythological, of the so-called organic theory of society.

All sociologists, in the most varying applications, attribute 'objectivity' to social 'institutions' in the same sense in which the latter are described as super-individual. It is typical of this idea to say

that the psychic interactions between individuals after they are 'set' and 'stabilized' become 'objective forces'. Social entities are spoken of as 'objectivations' or actually as 'systems of objectivations'. In all these applications there is an endeavour to express a contrast to subjective processes, that is, to psychic processes occurring in the individual mind, to the molecular movements of social life. Only these intra-individual, *subjective* psychic processes, however, are real, that is, have that psychological reality which alone should be taken into account in a social-psychologically oriented sociology. How real subjectivity can, by mere aggregation or multiplication, become an equally real objectivity, must remain enigmatical. Quantity is here metamorphosed into quality, or in other words, 'Lo! a miracle; only have faith!'

In the same way as their objectivity, the duration or permanence claimed for social institutions contrasts them strongly with the fluctuating, lightning-like existence of the phenomena of the individual mind, out of which the former are supposed to be somehow created. Precisely in the case of the state it is most striking how irreconcilable the essential uniformity and continuity of its specific existence, the fixed limitations of its extent—which is, of course, only the permanence of a sharply defined validity—is with the fluctuating, wavering, constantly intermittent, now expanding, now contracting reality of those psychic group-phenomena under which a psychological scientific theory vainly endeavours to subsume these social institutions. It is in naïve self-deception that sociology, as a social psychology, believes that in social institutions it is dealing with, so to say, frozen waves, with a petrified psychic group movement, in which psychic laws could be more conveniently and certainly discerned than amongst the ever-changing phenomena of the individual mind. If a sociologist believes that 'the psychic institutions with which sociology is concerned possess a certain objectivity and permanence which render them capable of observation and comparison in quite another fashion (namely, more intensively!) than is permitted by the transient processes in the individual mind',[32] then he must answer the question how exactly the metamorphosis is possible by which, from a number of subjective 'transient processes in the individual consciousness'—to which alone, be it noted, reality pertains—formations of 'objectivity and permanence' are obtained, which in spite of this change

[32] Eisler, *Soziologie*, S. 9.

of nature not only do not lose their original psychic character, but manifest it indeed in even a heightened degree.

The French sociologist Durkheim shows a typical example of this method of gliding out of the sphere of psychological causal knowledge into that of ethico-political or juridical considerations. He too insists upon establishing sociology as a natural science, oriented according to the laws of causation.[33] He accepts Comte's principle 'that social manifestations are natural phenomena and as such subject to the laws of nature'. With this we plainly see the 'objective character' ascribed to social phenomena. 'For in nature there are only things (*choses*),' and 'the primary and fundamental rule' for the understanding of social matters consists in 'regarding social phenomena as things'. Durkheim deliberately turns away from sociology as a knowledge of ideas or ideologies, and in opposition to this sets up a 'science of realities'. Durkheim declares social phenomena to be 'things', however, because and in so far as they are something 'objective', independent of the individual, something already pre-existing and therefore independent of him and also external to his person, realities of his external world into which he is born, so to speak. These phenomena of a social world, which contrasts with the individual, transcends him, and has come into existence without him, determine the individual and have a compelling power over him. These objective social phenomena, external to the individual and characterized as 'things', do indeed manifest themselves in the actions, thoughts and feelings of individuals, but they must not be confused with their 'individual radiations'. 'Here then we have a class of facts of a very special character: they consist in peculiar kinds of actions, thoughts and feelings; they are external to the individual, and are equipped with compelling powers by means of which they force themselves upon him'. The compelling character is 'an immanent quality in these things that appears forthwith upon any attempt at resistance to them'. 'Seeing that their (the social phenomena) essential peculiarity consists in their power of exercising compulsion from without upon the individual consciousness, this means that they are not derived from the latter and hence that sociology is no derivative from psychology. . . . If the individual is left out of consideration, only society remains; it is therefore in the nature of society itself in which the explanation of social life

[33] *Les règles de la méthode sociologique.*

is to be sought.' 'In virtue of this principle society is not merely a sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own character. No such manifestation can occur of course in the absence of an individual consciousness; but this necessary condition is not sufficient by itself. The individual minds must further be associated and combined in a definite manner; social life is the consequence of this manner of association, and hence it is this manner of association that explains social life. By harmonizing, interpenetrating and mingling with one another, the individual minds produce a new, if you will a psychic, being that represents a psychic individuality of a new order. It is in the nature of this individuality, not in that of the individuals of which it is constituted, that the primary and determining causes of the phenomena therein observed must be sought. The group thinks, feels, acts, quite otherwise than its members, were they isolated, would do.' The recognition of this fact, that individuals behave differently when they are in association with one another than they would if they were isolated, leads by the well-known path of uncritical hypostatizing to the assumption of a social reality external to the individual. The difference of function under different conditions becomes the difference of substances, becomes 'different things'. Durkheim cannot insist emphatically enough upon this objective character of social things. 'As a matter of fact, in consequence of their continual occurrence, many ways of acting and thinking acquire a certain consistence which isolates them from and renders them independent of the individual happenings which give rise to them. They take on bodily shape, perceptible individual form, and constitute a reality *sui generis*, which is completely distinct from the individual actions in which it is manifested.' After this, the corporeal form to which social things ultimately attain can admit of no question, for its perception by the senses is expressly asserted as follows: 'Since the aspects of things are only known to us by perceptual means, it may briefly be stated that to be objective science should not start from ideas that are formed independently of it, but should derive the principles of its fundamental definitions entirely from what is given by the senses.' This completely contradicts the statement that social phenomena are indeed 'things' but not 'material' things. It also contradicts the statement that society is a 'psychic' entity, and this again contradicts the statement that sociology has nothing to do with psychology. All these contradictions arise ultimately

from the erroneous hypostatization referred to above. Durkheim's '*méthode sociologique*' is simply the application of a naïve substantialistic (that is to say, mythological) point of view to the observation of human behaviour under the conditions of reciprocal interaction.

The normative tendency of Durkheim's sociology becomes herewith clearly evident. The 'objective' existence of social 'things' independent of the subjective, that is, of individual wish and will, is really nothing but the objective validity of the ethico-political norms which Durkheim dogmatically assumes, and endeavours to justify by stating that they are natural realities. He emphasizes that all social things have a peculiar 'imperative character' as regards the individual, he considers the obligations imposed—according to him, imposed by society—upon the individual to be of this kind and does not by any means confine his investigations to the fact that people—wrongly, perhaps—*consider themselves* to be under obligations. Durkheim sees in society a compelling authority, that is to say, a value which could as little be a subject for purely scientific causal consideration as could obligations. 'A social phenomenon is to be recognized by the external obligatory power that it exerts or can exert over the individual.' Indeed 'social', and in particular 'collective', and 'obligatory' are synonymous for Durkheim. As is known, he considers 'the exercise of a compulsion from without upon the individual consciousness' as an essential characteristic of social phenomena. Society is thus enabled 'to impose the kinds of thoughts and actions which it has invested with its authority' upon the individual. This 'authority' of society consists in its capacity for compelling; this 'imposing upon' is an obligation to certain behaviour. Because such obligation comes 'from without', therefore 'the source of all that is obligatory lies outside the individual'. Nevertheless, in considering the fact of the compulsion exercised 'from without' upon the individual consciousness, we have to do with a phenomenon of subjective consciousness, and if this fact is explained to be an essential characteristic of social things, then that is the end of the objectivity of the latter. At the same time it is incomprehensible why there should be any further mention of 'obligation'. It is merely a matter of the effect of a cause: the ideational process set up in the individual by some activity or other in the external world leading in turn to an impulse of the will and finally to an action; it is a chain of cause and effect in the same way as the heating and melting of a piece of metal by the incandescence of a spirit-flame.

Does the fire perchance ' oblige ' the piece of metal to become warm and finally melt ? Has the heart an ' obligation ' to beat ? Is the cause the ' authority ' for the effect ? Is the ' compulsion ', by virtue of which the effect follows upon the cause (and of which the ' compulsion ' that the social phenomenon exercises ' from without ' upon the individual consciousness is evidently only a special case), an obligation ? Has the cause an ' imperative character ' ? Just here, however, the social sphere appears to be impinged upon ! Exactly what ' compulsion ' does Durkheim mean when he says, ' In reality the fact of association, however far back we may go in history, is the most compelling of all, for it is the source of all other obligations ' ? The inquiry here is for the ' source ', that is, for the reason of the validity of obligations, not for the cause of ideas, volitions and actions ! Precisely in this connection Durkheim adduces the compulsory fellowship in the state to which one belongs and with which one is associated without reference to one's own will. This state seems to represent for Durkheim, so to say, the aggregate of all social ties, of all obligations. And precisely in the case of the state it is apparent that everything Durkheim attempts to express by the assertion of a peculiar psycho-physical objectivity in the external world of the individual is nothing else but the objective validity—assumed somehow—of a specific autonomous intellectual content, the objective validity of a system of norms.

The ethico-political character of this ' scientific ' sociology has now been sufficiently dealt with. Durkheim's theory must now be judged upon the assumption that society is identical with God. ' If it is not possible,' says Durkheim, ' to link up the entirety of moral ideas with a reality that the child can grasp with his fingers, then moral instruction is useless. The child must be given the feeling of a reality as the source of life from which come help and strength. For this, however, a concrete living reality is necessary.' [34] According

[34] *Bulletin de la société de philosophie*, 1906, p. 227. I quote this from Fouillée's paper *Humanitaires et libertaires au point de vue sociologique et moral*. I have unfortunately not as yet been able to get access to the *Bulletin de la société de philosophie*. I only became aware of this paper of Durkheim's as well as of the one quoted farther on, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse ; Le system totemique en Australie*, Paris, 1912, after the publication of my essay *Über den soziologischen und juristischen Staatsbegriff*. I therefore take advantage of the opportunity offered me

to Durkheim, society is this authority. 'Society is a higher moral force which has the same kind of transcendence as religion ascribes to the deity.' As already stressed, Durkheim does not so much, or at least does not only, tend to explain the psychological fact of the motivating power of certain norm ideas, but much rather to justify their validity by basing them upon an authority, upon society elevated to the rank of a deity. 'It is understood,' he says, 'that we bow reverently before society which demands from us those great and little sacrifices which constitute compliance in the moral life. The believer reveres God because it is God from whom he believes he has received his life and especially his spiritual life—his soul. We have similar reasons for experiencing this feeling where the collective body is concerned.' [35] 'Only a conscious being can be endowed with an authority such as is necessary to establish the moral order. God is a personality of this kind in the same way as society. If one can understand why the believer loves and reveres the deity, what can prevent us from understanding how the lay mind can love and revere the collective body, which is perhaps the sole reality in the idea of the deity?' 'The believer is not mistaken when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he is dependent and to which he owes all that is best. This power exists; it is society.' [36] 'Inasmuch as cultural customs serve the evident purpose of strengthening the bond between the believer and his God, they in truth at the same time make fast the bonds that tie the individual to the society of which he is a member, as God is only the figurative expression for society.' As the final outcome, so to say, of his work on the elementary forms of religious life represented by the totemic system of the Australians, Durkheim says: 'We have seen that society is the reality which the mythologies have represented under such manifold forms, the objective, general and everlasting cause of the peculiar feelings that constitute religious experience.' Concerning the totem, the investigation of which in particular prompted Durkheim's statement of this identity of the social and the religious, he says: 'It is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality which is borne by everything

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here of completing my account of Durkheim's *méthode sociologique* on this important point of the parallel he draws between society and God.

[35] *Bulletin de la société de philosophie*, 1906, p. 192.

[36] *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, p. 322.

pertaining in any way to the clan : people, animals, things. If then it is at once the symbol of God and of society, are not God and society one and the same ? How could the symbol of the group have become the expression of this so-called deity, if deity and group were two different realities ? The God of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, but hypostatized, and made over to fantasy in the form of perceptual objects such as plants and animals that serve for the totem.'

This, however, as little affords a psychological explanation of the riddle of totemism as it answers the question of what is the common source from which man's religious and social attitudes spring. For the problem of social authority is not solved psychologically by identifying it with religious authority. In this direction also Freud with his psycho-analytic investigation has gone beyond the present results of sociology. For Freud is in no way concerned with the justification of any social authorities whatsoever, but wholly and solely with the explanation of psychic phenomena. He remains—perhaps just on this account—in the domain of individual psychology, and resigns all claims to a mystical metaphysical knowledge of a collective psyche differing from the individual psyche. Like Durkheim, Freud also has studied totemism, and like the former has hit upon the intimate relationships between man's social and religious experience. Only Freud has not contented himself with explaining that God and society are identical. He has exposed the psychic root to which both the religious and the social bond goes back, and this precisely by his endeavour to explain totemism on individual-psychological lines. By taking literally the statements of primitive people—relying upon the similarities he had discovered in the psychic life of savages and neurotics—that the totem was their ancestor and primal father, a statement ' which ethnologists have hitherto not quite known what to make of and which therefore they gladly push into the background ', he recognized that the totem signified the primal father. I have already referred to the hypothesis put forward by Freud in connection with Darwin's that the primitive form of human society was the horde dominated by one powerful male, in which the aggressive jealous father keeps all the females for himself and drives off all the adolescent sons, who then one day join together, kill and devour the father and substitute the clan of brothers in place of the father horde. The father who has been slain and devoured is in repentance elevated to a deity and that which

in his lifetime he actually and practically prevented by force—the sexual intercourse of his sons with the females of the group—is transmuted in the way discovered by psycho-analysis (the so-called ' postponed obedience ') into the content of social and religious norms. The details of this exceptionally brilliant and far-seeing theory can and need not be dealt with individually here. The important thing is the statement that a psychological explanation of social and religious ties, and of all that they comprise, is only forthcoming by tracing them back to a fundamental psychic experience, to the relation of children to their father. Divine and social authority can only be identical because they are both but different forms of the same psychic tie that—psychologically—simply is authority itself, the authority of the father.[37] Precisely because Freud's psychology is utterly unconcerned with establishing norms of social ' duties ' by erecting a supreme ' value ', a highest ' authority ' in this ethico-dogmatic sense (as in Durkheim's deity-society (or society-deity)) but is concerned with an analysis of the *cause* of human conduct—whence his social psychology must necessarily be an individual-psychology —because of this the ' authority ' of the father brought to light by psycho-analysis as a primal matter of actual fact in the human psyche signifies nothing else than a peculiar form of *motivation*, a rule in consequence of which the conduct of one individual is oriented according to the will and nature of another.

Of the results of Freud's investigation into the psychic foundations of social as well as of religious ideology, I would further mention here the following: In his attempt to throw light upon the origins of society and religion, Freud starts out from the researches of the English investigator, Robertson Smith (*The Religion of the Semites*, second edition, London, 1907). The latter assumes that a peculiar ceremony, the so-called totem-feast, the slaying and devouring together of a peculiarly significant animal, the totem-animal, has from the very first constituted an integral part of the totemic system. Later it is a ' sacrifice ' to the deity whom it is to propitiate; originally it signified ' an act of social fellowship between the deity and his

[37] Psycho-analysis maintains this strictly causal explanation also when—as in Freud's *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*—unbiased by any political leanings, the object of its investigation is the psychic mechanism on which the monarchic state depends, the predominance of which in political history would otherwise be incomprehensible.

worshippers'. According to primitive thought, clan fellowship, social unity, is constituted by partaking together of one and the same sacrificial animal. Whosoever partakes counts as a member. 'But why is this binding power ascribed to eating and drinking in common? In the most primitive societies there is only one unconditional and never-failing bond, that of kinship. The members of this kinship stand by each other jointly and severally; a kin is a group of persons whose life is so bound into a physical unity that they can be considered as parts of a common life. . . . Kinship therefore signifies having a part in a common substance. . . . We have heard that in later times this partaking together, the *participation in a common substance* which entered into the body, established a holy bond between the communicants; in earliest times this meaning seemed to be attached only to participation in the substance of a holy sacrifice. The holy mystery of the sacrificial death was justified in that only in this way could the holy bond be established which united the participants with each other and with their god.' [38]

In this connection the passages quoted here have a twofold significance for me. First, in that for primitive thought social *unity*, the association of a number of individuals into a unity, is expressed in the visible and palpable substance of the sacrificial animal (totem-animal) which is eaten in common. And secondly, that social unity —as Durkheim recognized too—is from the outset religious in character; social union comes into existence as if by means of the union with the deity; indeed both unions—as psychic ties—are essentially identical from the very beginning, as is shown by the fact that the sacrificial totem-animal, whose consumption in common constitutes the social bond, is the deity itself. From a position quite different from Freud's, i.e. his psychological interpretation, from the point of view that I described at the beginning of this paper as a legal theory, in contradistinction to a scientific psychological sociology on causal lines, a theory that sees the state as a specific meaning-content and not as a progression of actual human behaviour in some way regulated, as an ideology in its specific autonomy, a system of norms and indeed of legal norms, a legal code, I have reached conclusions strikingly parallel with these results of social-psychological investigation, results that enable the problem to be elucidated from a totally different side.

[38] Freud: *Totem and Taboo.* English translation by A. A. Brill, 1919, p. 222 foll.

The central problem of the legal theory as applied to the state, not only of this so-called legal doctrine of the state but of all politics in general (of which the legal doctrine of the state by its derivation constitutes only one, even if the most important and significant, part), is the problem of the relationship between the state and the law. Although politics is actually one of the oldest disciplines, perhaps indeed the oldest science of all—for some reflection about the state must have preceded even the earliest mythological-religious nature-knowledge, since the king (father) who controlled men by the ordinances of the law was evidently the prototype for the deity who controlled nature, and the legal code was the prototype for the law of nature—nevertheless in scientific literature the fundamental problem of politics is in a most lamentable way. Not only do the various writers adduce wholly contradictory and irreconcilable views about the relations of the state and the law, some considering that the law logically and chronologically presupposes the state, others that the state presupposes, indeed creates, the law; but both these views, woven into the most suspicious contradictions, occur as a rule in the work of one and the same author. This is all the more remarkable since, both with the state and the law, one would seem to be dealing with everyday phenomena with which every one is conversant. A critical analysis of the scientific descriptions hitherto given reveals that the utterly insoluble problem of the theory of the state and the law—as so often happens in the history of science—is only apparently a problem. Actually there is only one object, where theory has endeavoured to define and differentiate two and their relationships. The state as a code of human conduct is precisely identical with the compelling code which is understood as the law or legal code. In so far, however, as the state is considered not in the category of regulation, not as an abstract system of norms of human conduct, but metaphorically as a trafficking active personality —in which sense the word 'state' is used in most instances—the term only signifies a simplifying personification of the legal code which constitutes the social community, which forms the unity of a multiplicity of human conducts. By hypostatizing this personification—a typical error of thought exposed especially by Vaihinger's 'As-If' philosophy—the single object of knowledge, i.e. the compulsory regulation of human conduct, is doubled, and the insoluble pseudo-problem evoked of the relationship of two objects where only the identity of one and the same abstract object is at issue,

and the latter is contrasted with its personification, erroneously considered to be real, though evolved merely as a makeshift for purposes of illustration and simplification (abbreviation). The technique of this hypostatization, with its duplication of the object of knowledge and its train of pseudo-problems, is absolutely the same as that at work in the mythological conception of nature that imagined a dryad in every tree, a god of the spring in every well, Luna in the moon and Apollo in the sun. From the point of view of the critique of knowledge, the mythological method (which in fact by virtue of our substantivistic speech—as Fritz Mauthner recognized and called it—has deeply penetrated all science, but particularly the sciences of the mind) appears as the tendency (which, because it is mistaken, must be overcome) to misinterpret *relationships* that are and can only be determined by recognition as solid *things*, to misinterpret function as substance. If it can be shown that the state as conceived by politics and differentiated in contrast to the law, ' behind ' the law, as the ' bearer ' of the law, is just as much a duplicating ' substance ' productive of pseudo-problems like the ' soul ' in psychology or ' force ' in physics, then there will be a politics without a state, just as to-day there is already a psychology without a ' soul ' and without all the pseudo-problems with which rational psychology tormented itself (immortality, for instance, a specific substance problem) and just as there already is a physics without ' forces '. Psychologically of course —and only psychologically—this propensity for personification and hypostatizing, this tendency for substantializing, is comprehensible. And precisely from this point of view it seems merely a difference of degree if natural science presupposes ' forces ' behind phenomena where primitives still imagine gods. In principle therefore it is the same thing when for primitive totemistic thought social unity, the combining of a multitude of individuals into a unity, can only be expressed in the visible and palpable substance of the sacrificial (totem) animal devoured in common, and when modern politics and law can only conceive of this abstract social code, this system of legal and compelling norms, the unity that is to say of the limiting social community (and the community consists solely in this code), as something of the nature of a substance, as a ' real ', entirely anthropomorphically constructed ' person ', without becoming aware of the peculiar character of this idea as merely a makeshift for thought, especially when it is observed how strong the tendency is to elevate this ' person ' somehow into a visible and tangible some-

thing, into a supra-biological creature. If modern politics is primitive in this respect, the totemic system is just the politics of primitives.

As a conception of substance like ' force ' and ' soul ', as a personifying fiction, the idea of the state forms a parallel to the idea of God. The agreement in the logical structure of both ideas is really amazing, especially when one considers the far-reaching analogy that exists between theological and political problems and their solutions. This analogy struck me particularly in the conceptions presented in the newer literature of the relationship between the state and the law. The meta-legal state, transcending the law, which is truly nothing else than the hypostatized personification, the unity—postulated as real—of the state, corresponds to a hair with the supernatural deity transcending nature, who is nothing else than the grandiose anthropomorphic personification of the unity of nature itself. Just as theology ultimately endeavours to overcome this dualism of its own creating by putting the problem—according to its own assumptions insoluble —of the unity-relationship of the metaphysical deity upon nature, and that of extra-divine nature upon God, so also politics and legal science are compelled to refer the meta-legal state to the law and extra-state law to the state. Theology—not only Christian—attempts to solve its problems by means of mysticism ; by man becoming God the supra-mundane God comes to the world, becomes its representative to man. The solution attempted by both politics and legal science is the same. It is the theory of so-called self-obligation or self-limitation of the state, in consequence of which the supra-legal state, being personified, submits herself voluntarily to her own legal code, that is to say to the legal code she has herself created, and from an extra-legal power the state becomes a legal being, simply the law. This theory has always been accused of having something of a ' mystical ' character, because it contradicts its own assumptions concerning politics and legal science and endeavours to account for the incomprehensible fact that two different beings are one. But so far it has not been observed that theology adduces the mystery of God's becoming man precisely from the point of view of the ' self-limitation ' of God. The correspondence between theology and politics, however, goes much further still ; the problem of theodocy tallies exactly with the problem of ' state injustice,' so-called. Religious speculation, especially mystical speculation, about the relations between God and the individual—the universal and the individual

soul—has on the whole achieved nothing more than the political theory of universalism and individualism has concerning the relation between the state (community) and the individual. Indeed even the theological doctrine of the miracles has its analogies in the theory of government, as I have shown in detail.[39]

Thus the connection between matters religious and social indicated by social psychology is confirmed from the point of view of the critique of knowledge. From this point of view, therefore, the state is shown as a deity-idea because it rests on a dualistic system characteristic of the theological method, that is to say because it was evoked as an hypostatization of the unity of the legal code, in contrast to this and as a transcendental being, in the same way as God, as a personification of nature, was evolved as a figure transcending the latter. From the point of view of a critique of knowledge it is particularly important to overthrow the theological method in the mental sciences, and especially in the social sciences—to wipe out the dualistic system. And Freud's psychological analysis has rendered an inestimable preparatory service precisely in this direction, by most effectually resolving into their individual psychological elements the hypostatizations of God, society and the state, equipped as they are with all the magic of their centuries-old terminology.

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[39] Compare my essay: *Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff*, 1922, p. 219 et seq.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MASCULINITY COMPLEX IN WOMEN [1]

BY

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In his essay on 'Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analysis,' Freud writes: [2]

'As we learn from our psycho-analytic work all women feel that they have been injured in their infancy, and that through no fault of their own they have been slighted and robbed of a part of their body; and the bitterness of many a daughter towards her mother has as its ultimate cause the reproach that the mother has brought her into the world as a woman instead of a man.' These lines came to my notice at the very moment when my attention had been directed in a small sequence of cases to a particular form of reaction to the complex referred to, and when I believed that in one case I also had determined some of the conditions of its origin. In the following paper I will give an account of my conclusions.

The type of reaction with which we are concerned is, in common with the castration complex in women, founded on a belief in the possibility of possessing a male genital organ. The chief difference between the two lies in the fact that a consciousness of guilt belongs to the castration complex. The loss, the damage, or the faulty development of the genital organ is supposed to be the result of wrong-doing, often punishment for a sexual lapse. The feeling of guilt is absent in the cases of which I shall speak here—not always, of course, completely, but the feeling of having been ill-treated and the consequent reaction of bitterness is in all very strongly developed. In view of this second group of cases, in which the protest (which seeks to make up for the want) is predominant, I propose to introduce the term masculinity complex.

[1] From a paper delivered before the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society, June 23, 1917.

[2] *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften.* Vierte Folge.

The origin of the masculinity complex is, of course, to be traced to the sight of a male organ, belonging either to the father or the brother, or some other man ; and in the history of most women patients, and without exception in those with a strongly-marked masculinity complex, there is found the memory of such an observation and of the comparison of the patient's own body with that of a man. In one of the cases I have analysed, the patient, D., tells me quite clearly that the wish to be a boy developed from the desire to be able to urinate like a boy, after she once saw a boy perform this act. This incident has determined till to-day the manner of her sexual satisfaction through masturbation. Another patient, H., was able to observe her father and uncle, who were not ashamed to urinate before her.

Yet the question arises, by what instincts the phantasy of masculinity is nourished, and how it is that the phantasy, in spite of later experience and information, not only continues to exist but even causes women frequently to behave as though they possessed male genitals. A patient, P., tells me that for some time past in urinating she has given up a sitting for a standing position, nominally because her hip-joints have become too stiff. She also sits down as though she had to guard against crushing her genitals, as if they were male organs.

Recollection of the masculinity complex does not always exist in consciousness, at any rate in the primitive form of a belief in the possession of a male genital. Often the recollection only becomes conscious during discussion of the so-called masculine attitude. But in every case it requires close study to establish that the complex is still effective in its original form in spite of repression or experience.

The small sequence of cases which first turned my attention to the complex consists of five patients, who were suffering from psychasthenia with obsessions, otherwise called obsessional neurosis. I have been able to observe four of them for quite a long period ; the fifth, however, gave up the analysis very soon. But this fifth patient came to me for treatment just after I had learnt to take sufficient notice of the phantasy of being a man. All the facts of her case pointed to her as the type sketched by Freud in the lines quoted above ; and I think, therefore, it will be agreed that there can be no misunderstanding about this statement of hers : ' Often when I am restless and don't know what to do with myself I have a feeling that I would like to ask my mother to give me something that she cannot give me.'

The behaviour of one of the four other patients had for a long time

inclined me to think that in her case also the problem was the influence of her unconscious wish to be a man. For instance, her obsessional movements in lying or sitting down are of such a kind as to give one the impression that she has to make the same overtures to the sofa or chair that a cock makes to his hens. Only a short time ago she said to me, ' I feel as though I coquetted with the sofa.'

It might perhaps be not without significance that three of the five patients informed me of their own accord that they possessed ' Hottentot nymphæ ' ; this fact, which they had already noticed very early in their lives, led them to the conviction that they were different from other women. I did not find to any great extent in any of these cases what is called a masculine disposition ; nor indeed a masculine appearance and expression, a contempt for men, or a predilection for masculine activities. I would rather define the attitude present as one of rivalry with men in the intellectual and artistic spheres. A pronounced homosexual component makes no difference to this, as the resulting rivalry in sexual matters expresses itself only in symptoms and symptomatic acts.

Returning to the question put above, we may state that we have already learnt from experience, when the recollection of an observation or of an event is being retained and used as the starting-point for a new phantasy-system (screen-memory), that we then have to do with the return of a repressed wish under fresh distortion. We are tempted to surmise such a return from the unconscious when a girl reacts to the experience of seeing or observing a male genital organ with the violent, embittered thought, ' Why haven't I anything like that ? ' or ' I ought to have had one too ' ; or on the other hand with anxiety and a consciousness of guilt, ' I might have had one too—what a pity that I injured myself to such an extent ' ; or with the expectation, ' It won't be long before I grow one too ' ; or even with the reassurance, ' Yet I do possess one ! ' These are only examples of such a reaction ; there are still a number of another kind, and the form of the bodily symptoms almost always present changes with these reactions. For instance in place of the genital so passionately desired, there is usually felt to be a ' wound ', which is either painful or irritating, according to the manner in which the patient regards the lack of the organ.

Now what are the repressed impulses which, after the trauma of seeing a male organ, can find an outlet in the newly appearing idea of having such an organ ? We may assume that these bear a certain relation or likeness to the content of the masculinity idea. In an

allusive way the patients speak of this themselves, by making vague contrasts—and this often happens—between their masculine traits and their feminine inclinations, also quite well-known to them. Even when they do not mention the thing they seek, the meaning of their expressions is quite clear to the analyst. That is to say, they usually express a wish to take possession of a person, instead of devoting and subjecting themselves to him; or they have the feeling that they wish to penetrate someone else, instead of themselves being penetrated; or they remark that a state of tension would disappear if they could but give out something instead of taking something in. Such expressions are of course used then in a hyperbolical sense; but not seldom associations of this kind afford evidence that they should be taken to a certain extent literally—in fact, it is one of the several ways in which one can discover the masculinity complex in analysis.

At the central point of the childhood-reminiscences of one of my patients, whom I shall call H., and of whose analysis I shall give the most detailed account, there stands the following dream; it dates from about her fourth year when she still slept in her parents' bedroom. She dreamed—it may perhaps be a mere phantasy—that she lay in bed and her mother stood near her. She had a surprisingly pleasant bodily sensation and her mother told her it was quite all right, there was no harm in it. Thereupon she experienced a kind of orgasm and awoke. To her astonishment and horror she found that she had soiled the bed. She called her mother, who came to her assistance without being angry. Since that time the patient has always remained shy, has had anxiety during the night, has suffered to an increasing extent from sleeplessness, and so has gradually developed a neurosis; this neurosis grew very much worse at the age of thirteen, when she lost her mother, and again at nineteen, when she lost her brother; its chief symptom is shyness with men. We may suppose that the sensations which the patient had in her dream were derived from her filled bladder, and that the emptying of it corresponds to the orgasm of the dream. Her feeling of shame and astonishment on waking prove to us that the girl must already have learnt to control the bladder-function. As a contrast there is in the dream a return to an earlier period before she had learned this control, associated with the idea of the methods of teaching her cleanliness: the mother near the bed, who tells her to let it happen, is obviously the mother who makes her use the chamber. Urinating into a chamber has had considerable significance to her; her father also helped her

with this function later, and imitated the noise to her in order to make her urinate. And in addition she had in her early youth heard the sound of her father urinating in the next room.

The patient is very gifted musically and composed music even as a child. It often happened that while she sat on the closet she let a stream of water run from a tap in order to catch a melody from the noise. When she plays at a concert she often feels as though through her playing she were to put an end to the tension which she feels in the public or in an individual listener—sometimes the public is replaced by the composer. If she succeeds in feeling in this way, she plays well. From her associations there appeared an analogy in this with the childhood-situation in which by urinating she produced the noise which her father had either produced for her with his mouth or by urinating in another room ; she transfers this detail, therefore, of her father-complex to the composer : the tension either actually felt or unconsciously existing in herself is projected into the audience or again into the composer. In addition her father has always encouraged her musical ambitions, with the result that the patient has identified herself with him in the musical sphere and has regarded herself as the instrument of his will. One very primitive expression of this identification is the idea of being her father's genital organ.[3] One has only to remember her attitude at concerts, which I have just mentioned ; she is to be the organ which provides relief for the tension she feels in the audience. The association of music with urination led to this phantasy. Moreover, she has already inferred a connection between the symptom of congestion (due to the pressure from constipation) and the reddened glans penis she had seen in her brother's genitals, and had interpreted her convulsions of weeping as ejaculations. The sobbing and sighing which accompanies such a convulsion reminded her of what she used to hear in her parents' bedroom.

In this connection the following fact is also of importance. The patient was awaiting her last examination at the Conservatoire and had considerable anxiety about it. A vision, as she calls it, came to her rescue in her need : someone standing near her bed speaks to her during the night about her attitude to music and to her examination ; she is to forget herself and to surrender herself entirely to the intentions of the composer, and give herself free rein. After the vision she fell into a state of exaltation, slept no more, but played very well at her

[3] This phantasy connects with infantile birth-theories.

examination. The agreement of this vision with the dream in childhood must of course occur to everyone ; the identification with her father to which I have alluded above was also in operation in this experience.

It is natural to conclude that *hearing* has played a large part in the development of this interest in little H. We have already mentioned the fact that she listened when anyone passed water in the room, or in the next room. The patient suffered quite early from sleeplessness. At night she always felt obliged to listen, either to the music that was going on in the house, or lest burglars were in the room, or to hear what her parents were saying on the other side of the wall against which her own bed stood. This habit of listening had begun when she ceased to sleep in her parents' room. I cannot prove that she had observed, or tried to observe, parental coitus on one or more occasions, but from what has been said above it is obvious that she had been greatly interested in what went on in her parents' bedroom or bed. The reason for her sleeplessness was the tension produced by sexual curiosity.

The patient herself suggested that the childhood-dream might be due to her having witnessed parental coitus and that she probably identified herself with her father. It is a fact that many associations pointed to a possibility of this sort, but no recollection of it has come into consciousness. We know that children sometimes imagine that the man passes urine into the woman ; it would be in agreement with this idea if we looked upon this dream as a homosexual coitus dream. Of course the material used to represent the fulfilment of the desire to perform coitus with the mother (or rather, to do with her what the patient thought her father did) is taken from an earlier period.

A whole series of recollections bear witness to infantile intimacy with the mother, and particularly to occasions when they went to the closet together and her mother passed urine as well as she herself. We may assume that the child's wish to see what her mother looked like and how she did this was a preliminary phase of the later curiosity. Sometimes, too, little H. had difficulty in defecation ; she suffered from constipation, and she clearly remembered that when she strained very hard her mother told her not to do so. When straining in this way she had a curious sensation in her head, a kind of giddiness, which recurred later accompanying her shyness. Here, the infantile situation in the closet has been transferred to later situations when she has been overcome by shyness. By means of displacement from

below upwards, into which I do not wish to enter here, the mouth has become an anus and that which proceeds from the mouth, namely speech, is fæces and flatus. For instance, in talking to anyone, she is compelled to notice whether any odour proceeds from that particular person's mouth. In the same way there has been a transference of details connected with the bladder-function, and to this is to be traced the struggle with fits of crying which is another of the symptoms connected with shyness.

Quite suddenly these intimate relations with her mother were stopped ; she was no longer allowed to go to the closet with her, and so on. Suddenly, too, her relations with her father in these matters were forcibly interrupted. She was already suffering from sleeplessness, probably at the beginning of her fifth year, and she had formed a habit of calling her parents, whereupon she was helped on to the chamber. One night she called more than once and her father came in angrily and gave the unsuspecting child a box on the ear. She was much embittered by this and vowed to herself that she would never call out again. In order to attract her parents' attention, or possibly to disturb them, she then bethought her of the plan of shaking her bed.

It is quite likely that being suddenly forced to give up her infantile pleasure for which no substitute was provided may have had a traumatic effect and have produced an embittered frame of mind, which might have been avoided if the parents had gone about her training in a less abrupt manner. We find something similar if we leave this period of the patient's life and observe her in the following period when she was in the infants' school and the first class of a preparatory school. She was compelled to go to school, and once more, at least so she thinks, the order was given quite unexpectedly. On one fateful day she was restless and lay down on a table and rolled about on it, without any definite idea of what she wanted. Thereupon she was suddenly told : ' Now you will have to go to school.' She has always felt this conduct on the part of her mother as a great injustice and it left its traces of resentment and anxiety—anxiety due to an uncertainty of what unpleasant thing might happen next because of something she quite innocently did or said. It was as if something had been taken from her, which she herself could not put into any definite words. But from that day on she inwardly resisted the rules made by those who brought her up, even though she seemed to submit and obey them. Her mental picture of the infants' school is linked

up with the recollection of several forbidden things, two of which I will mention. Her mother forbade her to go to the closet at school, but she once did so all the same, out of curiosity. Moreover, she has never quite lost her curiosity in relation to the functions of the bladder and bowel or her interest in excrement, which is in agreement with what has been said above. Secondly, when sitting on the form she played with her genitals and then, afraid lest the smell on her hand should be detected, she licked her fingers till no smell could be noticed. It is a remarkable thing that the patient cannot say whether she had masturbated before that as well. Analysis has not been able to decide this point either. But it is quite possible that the childhood-dream indicates the beginning, the first perception, of clitoris sensations, For the feeling of gratification was, as the patient expressly said, hitherto unknown to her, and after this experience she felt different from what she was before, as though she possessed something special, a kind of secret, which from that time on made her different from other people. In general, a connection between the function of the bladder and that of the clitoris is established very early; probably this is partly due to the anatomical condition. Freud in one of his writings emphasizes the connection between strongly developed urethral erotism and ambition. Certainly my patient was ambitious in every direction; her ambition was fostered, moreover, by her father's expectations based on her musical talent, and it culminated in a phantasy which I do not wish to go into in detail here: the so-called 'hospital phantasy' in which she figured to some extent as a healer but treated people with extraordinarily cruel remedies. In the same way her ambition was fed by rivalry with a sister a year older than herself but less talented. She succeeded too in apparently excelling her in almost every respect, but on the other hand there were various relations, especially that with her father, in which she was inhibited, constrained and shy. In later years impulses of rivalry caused her to attach herself rather to her brother, who was some years her junior—at first as his school-fellow, and afterwards, when their mother died, with a mother's devotion.

She often heard it said that, before she was born, her parents wanted a boy and that they were somewhat disappointed when another girl was born. She noticed too how proud they were of their son. Here again was an injustice which she never forgot. She could not say whether at that time the thought already occurred to her—at any rate it was a familiar thought—that she too might have been a

boy if only she had been born rather later. She regarded herself as having been born too soon. The same bitterness was displayed in her analysis in a striking way when, for certain reasons, I fixed a time for the treatment to end—I too, then, was making her go before she was ready. I think that the idea of being born too early is somehow connected with the experience, several times undergone by the patient, that something was ordered or forbidden, some renunciation imposed upon her or the fulfilment of a duty required of her, before she had enjoyed the infantile modes of gratification long enough. Here of course there may also be the wish to retain a form of gratification as long as possible, an attitude originating in strongly developed anal erotism.

The patient observed the male genital principally in her brother, but also in her father and an uncle, with whom many years later she fell in love; this unfortunate love-affair was the direct cause of her illness growing worse and of treatment being undertaken. In those early days she made comparisons of the male organ with her own genitals, and once more I found in her case too the familiar expectation that an organ would grow out from within. This expectation was supported by the Hottentot nymphæ, which she noticed very early and construed as something peculiar to herself. Her conviction that she was an exception found plenty of evidence in this respect.

The expectation I have just mentioned, that a penis would grow out from within, was also for a time transferred to the intestines. I have several times had the opportunity of observing a similar process in girls who had witnessed coitus in dogs. Phantasies occur too of an auto-erotic coitus in which the rectum stands for the vagina and the fæces for the penis. The discovery of phantasies of this sort has led me to wonder whether the vaginal sensations which should develop later are not derivable from anal feelings. It is not surprising that the patient developed strong homosexual tendencies, for in the first place her intimate relations with her mother and later the identification with her father were a most favourable soil for such tendencies. But, of course, here too gratification was denied her, or else the tendencies always became inhibited by strong negative feelings. Only when her incestuous love for her uncle, at the beginning of her illness, threatened to overwhelm her did she take refuge in a homosexual relation which in a short time resulted in an acute confusional condition.

If we sum up what we know of this patient we may say briefly that here is a case where the idea of being a male, an idea based on identi-

fication with the father or the brother, is the central feature of the picture. The idea of masculinity, so closely bound up with clitoris erotism, finds congenial soil in the repression of the strongly developed bladder and urethral erotism. Owing to the failure to effect a permanent and satisfactory transference to homosexual and heterosexual objects there is regression to the auto-erotic stage of libido-development, principally to that of urethral erotism.

In the other patient, too, the connection between the masculinity complex and urethral erotism is perfectly plain.

The patient D., of whom I have already said that the masculinity complex manifested itself in her in the desire to urinate like a man, either tries to lengthen the urethra, for instance by passing her urine through a tube, or she passes it into vessels not intended for that purpose. Tricks of this sort, occasioned by an already existing sexual tension, then invariably lead to masturbation. This patient has marked homosexual tendencies, which are displayed far more strongly than her heterosexual desires. The latter are confined to innumerable fleeting experiences of being in love—underneath there is a firm fixation to a childish love-relation which continues to exercise a powerful inhibitory influence. Her psychasthenic symptoms are those of obsessive doubt and speculating. These probably originate in a strongly-developed childish curiosity, which in this particular case culminated in the question : ' How do men do it ? ' i.e. how does he (the father) perform the act of defecation ? The patient is the only daughter of an elderly couple ; her father died when she was about sixteen. At one time she had turned from him and had thoughts of hatred and death-wishes against him ; after his death she reproached herself for feeling it to be a deliverance rather than a loss, and was troubled with doubts whether her thoughts could have caused him to die. Later she also developed negative feelings towards her mother, and asked herself whether she were to blame for her mother's illness, a kind of arthritis deformans. We understand the meaning of such wishes, especially when we know further that the patient had to help her mother in everything because the latter could hardly move at all. The attachment to the incestuous homosexual object was thus not threatened by prohibitions from without, and this gave ample scope for a large amount of infantile libido to come into action. The patient never sucked, either at the breast or from a bottle ; she always drank her milk from a cup or a spoon. She herself now uses this fact as a pretext for regarding herself as an exception.

I mentioned a third patient, P., as an example of a woman who behaves as though she were a man, or at least as though she had a male genital. In this case I have not been able to prove the connection with urethral erotism so clearly as in the other. But this is not very surprising, for the patient in question is somewhat older. In any case I could not prove that there was any other form of infantile auto-erotic sexual activity corresponding to the extreme development of the masculinity complex, and there was not much difficulty in discovering the connection with the earlier masturbation which was generally accompanied by homosexual phantasies of an incestuous sadistic-masochistic type. In this case, however, the masculinity complex had long been conscious. As a child the patient used to enjoy making bread or dough into figures shaped like a phallus and recognized them as such. As late as her tenth or twelfth year she used to play a kind of shadow-game with her sisters, and used to like to make her own shadow project in the region of the genitals. Her principal symptoms represented the fulfilment of the wish to have a male organ, and were accompanied by a feeling of envy of men for their possession of it, and by an attitude to women which must be regarded as an over-compensation for her embitterment against her mother for withholding it from her.

I feel as if I had not really succeeded in making it clear how strong an impression I have received in my analytic work of the intimate connection between the masculinity complex, infantile masturbation of the clitoris and urethral erotism. I have said to myself that the observations which I happened to make all at one time might be merely accidental findings. Nevertheless I decided to publish them, because I am convinced that publication of the result of any careful observations may be of some value.

ON THE GENESIS OF THE CASTRATION COMPLEX IN WOMEN [1]

BY

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Whilst our knowledge of the forms which the castration complex may assume in women has become more and more comprehensive,[2] our insight into the nature of the complex as a whole has made no corresponding advance. The very abundance of the material collected which is now familiar to us brings to our minds more strongly than ever the remarkable character of the whole phenomenon, so that the phenomenon in itself becomes a problem. A survey of the forms assumed by the castration complex in women that have hitherto been observed and of the inferences tacitly drawn from them shows that, so far, the prevailing conception is based on a certain fundamental notion which may be briefly formulated as follows (I quote in part *verbatim* from Abraham's work on the subject) : Many females, both children and adults, suffer either temporarily or permanently from the fact of their sex. The manifestations in the mental life of women which spring from the objection to being a woman are traceable to their coveting a penis when they were little girls. The unwelcome idea of being fundamentally lacking in this respect gives rise to passive castration phantasies, while active phantasies spring from a revengeful attitude against the favoured male.

In this formulation we have it assumed as an axiomatic fact that females feel at a disadvantage in this respect of their genital organs, without this being regarded as constituting a problem in itself—possibly because to masculine narcissism this has seemed too self-evident to need explanation. Nevertheless, the conclusion so far

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[1] Paper delivered at the Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Berlin, Sept. 1922.

[2] Cf. in particular Abraham, ' Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex ' (1921), INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. III, p. 1.

drawn from the investigations—amounting as it does to an assertion that one-half of the human race is discontented with the sex assigned to it and can overcome this discontent only in favourable circumstances—is decidedly unsatisfying, not only to feminine narcissism but also to biological science. The question arises, therefore: Is it really the case that the forms of the castration complex met with in women, pregnant with consequences as they are, not only for the development of neurosis but also for the character-formation and destiny of women who for all practical purposes are normal, are based solely on a dissatisfaction with the fact of womanhood—a dissatisfaction due to her coveting a penis? Or is this possibly but a pretext (at any rate, for the most part) put forward by other forces, the dynamic power of which we know already from our study of the formation of neurosis?

I think that this problem can be attacked from several sides. Here I merely wish to put forward from the purely ontogenetic standpoint, in the hope that they may contribute to a solution, certain considerations which have gradually forced themselves upon me in the course of a practice extending over many years, amongst patients the great majority of whom were women and in whom on the whole the castration complex was very marked.

According to the prevailing conception the castration complex in females is entirely centred in the 'penis-envy' complex; in fact the term 'masculinity-complex' is used as practically synonymous. The first question which then presents itself is: How is it that we can observe this penis-envy occurring as an almost invariable typical phenomenon, even when the subject has not a masculine way of life, where there is no favoured brother to make envy of this sort comprehensible and where no 'accidental disasters'[3] in the woman's experience have caused the masculine rôle to seem the more desirable?

The important point here seems to be the fact of raising the question; once it has been put answers suggest themselves almost spontaneously from the material with which we are sufficiently familiar. For supposing we take as our starting-point the form in which 'penis-envy' probably most frequently directly manifests itself, namely, in the desire to urinate like a man, a critical sifting of the material soon shows that this desire is made up of three component

[3] Cf. Freud, 'Tabu der Virginität', *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Vierte Folge.

parts, of which sometimes one and sometimes another is the more important.

The part about which I can speak most briefly is that of *urethral erotism* itself, for sufficient stress has already been laid on this factor, being as it is the most obvious one. If we want to appraise in all its intensity the envy springing from this source we must above all make ourselves realize the narcissistic overestimation [4] in which the excretory processes are held by children. Phantasies of omnipotence, especially such as are of a sadistic character, are as a matter of fact more easily associated with the jet of urine passed by the male. As an instance of this idea—and it is only one instance amongst many—I can quote something I was told of a class in a boys' school: when two boys, they said, urinate to make a cross the person of whom they think at the moment will die.

Now even though it is certain that a strong feeling of being at a disadvantage must arise in little girls in connection with urethral erotism, yet it is exaggerating the part played by this factor if, as has hitherto been done in many quarters, we straightway attribute to it every symptom and every phantasy of which the content is the desire to urinate like a man. On the contrary, the motive force which originates and maintains this wish is often to be found in quite other instinct-components—above all in active and passive scoptophilia. This connection is due to the circumstance that it is just in the act of urinating that a boy can display his genital and look at himself and is even permitted to do so, and that he can thus in a certain sense satisfy his sexual curiosity, at least as far as his own body is concerned, every time he passes urine.

This factor, which is rooted in the scoptophilic instinct, was particularly evident in a patient of mine in whom the desire to urinate like a male dominated the whole clinical picture for a time. During this period she seldom came to the analysis without declaring that she had seen a man urinating in the street, and once she exclaimed quite spontaneously: 'If I might ask a gift of Providence it would be to be able just for once to urinate like a man.' Her associations completed this thought beyond all possibility of doubt: 'For then I should know how I really am made.' The fact that men can see themselves when urinating, while women cannot, was in this patient,

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[4] Cf. Abraham, 'Zur narzisstischen Überwertung der Excretionsvorgänge in Traum und Neurose', *Internationale Zeitschrift*, 1920.

whose development was to a great extent arrested at a pregenital stage, actually one of the principal roots of her very marked ' penis-envy.'

Just as woman, because her genital organs are hidden, is ever the great riddle for man, so man is an object of lively jealousy for woman precisely on account of the ready visibility of his organ.

The close connection between urethral erotism and the scoptophilic instinct was obvious in yet another patient, a woman whom I will call Y. She practised masturbation in a very peculiar way which stood for urinating like her father. In the obsessional neurosis from which this patient suffered, the chief agent was the scoptophilic instinct ; she had the most acute feelings of anxiety consequent on the idea of being seen by others whilst thus practising masturbation. She was therefore giving expression to the far-back wish of the little girl : I wish I had a genital too, which I could show, like father, every time I pass urine.

I think, moreover, that this factor plays a leading part in every case of exaggerated embarrassment and prudery in girls, and I further conjecture that the difference in the dress of men and women, at least in our civilized races, may be traced to this very circumstance that the girl cannot exhibit her genital organs and that therefore in respect of her exhibitionistic tendencies she regresses to a stage at which this desire to display herself still applied to her whole body. This puts us on the track of the reason of why a woman wears a low neck, while a man wears a dress-coat. I think too that this connection explains to some extent the criterion which is always mentioned first when the points of difference between men and women are under discussion—namely, the greater subjectivity of women as compared with the greater objectivity of men. The explanation would be that the man's impulse to investigate finds satisfaction in the examination of his own body and may, or must, subsequently be directed to external objects ; while the woman, on the other hand, can arrive at no clear knowledge about her own person, and therefore finds it far harder to become free of herself.

Finally, the wish which I have assumed to be the prototype of ' penis-envy ' has in it a third element, namely, suppressed onanistic wishes, as a rule deeply hidden but none the less important on that account. This element may be traced to a connection of ideas (mostly unconscious) by which the fact that boys are permitted to take hold of their genital when urinating is construed as a permission to masturbate.

Thus a patient who had witnessed a father reproving his little daughter for touching that part of her body with her tiny hands said to me quite indignantly: 'He forbids her to do that and yet does it himself five or six times a day.' You will easily recognize the same connection of ideas in the case of the patient Y., in whom the male way of urinating became the decisive factor in the form of masturbation that she practised. Moreover, in this case it became clear that she could not become completely free from the compulsion to masturbate so long as she unconsciously maintained the claim that she should be a man. The conclusion I drew from my observation of this case is, I think, quite a typical one: girls have a very special difficulty in overcoming masturbation because they feel that they are unjustly forbidden something which boys are allowed to do on account of their different bodily formation. Or, in terms of the problem before us, we may put it in another way and say that the difference in bodily formation may easily give rise to a bitter feeling of injury, so that the argument which is used later to account for the repudiation of womanhood, namely, that men have greater freedom in their sexual life, is really based upon actual experiences to that effect in early childhood. Van Ophuijsen at the conclusion of his work on the masculinity-complex in women lays stress on the strong impression he received in analysis of the existence of an intimate connection between the masculinity-complex, infantile masturbation of the clitoris and urethral erotism. The connecting link would probably be found in the considerations I have just put before you.

These considerations, which constitute the answer to our initial question about the reason why 'penis-envy' is of typical occurrence, may be summarized shortly as follows: The little girl's sense of inferiority is (as Abraham has also pointed out in one passage) by no means primary. But it seems to her that, in comparison with boys, she is subject to restrictions as regards the possibility of gratifying certain instinct-components which are of the greatest importance in the pregenital period. Indeed, I think I should put the matter even more accurately if I said that *as an actual fact*, from the point of view of a child at this stage of development, little girls *are* at a disadvantage compared with boys in respect of certain possibilities of gratification. For unless we are quite clear about the *reality* of this disadvantage we shall not understand that 'penis-envy' is an almost inevitable phenomenon in the life of female children, and one which cannot but complicate female development. The fact that

later when she reaches maturity a great part in sexual life (as regards creative power perhaps even a greater part than that of men) devolves upon a woman—I mean when she becomes a mother—cannot be any compensation to the little girl at this early stage, for it still lies outside her potentialities of direct gratification.

I shall here break off this line of thought, for I now come to the second, more comprehensive, problem: Does the complex we are discussing really rest on ' penis-envy ' and is the latter to be regarded as the ultimate force behind it ?

Taking this question as our starting-point, we have to consider what factors determine whether the penis-complex is more or less successfully overcome or whether it becomes regressively reinforced so that fixation occurs. A consideration of these possibilities compels us to examine more closely *the form of object-libido* in such cases. We then find that the girls and women whose desire to be men is often so glaringly evident have at the very outset of life passed through a phase of extremely strong father-fixation. In other words: They tried first of all to master the Œdipus complex in the normal way by retaining their original identification with the mother and, like the mother, taking the father as love-object.

We know that at this stage there are two possible ways in which a girl may overcome the ' penis-envy ' complex without detriment to herself. She may pass from the auto-erotic narcissistic desire for the penis to the woman's desire for the man (= the father), precisely in virtue of her identification of herself with her mother; or to the material desire for a child (by the father). With regard to the subsequent love-life of healthy as well as abnormal women it is illuminating to reflect that (even in the most favourable instances) the origin, or at any rate one origin, of either attitude was narcissistic in character and of the nature of a desire for possession.

Now in the cases under consideration it is evident that this womanly and maternal development has taken place to a very marked degree. Thus in the patient Y., whose neurosis, like all those which I shall cite here, bore throughout the stamp of the castration complex, many phantasies of rape occurred which were indicative of this phase. The men whom she thought of as committing rape upon her were one and all unmistakably father-imagines; hence these phantasies had necessarily to be construed as the compulsive repetition of a primal phantasy in which the patient, who till late in life felt herself one with her mother, had experienced with her the father's act of complete

sexual appropriation. It is noteworthy that this patient, who in other respects was perfectly clear in her mind, was at the beginning of the analysis strongly inclined to regard these phantasies of rape as actual fact.

Other cases also manifest—in another form—a similar clinging to the fiction that this primal feminine phantasy is real. From another patient, whom I will call X., I heard innumerable remarks constituting direct proof of how very real this love-relation with the father had seemed to her. Once, for instance, she recollected how her father had sung a love-song to her, and with the recollection there broke from her a cry of disillusion and despair: 'And yet it was all a lie!' The same thought was expressed in one of her symptoms which I should like to cite here as typical of a whole similar group: at times she was under a compulsion to eat quantities of salt. Her mother had been obliged to eat salt on account of hæmorrhages of the lungs, which had occurred in the patient's early childhood; she had unconsciously construed them as the result of her parents' intercourse. This symptom therefore stood for her unconscious claim to have suffered the same experience from her father as her mother had undergone. It was the same claim that made her regard herself as a prostitute (actually she was a virgin) and that made her feel a compelling need to make a confession of some kind to any new love-object.

The numerous unmistakable observations of this kind show us how important it is to realize that at this early stage—as an ontogenetic repetition of a phylogenetic experience—the child constructs, on the basis of a (hostile or loving) identification with its mother, a phantasy that it has suffered full sexual appropriation by the father; and further, that in phantasy this experience presents itself as having actually taken place—as much a fact as it must have been at that distant time when all women were primarily the property of the father.

We know that the natural fate of this love-phantasy is a denial of it by reality. In cases which are subsequently dominated by the castration complex this frustration often changes into a profound *disappointment*, deep traces of which remain in the neurosis. Thus there arises a more or less extensive disturbance in the development of the sense of reality. One often receives the impression that the emotional intensity of this attachment to the father is too strong to admit of a recognition of the essential unreality of the relation; in other cases again it seems as though from the outset there had

been an excessive power of phantasy, making it difficult to grasp actuality correctly; finally the real relations with the parents are often so unhappy as to account for a clinging to phantasy.

These patients feel as if their fathers had actually once been their lovers and had afterwards been false to them or deserted them. Sometimes this again is the starting-point of doubt: Did I only imagine the whole thing, or was it true? In a patient whom I will call Z., of whom I shall have to speak in a moment, this doubting attitude betrayed itself in a repetition-compulsion which took the form of anxiety whenever a man appeared attracted to her, lest she might only be imagining this liking on his part. Even when she was actually engaged to be married she had to be constantly reassuring herself that she had not simply imagined the whole thing. In a day-dream she pictured herself as assailed by a man whom she knocked down with a blow on the nose, treading upon his penis with her foot. Continuing the phantasy, she wished to give him in charge but refrained because she was afraid he might declare she had imagined the scene. When speaking of the patient Y., I mentioned the doubt she felt as to the actuality of her phantasies of rape, and that this doubt had reference to the original experience with the father. In her it was possible to trace out the way in which the doubt from this source extended to every occurrence in her life and so actually became the basis of her obsessional neurosis. In her case, as in many others, the course of the analysis made it probable that this origin of the doubt had deeper roots than that uncertainty, with which we are familiar, about the subject's own sex.[5]

In the patient X., who used to revel in numerous recollections of that earliest period of her life which she called her childhood's paradise, this disappointment was closely connected in her memory with an unjust punishment inflicted on her by her father when she was five or six years old. It transpired that at this time a sister had been born and that she had felt herself supplanted by this sister in her father's affections. As deeper strata were revealed it became clear that behind the jealousy of her sister there lay a furious jealousy of her mother which related in the first instance to her mother's many pregnancies. 'Mother *always* had the babies', she once said indignantly. More strongly repressed were two further roots (by

[5] Cf. the explanation Freud gives of doubt as doubt of the subject's capacity for love (hate).

no means equally important) of her feeling that her father was faithless to her. The one was sexual jealousy of her mother dating from her witnessing parental coitus at a time when her sense of reality was sufficiently awakened for it to be impossible for her any longer completely to incorporate all that she saw in her phantasy of an experience undergone by herself. It was a mishearing on her part which put me on the track of this last source of her feeling: once as I was speaking of a time '*nach* der Enttäuschung' (after the disappointment), she understood me to say '*Nacht* der Enttäuschung' (the night of the disappointment) and gave the association of Brangäne keeping vigil during Tristan and Isolde's love-night.

A repetition-compulsion in this patient spoke in language no less clear: the typical experience of her love-life was that she first of all fell in love with a father-substitute and then found him faithless. In connection with occurrences of this sort the final root of the complex became plainly evident: I allude to her feelings of guilt. Certainly a great part of these feelings was to be construed as reproaches originally directed against the father and then turned upon herself. But it was possible to trace very clearly the way in which the feelings of guilt, especially those which resulted from strong impulses to do away with her mother (to the patient this identification had the special significance of 'doing away with her' and 'replacing her') had produced in her an expectation of calamity, which of course referred above all to the relation with her father.[6]

I wish especially to emphasize the strong impression I received in this case of the importance of *the desire to have a child* (from the father).[7] My reason for laying stress upon it is that I think we are inclined to underestimate the unconscious power of this wish and in particular its libidinal character, because it is a wish to which the ego can later more easily assent than to many other sexual impulses. Its relation to the 'penis-envy' complex is twofold. On the one hand it is well known that the maternal instinct receives an 'unconscious libidinal reinforcement'[8] from the desire for a penis, a

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[6] [While revising the translation of this paragraph I wrote *competition-repulsion* instead of repetition-compulsion!—TRANS. ED.]

[7] Cf. O. Rank's paper 'Perversion und Neurosis,' published in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV, Part 3.

[8] Cf. Freud, 'Über Triebumsetzungen insbesondere der Analerotik', *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*. Vierte Folge.

desire which comes earlier in point of time because it belongs to the auto-erotic period. Then when the little girl experiences the disappointment described in relation to her father she renounces not only her claim upon him but also the desire for a child. This is regressively succeeded (in accordance with the familiar equation) by ideas belonging to the anal phase and by the old demand for the penis. When this takes place that demand is not simply revived, but is reinforced with all the energy of the girl-child's desire for a child.

I could see this connection particularly clearly in the case of the patient Z., who, after several symptoms of the obsessional neurosis had vanished, retained as the final and most obstinate symptom a lively dread of pregnancy and childbirth. The experience which had determined this symptom proved to be her mother's pregnancy and the birth of a brother when the patient was two years old, while observations of parental coitus, continued after she was no longer an infant, contributed to the same result. For a long time it seemed that this case was singularly well calculated to illustrate the central importance of the 'penis-envy' complex. Her coveting of the penis (her brother's) and her violent anger against him as the intruder who had ousted her from her position of only child, when once revealed by analysis, entered consciousness heavily charged with affect. The envy was, moreover, accompanied by all the manifestations which we are accustomed to trace to it: first and foremost the attitude of revenge against men, with very intense castration phantasies; repudiation of feminine tasks and functions, especially that of pregnancy; and further, a strong unconscious homosexual tendency. It was only when the analysis penetrated into deeper strata under the greatest resistances imaginable that it became evident that the source of the 'penis-envy' was her envy on account of the child which her mother and not she had received from her father, whereupon by a process of displacement the penis had become the object of envy in place of the child. In the same way her vehement anger against her brother proved really to have reference to her father, who she felt had deceived her, and to her mother who, instead of the patient herself, had received the child. Only when this displacement was cancelled did she really become free from 'penis-envy' and from the longing to be a man, and was she able to be a true woman and even to wish to have children herself.

Now what process had taken place? Quite roughly it may be

outlined as follows: (1) the envy relating to the child was displaced to the brother and his genital; (2) there clearly ensued the mechanism discovered by Freud, by which the father as love-object is given up and the object-relation to him is regressively replaced by an identification with him.

The latter process manifested itself in those pretensions to manhood on her part of which I have already spoken. It was easy to prove that her desire to be a man was by no means to be understood in a general sense, but that the real meaning of her claims was to act her father's part. Thus she adopted the same profession as her father, and after his death her attitude to her mother was that of a husband who makes demands upon his wife and issues orders. Once when a noisy eructation escaped her she could not help thinking with satisfaction: 'Just like Papa'. Yet she did not reach the point of a completely homosexual object-choice; the development of the object-libido seemed rather to be altogether disturbed, and the result was an obvious regression to an auto-erotic narcissistic stage. To sum up: displacement of the envy which had reference to children on to the brother and his penis, identification with the father, and regression to a pregenital phase all operated in the same direction—to stir up a powerful 'penis-envy' which then remained in the foreground and seemed to dominate the whole picture.

Now in my opinion this kind of development of the Œdipus complex is typical of those cases in which the castration complex is predominant. What happens is that a phase of identification with the mother gives way to a very large extent to one of identification with the father, and at the same time there is regression to a pregenital stage. This process of identification with the father I believe to be one root of the castration complex in women.

At this point I should like to answer at once two possible objections. One of them might run like this: such an oscillation between father and mother is surely nothing peculiar. On the contrary, it is to be seen in every child, and we know that, according to Freud, the libido of each one of us oscillates throughout life between male and female objects. The second objection relates to the connection with homosexuality, and may be expressed thus: in his paper on the psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman Freud has convinced us that such a development in the direction of identification with the father is one of the bases of manifest homosexuality; yet now I am depicting the same process as resulting in the castra-

tion complex. In answer I would emphasize the fact that it was just this paper of Freud's which helped me to understand the castration complex in women. It is exactly in these cases that, on the one hand, the extent to which the libido normally oscillates is considerably exceeded from a quantitative point of view, whilst, on the other hand, the repression of the love-attitude towards the father and the identification with him are not so completely successful as in cases of homosexuality. And so the similarity in the two courses of development is no argument against its significance for the castration complex in women; on the contrary, this view makes homosexuality much less of an isolated phenomenon.

We know that in every case in which the castration complex predominates there is without exception a more or less marked tendency to homosexuality. To play the father's part always amounts also to desiring the mother in some sense. There may be every possible degree of closeness in the relation between narcissistic regression and homosexual object-cathexis, so that we have an unbroken series culminating in manifest homosexuality.

A third criticism which suggests itself here relates to the temporal and causal connection with 'penis-envy' and runs as follows: Is not the relation of the 'penis-envy' complex to the process of identification with the father just the opposite of that depicted here? May it not be that in order to establish this sort of permanent identification with the father there has first to be an unusually strong 'penis-envy'? I think we cannot fail to recognize that a specially powerful 'penis-envy' (whether it is constitutional or the result of personal experience) does help to prepare the way for the change-over by which the patient identifies herself with the father; nevertheless, the history of the cases I have described, and of other cases as well, shows that notwithstanding the 'penis-envy' a strong and wholly womanly love-relation to the father had been formed, and that it was only when this love was disappointed that the feminine rôle was abandoned. This abandonment and the consequent identification with the father then revives the 'penis-envy', and only when it derives nourishment from such powerful sources as these can that feeling operate in its full strength.

For this revulsion to an identification with the father to take place it is essential that the sense of reality should be at least to some extent awakened; hence it is inevitable that the little girl should no longer be able to content herself, as she formerly did, simply with a

phantasied fulfilment of her desire for the penis, but should now begin to brood upon her lack of that organ or ponder over its possible existence. The trend of these speculations is determined by the girl's whole affective disposition; it is characterized by the following typical attitudes: a feminine love-attachment, not yet wholly subdued, to her father, feelings of vehement anger and of revenge directed against him because of the disappointment suffered through him, and last but not least, feelings of guilt (relating to incestuous phantasies concerning him) which are violently aroused under the pressure of the privation. Thus it is that these broodings invariably have reference to the father.

I saw this very clearly in the patient Y., whom I have already mentioned more than once. I told you that this patient produced phantasies of rape—phantasies which she regarded as fact—and that ultimately these related to her father. She too had reached the point of identifying herself to a very great extent with him; for instance, her attitude to her mother was exactly that of a son. Thus she had dreams in which her father was attacked by a snake or wild beasts, whereupon she rescued him.

Her castration phantasies took the familiar form of imagining that she was not normally made in the genital region, and besides this she had a feeling as though she had suffered some injury to the genitals. On both these points she had evolved many ideas, chiefly to the effect that these peculiarities were the result of acts of rape. Indeed, it became plain that her obstinate insistence upon these sensations and ideas in connection with her genital organs was actually designed to prove the reality of these acts of violence, and so, ultimately, the reality of her love-relation with her father. The clearest light is thrown upon the importance of this phantasy and the strength of the repetition-compulsion under which she laboured, by the fact that before analysis she had insisted on undergoing six laparotomy operations, several of which had been performed simply on account of her pains. In another patient, whose coveting of the penis took an absolutely grotesque form, this feeling of having sustained a wound was displaced on to other organs, so that when her obsessional symptoms had been resolved the clinical picture was markedly hypochondriacal. At this point her resistance took the following form: ' It is obviously absurd for me to be analysed, seeing that my heart, my lungs, my stomach, and my intestines are evidently organically diseased.' Here again the insistence on the

reality of her phantasies was so strong that on one occasion she had almost compelled performance of an intestinal operation. Her associations constantly brought the idea that she had been struck down (*geschlagen*) with illness by her father. As a matter of fact, when these hypochondriacal symptoms cleared up, phantasies of being *struck* (*Schlagephantasien*) became the most prominent feature in her neurosis. It seems to me quite impossible to account satisfactorily for these manifestations simply by the 'penis-envy' complex. But their main features become perfectly clear if we regard them as an effect of the impulse to experience anew after a compulsive fashion the suffering undergone at the hands of the father and to prove to herself the reality of the painful experience.

This array of material might be multiplied indefinitely, but it would only repeatedly go to show that we encounter under totally different guises this basic phantasy of having suffered castration through the love-relation with the father. My observations have led me to believe that this phantasy, whose existence has indeed long been familiar to us in individual cases, is of such typical and fundamental importance that I am inclined to call it the second root of the whole castration complex in women.

The great significance of this combination is that a highly important piece of repressed womanhood is most intimately bound up with the castration phantasies. Or, to look at it from the point of view of succession in time, that it is wounded womanhood which gives rise to the castration complex, and that it is this complex which injures (not *primarily*, however) feminine development.

Here we probably have the most fundamental basis of the revengeful attitude towards men which is so often a prominent feature in women in whom the castration complex is marked; attempts to explain this attitude as resulting from 'penis-envy' and the disappointment of the little girl's expectation that her father would give her the penis as a present, do not satisfactorily account for the mass of facts brought to light by an analysis of deeper strata of the mind. Of course in psycho-analysis the 'penis-envy' is more readily exposed than is the far more deeply repressed phantasy which ascribes the loss of the male genital to a sexual act with the father as partner. That this is so follows from the fact that no feelings of guilt at all are attached to 'penis-envy' in itself.

It is specially frequent for this attitude of revenge against men to be directed with particular vehemence against the man who

performs the act of defloration. The explanation is natural, namely, that it is precisely the father with whom, according to the phantasy, the patient mated for the first time. Hence in the subsequent actual love-life the first mate stands in a quite peculiar way for the father. This idea is expressed in the customs described by Freud in his essay on the taboo of virginity; according to these the performance of the act of defloration is actually entrusted to a father-substitute. To the unconscious mind, defloration is the repetition of the phantasied sexual act performed with the father, and therefore when defloration takes place all those affects which belong to the phantasied act are reproduced—strong feelings of attachment combined with the abhorrence of incest, and finally the attitude described above of revenge on account of disappointed love and of the castration supposedly suffered through this act.

This brings me to the end of my remarks. My problem was the question whether that dissatisfaction with the female sexual rôle which results from ' penis-envy ' is really the alpha and omega of the castration complex in women. We have seen that the anatomical structure of the female genitals is indeed of great significance in the mental development of women. Also, it is indisputable that ' penis-envy ' does essentially condition the *forms* in which the castration complex manifests itself in them. But the deduction that therefore their repudiation of their womanhood is based on that envy seems inadmissible. On the contrary we can see that ' penis-envy ' by no means precludes a deep and wholly womanly love-attachment to the father and that it is only when this relation comes to grief over the Œdipus complex (exactly as in the corresponding male neuroses) that the envy leads to a revulsion from the subject's own sexual rôle.

The male neurotic who identifies himself with the mother and the female who identifies herself with the father repudiate, both in the same way, their respective sexual rôles. And from this point of view the castration fear of the male neurotic (behind which there lurks a castration wish upon which, to my mind, sufficient stress is never laid) corresponds exactly to the female neurotic's desire for the penis. This symmetry would be much more striking were it not that the man's inner attitude towards identification with the mother is diametrically opposed to that of the woman towards identification with the father. And this in two respects: in a man this wish to be a woman is not merely at variance with his conscious

narcissism, but is rejected for a second reason, namely, because the notion of being a woman implies at the same time the realization of all his fears of punishment, centred as they are in the genital region; in a woman, on the other hand, the identification with the father is confirmed by old wishes tending in the same direction, and it does not carry with it any sort of feelings of guilt but rather a sense of acquittal. For there ensues, from the connection I have described as existing between the ideas of castration and the incest-phantasies relating to the father, the fateful result, opposite to that in men, that being a woman is in itself felt to be culpable.

In his papers entitled 'Trauer und Melancholie'[9] (Grief and Melancholia) and 'The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality',[10] and in his *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, Freud has shown more and more fully how largely the process of identification bulks in human mentality. It is just this identification with the parent of the opposite sex which seems to me to be the point from which in either sex both homosexuality and the castration complex are evolved.

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[9] *Sammlung kleiner Schriften.* Vierte Folge.

[10] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. I, p. 125.

THE VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS UNDERGONE BY NARCISSISM IN MEN AND IN WOMEN

BY

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The following paper is based on the main principles laid down by Freud and Ferenczi in their works on this subject, and in it I propose to examine certain transformations to which (primary) narcissism is subject, i.e. the transformations connected with sex differences or with their development. We shall scarcely find relevant material in the period of infantile sexuality, for, as we have learnt from Freud, in that period the differences of sex are of no very decisive importance. More light is thrown on the connections between these differences and the later modifications of narcissism by a study of the second period of sexual ripening, namely, the time of puberty, at which indeed the actual physical differentiation between man and woman manifests itself in its ultimate forms. These alterations, so significant for the mental development of human beings, will be taken as the point of departure for our examination of the problem of ' Narcissism and Sex Differences '.

I

It will be advisable first of all to consider the striking changes which take place in the young maturing woman at the time of puberty. A comparison of the principal lines along which change occurs leads to important assumptions and inferences. The results of analytic research on the subject of the puberty-period in women are summed up by Freud in the following words : ' Puberty, which gives so powerful an impetus to the libido in boys, in girls is marked by a fresh wave of repression, which relates especially to the sexuality associated with the clitoris. The side of their sexual life which then succumbs to repression is the masculine one.' [1] In order rightly to appreciate this concise statement one important change which takes

[1] *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, 5te Auflage, S. 84.

place must be considered particularly. The suppression of clitoris-masturbation (which is very frequently practised up to puberty) may be regarded as one of the chief consequences of this access of repression. As to the mental forces at work in this process, analytic experience goes to show that the final incitement to give up clitoris-masturbation normally comes from a momentous experience, namely, the first onset of menstruation. (In the same way this event often puts an end to object-relations in which clitoral sexuality and its gratification predominate.) As we know, psycho-analysis has so far explained this fact by revealing that to the unconscious of the adolescent girl the first period signifies a flow of blood caused by castration, and has therefore the same effect as a threat of castration. It may be conjectured that the periodical menstrual flow from this time onwards helps to prepare for the change in the leading erotogenic zone, acting as a kind of anticipation of the later flow which occurs on a single occasion, namely, when defloration takes place. Freud has shown the unconscious significance of this latter bleeding [2] and Ferenczi [3] speaks of it as conditioning the transition of the libido from the clitoris to the vagina. For the rest, a passing reference to Freud's classic description of what subsequently becomes of the excitability of the clitoris must suffice to introduce the proper subject of our inquiry.

We begin with the question what sort of distribution of libido follows directly from the wave of repression just described as occurring at puberty in women? First of all let us refer once more to the account given by Freud, who dealt with this subject again in a different connection and arrived at the following important conclusion: 'In the most common, and probably the purest and truest female type, the development at puberty, when the hitherto latent female sex organs mature, seems to be accompanied by an intensification of the original narcissism.' [4] Now let us try to compare these two libidinal situations, separated as they are by the wall built up by the repression supervening at puberty. In the period before puberty the sexual life has a masculine trend, expressed in excitability and masturbation of the clitoris; when puberty is reached there follows a reinforcement of sexual inhibitions, the appearance of the secondary

[2] 'Tabu der Virginität.' *Sammlung kleiner Schriften.* Vierte Folge.

[3] *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, S. 15.

[4] 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.' *Sammlung kleiner Schriften.* Vierte Folge.

sex characteristics, the development of 'beauty', and an intensification of narcissism. The latter condition must not be regarded simply as succeeding the former in time: it is a change enforced by the repression taking place at puberty, a change which yet betrays its origin in the *psychological* and *biological* traits that characterize it.

Before the onset of repression at puberty the little girl virtually possessed a penis; at puberty her 'beauty' develops, accompanied by the appearance of those 'charms' which are destined sexually and æsthetically to excite the desire of men.[5] These charms are now the object of the narcissistic self-love which compensates the woman not only for the social restrictions imposed upon her object-choice (as Freud remarks), but also for the renunciation of her infantile masculinity—the loss of her penis. Thus her physical beauty, and especially the beauty of her face, makes up to her for the lost penis. This view fits in with the assumption that this same narcissistic esteem in which the adolescent girl holds her body as it ripens to maturity had reference, before puberty brought an access of repression, to the genital organ, i.e. to that which was virtually a penis. But this idea simply amounts to an application (let us hope a justifiable application) of an hypothesis which was formulated by Ferenczi in one of his most important works, and which, as will at once be seen, really suggested the trains of thought followed out in this paper. The passage I refer to runs as follows:

'The status of the genitals amongst the erotogenic zones is a quite peculiar one. Since Freud made his discoveries we know that quite early the genital zone assumes the primacy over all the erotogenic zones, with the result that the erotogenic function of all these others is circumscribed in favour of the genital zone. We must add that this primacy is manifested in the fact that every excitation of an erotogenic area immediately affects the genital region sympathetically; so that as a central erotic organ the genitals are related to the other zones as the brain is to the organs of sense. The development of an organ of this sort, which includes in itself all the other erotisms, is probably a precondition of the narcissistic phase of sexuality postulated by Freud. We need have no hesitation in assuming that throughout life the most intimate relations exist between the genitals and the narcissistic ego (Freud); indeed, that the

[5] Cf. Freud's remark on the conception of 'the beautiful'. *Sexualtheorie*, S. 23.

nucleus round which the whole narcissistic ego-formation crystallizes is probably the genitals. We find psychological confirmation of these hypotheses in the widespread identification of the ego with the genitals in dreams, in neurosis, in folk-lore and in wit.' [6]

If we now compare Ferenczi's remarks with our previous conclusions in regard to narcissism in women, it becomes evident that there is a fundamental difference in the form taken by narcissism in the two sexes. The onanism at puberty of the male sex is certainly in most striking contrast to the sexual inhibitions (suppression of onanism) which characterize the puberty-period in the female; the male sex retains the narcissistic estimation of his own penis to a great extent all his life long, whilst the woman, on reaching maturity at puberty, is obliged to renounce this high valuation and instead to prize the beauty of her figure and face. Or, to express the same thing in a formula: in men the genital continues to be the centre of their narcissism, whilst in women there is a secondary narcissism which becomes attached to the body as a whole.

At this point it seems advisable to illustrate my remarks with an example taken from analytic experience. A young hysterical woman (A), who had come for treatment mainly on account of sexual anæsthesia, had in former years taken a lively part in the activities of a certain set of people who cultivated and attached great value to physical beauty and nudity ('The Cult of the Nude'). This had obviously afforded her narcissistic exhibitionism ample opportunities of gratification. I may say that at times she fell back into the onanism of her earlier youth, and that then upon repeated occasions she derived her gratification in a characteristic way. When in the bath she would set up a mirror on the edge of the bath in such a way that she could see her genitals, and in this position she practised masturbation. Thus this woman had indeed developed the typical feminine narcissism, but she had also retained the tendency to regress to the narcissism of childhood which is of the male type and centres in the genitals.

Further, I can cite an interesting observation to show how feelings of guilt on account of onanistic activities in the years preceding puberty may exercise an inhibiting and disturbing influence from the unconscious upon the development of the intensified female narcissism. From the analysis of a girl (B) who also suffered from

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[6] 'Über Pathoneurosen.' *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, S. 11.

hysteria, I learnt that in early adolescence she thought that she, or rather her face, was very ugly. But a photograph which had been taken at that period and which she once brought with her showed the face of a charming, and indeed a beautiful, young girl. She said that she was convinced of her ugliness at that time because of what people said, and particularly, by constant unkind allusions to the freckles on her face. When she told me this I was confirmed in my suspicion that this attitude of hers expressed her self-reproach about the 'ugly' habit of onanism ('stains'—'soiling oneself'—'self-abuse'[7]), a practice which she had really given up at the beginning of puberty. My view of the matter was really based on the change which this attitude had evidently undergone in the course of years. In her analysis she could not complain bitterly enough of the ugliness of her *body*, which she thought hideous and with which she found fault on a hundred different counts. On the other hand, she was generally quite satisfied with the prettiness of her *face*. (Once again she was relying on the opinion of other people.) It was natural to assume here an intimate connection in this with her erotic life, for after certain sexual experiences of a later date she had recently given way again to masturbation. And the same reaction—the idea that she was ugly—occurred again, with the difference that this time this opinion concerned her body only. Possibly this was due to the revival of some former similar repugnance towards her body, but probably it was also connected with the fact that she now practised masturbation not in the region of the clitoris but principally at the vaginal orifice. The conclusion I drew from the whole situation was that there had been a displacement, and that at the time (puberty) when she thought her face so plain she was fascinated by the charms of her body. She confirmed this idea of mine by recalling that at that time she had often contemplated her body, then in the fresh bloom of youth, with interest and satisfaction.

I should like to dwell for a moment on these 'ideas of one's own ugliness,' because they occur in men too (I do not know how common they may be) and the motivation is the same. One patient of mine (C) is a young man suffering from obsessional neurosis with impaired potency. His appearance is quite normal; but he thinks himself too ugly for any girl to love him, and, moreover, even earlier he used to lament his supposed ugliness. For years he has kept up a vigor-

[7] [German: '*Flecken*'—'*Selbstbefleckung*'.]

ous but unsuccessful struggle against his onanistic habits, and long ago now he accepted the well-known widespread belief, or fear, that onanism leaves visible and recognizable traces on the face of anyone who practises it. He has always regarded the penis as something ugly, and even when he had reached adolescence he declared that it was because they had no male organ that women were beautiful. Possibly in this idea of his he had instinctively got hold of a certain truth. His case shows us that men as well as women can develop some amount of *female* narcissism, that is to say, narcissism relating to physical beauty. This is perhaps quite normal, though it occurs in a much less intense degree than in women. From this it follows that a correction in the current theory of male narcissism must be made: in men, too, a partial displacement in the distribution of their narcissism takes place in the manner that in women is typical and paramount. This narcissism is strongly marked in a number of men whose love-life is also frequently characterized by a reversal of the typical relation between man and woman: they are attracted by a woman who falls in love with them and displays towards them the sexual overestimation appropriate to their own narcissistic valuation of themselves.[8] It is entirely in accordance with our views on bisexuality to assume that a given psychic mechanism operates in both sexes, only more powerfully in the one than in the other, and this is an idea to which we shall recur later. I shall then show that there is also the possibility of a quite normal and typically masculine process by which the whole body is invested with libidinal interest proceeding from the primary narcissism. This is exactly analogous to the process in women which I have described as a secondary displacement of narcissism—yet there is a difference.

I said above that the biological, as well as the psychological, characteristics of the development which takes place in females at puberty are indications of corresponding displacements of libido and of the part played by these in determining the form assumed by narcissism in women. In discussing this point I shall first of all cite some facts from clinical experience in support of my argument, and

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[8] It is striking how important this narcissistic position of the libido is for the delineation of human beings in art. Cf. Rank, 'Ein Beitrag zum Narzissmus'. *Jahrbuch*, Bd. III.

then proceed to develop the conclusions I have drawn from them. In doing this I do not propose to give a detailed account of individual cases; I shall confine myself to referring to a general impression that I have received from my study of female development at puberty. In the first place I was struck in certain isolated cases by the fact that, in young girls who had not been able to overcome the impulse to masturbate after the monthly periods began, the secondary sex characteristics, and especially the breasts, were imperfectly developed. Further experience then showed that it is these same girls who retain unchanged after puberty, sometimes throughout life, a childish slenderness, the undifferentiated boyish figure and boyish appearance which belongs to the pre-pubertal period. There are some cases indeed where this trait is accompanied by a certain uncomeliness of face which is permanent.[9] Thus it is clear that suppression of the clitoris-masturbation which has been practised before puberty, together with diminution of the excitability of the clitoris, is normally required for the full and correct development of those womanly 'charms' whose connection with the secondary attachment of narcissism we are examining.

Of course this conception cannot be maintained in so general a form and without any modifications. From a critical scrutiny of my material I was able to recognize at least one type of deviation from this rule. In some cases repression of the infantile genital activities is completely successful at puberty, and yet there is only a rudimentary development of the physical characteristics of mature womanhood. This occurs in girls who, on account of an unconscious sense of guilt, suffer from a strong permanent fixation to the onanism of the period before puberty and (if I may draw an inference from a case which has had a long course of analytical treatment and in which there was complete amnesia of any such sexual activity) display grave neurotic disturbances very soon after puberty. The general correctness of my conclusion should not be thought to be affected by cases of this sort nor yet by the possibility that in certain women there may be constitutional factors which dispose them to retain the physical characteristics of immaturity. Nor do I pretend that my view explains *all* the phenomena of puberty in females; I merely say that within these limits it does give *one* important condition of

[9] The mental attitude of the patient B should be recalled here: it is entirely in accordance with this.

normal development. It would seem then that this development to normal maturity is principally characterized by the fact that the genital activity, repressed and diverted from its original goal and yet at the same time reinforced with all the momentum of the influx of sexual feeling at puberty, comes out, so to speak, in collateral ways and contributes its quantum of libido to the development and perfecting of the sex characteristics which make their appearance at that time. Thus the process commonly called 'genitalization' would play the largest part in the production of the charms of the female body. This view receives ready support from a consideration of the genital qualities developed by the female breasts, and especially the nipples. It is further confirmed by a statement of Ferenczi's with reference to the narcissistic significance of the face: 'I think it probable that the displacement of libidinal tendencies "from below upward" (Freud) which takes place in the sublimation period effects a secondary genitalization—probably with the help of the rich vascular innervation of the face—of the sexual rôle of the face, which is at first simply exhibitionistic. (By "genitalization" of any part of the body I understand, with Freud, a periodically intensified hyperæmia, œdema and turgescence, accompanied by corresponding nervous excitation.)'[10] Indeed, one may go still further and postulate, as Radò once remarked to me personally, that this process may have prevailed in the evolution of the race as well and have led to the disappearance of hair from the face in women. This evolutional idea that the disappearance of hair from the face is due to the narcissistic desire to expose oneself is entirely in accordance with Sachs' statement, based on clinical observation, that the male exhibitionist displays his genital, whilst the form of exhibitionism which we regard as normal in women has reference to the other parts of the body, above all, to the face.[11]

These considerations form a firmer basis than ever for the notion that the beauty of a woman's person, and especially of her face, is a substitute to her for the loss of the penis. We see that the connection is a more intimate one than was at first suggested, for this formula does not represent merely a psychological identity, but indicates as well a biological equivalence.

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[10] *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, S. 11.

[11] Dr. Horney drew attention to the significance of this difference in her paper read at the Berlin Congress, 1922. (Published in this number of the JOURNAL.)

This may encourage us to pursue other trains of thought which occur in this connection. Greek mythology provides us with an interesting, and at the same time attractive, confirmation of our view. In the world of myth there moves a charming group of three female figures, the three Graces (χάριτες). They are 'the goddesses of grace and of the magic charms of beauty' (Roscher's *Lexicon*). If we make use of our knowledge of symbolism and substitute for the male organ *the number three*, we discover in this artistic creation of the mind of a people an intuitive knowledge of the connection shown by psychoanalysis to exist between the male genital attitude and female beauty.[12]

Another figure of Greek mythology, that of Heracles, serves at this point to illustrate those typical manifestations of secondary narcissism in men to which I have already referred. The figure of Heracles stands to us for the epitome of manly strength, the personification of powerful manhood. But there is one specially interesting fact, pointed out to me some years ago by Ferenczi, about the manner in which Heracles is depicted in art. Ferenczi was struck by the circumstance that in statues of the hero the body, which is of course powerful and robust, has generally a disproportionately small penis, and he rightly inferred some connection here with the 'complex of the small penis'—that outpost in consciousness of the castration complex. Shortly afterwards the same observation was made in one of the analyses I was conducting. A young man told me that he had long noticed that the penis was much too small in Greek statues, especially in those of Heracles. This was the same patient, C, who as

[12] I cannot refrain from mentioning also a literary work by Rudolf G. Binding, the principal theme of which, as of my present paper, is the change wrought in girls at puberty—the development of beauty and narcissistic exhibitionism. In his *Legende von der Keuschheit* (Insel-Bücherei, No. 302), ancient forms of religious thought are linked up with and animated by modern feeling in the happiest manner. He writes on familiar themes ('Sacred and Profane Love', 'Maiden and Prostitute'), infusing into them the most subtle eroticism, and presenting them in a new and unique guise. The author's intuition, particularly of the workings of the mind in young women, is admirable. I should like to reproduce the content of his legends, if it could be given briefly. I will, however, quote one sentence which expresses a view wholly akin to my own. He says of his young heroine who is rapidly developing the beauty of an adolescent maiden: 'Her purity led to a form of beauty in Evlein which seemed to be determined, even imposed, by this quality alone'.

a boy had thought the male organ so ugly and had declared that women were beautiful because they were not encumbered with it. In accordance with this view he was of opinion that the artists of antiquity had been actuated by æsthetic feeling in giving a male statue a penis of such an inconsiderable size. Whether he was right in making this generalization I do not know, but it is certainly true in the case of figures of Heracles ; and a possible explanation of it is that in moulding this ideal figure of manly strength unconscious phantasy formed it at the cost of, and as a substitute for, a powerful genital organ. So from this point of view Heracles would be a male pendant to the three Graces. If the Graces represent womanly beauty, the equivalent of male genital activity, Heracles stands for masculine strength, which has attracted to itself a part of the original narcissistic estimation of the genital. We then see that the processes of phantasy which gave birth to the figure of Heracles are the prototype of that characteristic discharge and development of bodily strength in *sport*, accompanied as it is by the requirement of sexual abstinence. This point comes out still more clearly in the case of young men who endeavour to free themselves from onanism by means of strenuous physical training. We know that a struggle of this sort is induced by the castration complex, the most important of the disturbances to which the original narcissism of the child is exposed (Freud).

Thus we arrive at a second modification of the theory of narcissism in men. Men cannot continue, any more than women, to centre their narcissism upon the genitals without some sacrifice. Under the pressure of the castration complex they are obliged—in a manner analogous to the processes which characterize puberty in females—to effect a secondary cathexis of the whole body with a part of the narcissistic libido and to bring about a displacement of libido on to interests the aim of which is to increase their bodily strength. With this conclusion we touch upon the process which may be called the formation of the ego-ideal of ' manliness '. We shall return to this process later in another connection, but we must not omit here to note in the light of the theory of bisexuality that in many women also this typically male striving for physical strength is clearly recognizable (women's sports). This tendency is not incompatible with the genuine feminine ' beauty-narcissism ', but may enter into opposition to it, or even—when it is combined with other no less typically male tendencies —completely suppress it.

II

We may suppose that if we follow up the results of our inquiry so far, we shall arrive at further conclusions of some importance. I propose to continue the trains of thought indicated in two different directions only.

It is particularly tempting to look back to the narcissism of earliest childhood, the different destinies of which we have traced in the two sexes. We have learnt that this narcissism constitutes the primal condition of libidinal cathexis in the little child. Its development proceeds gradually in proportion as the ego develops from the early stage of auto-erotism. Freud says expressly: 'It is an inevitable assumption that there is no unity existing in the individual from the beginning which is comparable to that of the ego: the ego has to be evolved. Yet the auto-erotic instincts are primordial; something therefore must be added to them, some new psychic activity must arise to produce narcissism.' [13] On the other hand we are accustomed to see in the condition of sleep some sort of periodical recurrence of the narcissistic distribution of libido, the prototype of which must be the blissful isolation of the individual during intra-uterine life—that is to say, a phase of development the narcissistic perfection of which is evident, although in describing it it would scarcely be correct to speak of a psychological ego. At this point a lack of precision in our terminology must be noted, bringing with it disadvantages which undoubtedly increase our difficulties, for example, in our understanding of the psychology of catatonic conditions. The disadvantages of this inexactitude, however, are most evident in the lack of any certain discrimination between the concepts of narcissism in the original purely psychological, sense and the primal narcissistic condition which is assumed to characterize intra-uterine existence. On this point I have followed in a somewhat roundabout way the conceptions and definitions of an analytical writer whose work I shall shortly mention. But first of all I shall describe the circuitous route my investigations have followed, for I think that this train of thought may lead to noteworthy conclusions in reference to the questions I am now dealing with.

It is natural and right that the analyst should endeavour to acquire a more definite knowledge of the psychosexual conditions which may be supposed to exist during passive fœtal existence. Everybody is

[13] 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.'

familiar with the description given by Ferenczi in his bold experimental attempt at reconstruction: 'Stages in the development of the sense of reality'.[14] It is true that his paper contains only remote allusions to any kind of libidinal economy prevailing in this phase of development. So far as I know, S. Radó was the first to postulate any organization of the libido in intra-uterine existence. At a meeting of the Budapest Society he once expressed a conjecture to which he had been led in an interesting way. This was that the *prenatal* stage of organization of the libido is characterized by the predominance of *tactile* erotism; that is to say, that the cutaneous envelope of the fœtus floating in the amniotic fluid is the principal erotogenic zone.[15] I was reminded of this conjecture by a point which came up during analytic work and seemed to furnish empirical confirmation. A patient—the patient A mentioned above—who often brought to the analysis only very short, yet very interesting, fragments of dreams, repeatedly described a fragment of this kind which seemed more like a dream-sensation than anything that could be called a piece of a dream. She dreamt that she was 'somehow hidden . . . somewhere or other . . . and she had a feeling of indescribable happiness and a sense of unusual well-being which affected the surface of her whole body'. The interpretation brought to light a transference-wish to be able to lie on my lap. I could not help conjecturing that this dream contained a phantasy of the mother's womb, in which certain sensations of the skin predominated, and these would probably be ultimately traceable to the processes of tactile excitation in the intra-uterine state surmised by Radó. This view was completely in accordance with what I knew of the patient's actual manifest sexuality. Owing to vaginal anæsthesia she had developed a high degree of excitability of the skin, so that in coitus the contact of the embrace provided the

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[14] *Contributions to Psycho-analysis.*

[15] Radó was careful to point out a fact which at first sight contradicts this supposition. His conjecture postulates the existence of psychic instinctual processes in the fœtus, which however according to other aspects of psycho-analytical theory is regarded as enjoying a state of mental passivity. I should mention that later Eisler proposed to describe the prenatal organization of libido as *apnoic* or *lethargic*, whilst recently Alexander gave his opinion that the principal characteristic of this prenatal organization is the function of the umbilical cord (fœtal circulation).

strongest stimulation for her. This is a not unusual result of displacement of erotogenicity, and it was quite possible to conceive of it as a reactivation of cutaneous erotism in its full intra-uterine significance —a ' genitalization ' of the pregenital tactile zone of the fœtal period.

Of course I could but admit that such uncertain conclusions, based on a single observation, did not solve the problem. But it seemed to me legitimate to follow up this train of thought for the purposes of my present argument. Once more I made use of the formula that the narcissism of the adolescent female which originally centred on the genital organs undergoes a secondary displacement to the whole of the rest of the body. I then endeavoured to connect up this idea with Radó's hypothesis that the ' narcissistic ' fœtal state is characterized by a special erotogenicity of the surface of the skin. This leads in the first instance to the conjecture that in post-natal development the narcissistic libido migrates (to use a metaphorical expression) from the surface of the skin to the genitals, and that this process takes place in *both* sexes in a manner which is at present unknown. And secondly, it suggests that there is a process, more plainly seen in *women* than in men (in accordance with the differences between them which appear in the course of the development of the ultimate sex differentiation), by which these quantities of libido are displaced again back to their former position, a cathexis being effected of the whole surface of the body. In other words, the narcissism of women in its mature form reproduces once again the ' narcissistic ' distribution of libido which was characteristic of the prenatal period. We know already that there are indications of the same processes in men also.

It is true that the evidence of these analogies would carry more weight were it not based on an assumption, which is not yet sufficiently confirmed, concerning the prenatal organization of the libido. In view of this uncertainty it is particularly gratifying to find in a work by Tausk,[16] which in my opinion has as yet received far too little attention, certain conceptions which we may quote in further support of our argument, independently of the difficult question of the fœtal organization of the libido. In particular, Tausk's hypotheses offer some sort of satisfactory solution of the terminological difficulty mentioned above in connection with the problem of primal narcissism. According to his definition the ' narcissistic ' position of the libido

[16] ' Über die Entstehung des Beeinflussungsapparates in der Schizophrenie ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Jahrgang, V. Heft 1.

during intra-uterine life should be described as '*organic narcissism*' in contrast to '*psychic narcissism*', the development of which is conditioned by the evolution of the ego. Whether the term chosen by Tausk is a very happy one, and particularly whether it should be applied to the libidinal state during the fœtal period, are questions which may be ignored at the moment. But the meaning is clear. We are asked to regard the *individual* itself (or, if you like, the organism) even in the intra-uterine period as 'a unity comparable to the ego', whose libidinal cathexis serves as a foundation for the (primal) narcissism to be developed later. Tausk adds that 'the cohesion of the organism is conditioned by a libido-tension', a supposition which reminds us of Freud's attempt [17] 'to derive the narcissistic libido of the ego from that part of the libido which causes the cells of the soma to cohere'. Tausk conceives of the intra-uterine existence as a pre-genital stage of diffused 'narcissistic' organ-libido, in which it may be said that 'the whole body is a libidinal zone'. In schizophrenia, as we know, regression takes place from an already established genital organization to this phase, and 'the ego becomes an entity of diffused sexuality'. To use the mode of expression proper to this later phase: the whole body becomes a genital.

It is obvious that this view has an important bearing on our problem. Here we have direct authority for regarding the development of the mature narcissism of women as a secondary approach to the position of the libido at the fœtal stage. Thus it is legitimate and entirely in accordance with Tausk's view to sum up the psychogenetic situation in female narcissism in the formula: 'The whole body is equivalent to a genital.' The extent to which this formula holds good for men also (though with important qualifications) is self-evident from the earlier part of this discussion. I showed that the pursuit of muscular activity and development is a typically masculine form of the secondary narcissistic cathexis of the whole body. According to the hypothesis just now adopted this process should at the same time be conceived of as a secondary reactivation of the prenatal diffused sexuality.

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I gladly leave the field of these still debatable views in order to turn to the consideration of a question which arises much more directly out of clinical analytical experience. It concerns a difference in the

[17] *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

formation of the ego-ideal in the two sexes and it affords an opportunity for studying the relation of narcissism to bisexuality in one at least of its most important transformations. According to Freud, the process of forming the ego-ideal consists in departing farther and farther from the primary narcissism and must be conceived of as a displacement of libido from that narcissism to an ego-ideal imposed from without. For a first consideration of the differences in the formation of the ego-ideal in the two sexes we may content ourselves with the phraseology which terms one of the ego-ideals in question ' manliness ', and another ' womanliness '. Finer shades and connections will, as usual, be revealed by the interpretation of the distortions and exaggerations occurring in the neuroses.

The analysis of a woman (D) who suffered from a severe neurosis gave me ample opportunity of studying a personality whose endeavour it was to fulfil the extravagant demands of an ego-ideal which was presumably too high. From her youth upwards she had been dominated by artistic ambitions which all her life she had striven to satisfy. She had never been able to do so, but she never gave up the hope of success, even when suffering from most serious nervous breakdown. Thus she cherished the longing for creative artistic power and activity. In spite of the long duration of the analysis it was not possible to determine whether or not the demands which she made upon herself were altogether disproportionate to her capacity for execution (her talent) ; the only thing that was plain was that the far-reaching neurotic process must have absorbed and destroyed those powers, if indeed they existed. But for the purpose of this discussion there is no need to answer this question. The starting-point of our argument is the fact that in her ego-ideal this woman identified herself principally with her father. Accordingly she set before herself (more or less consciously) as a shining example a great artist of the past. Her analysis showed that she suffered from the female castration complex, which in her had developed to a quite unusual degree. Many of her neurotic symptoms were governed by it ; in particular it dominated the formation of a character remarkable for strong masculine tendencies. The penis which she lacked and longed for (for a long time she unconsciously clung to the belief in its existence) was to be compensated for by the capacity for artistic production : this wish was the motive force behind the erection of her ego-ideal. We may say of this ideal that it is full of typically masculine ambitions. It happened in the analysis that for a time the patient experienced a positive and

conscious wish for offspring—a late manifestation of the early repressed (infantile) wish for a child. And she herself drew the obvious parallel: she wanted either to have children, in order to ensure the survival of her ego, or else she must be employed in artistic creation and be able to leave behind her the offspring of her mind, like a man. Thus her desire for children as well as for the penis had been absorbed into the constitution of her exalted ego-ideal.

At this point let us consider for a moment the normal ego-ideal of 'womanliness'. Without doubt 'motherhood' and 'motherliness' are amongst the most important features of this feminine ego-ideal. We have learnt from Freud what is the essence of the mother's relation to the child. He showed that the narcissistic woman regards her child as part of her own body in the guise of an object outside herself, upon which she can lavish full object-love out of her (secondary) narcissism.[18] We may supplement this statement by recalling that, as is well known, the child also stands to the woman for the male organ which (in phantasy) she once possessed and now supposes to be leading a separate existence of its own, as it were, after having been severed from herself. Possibly the libidinal cathexis of this being (achieved as it is at the cost of secondary narcissism) is always equivalent to a reversion of the secondary to the primary narcissism bound up with the genital, from which, according to my argument, the secondary form proceeded. We are justified in assuming that this reversion takes place in a complicated way, by subterranean paths, so to speak—what happens is that first of all, when birth takes place, a narcissistic hyper-cathexis of the genital is effected which is subsequently transferred to the child (=penis) who has passed through it in the course of birth.[19]

As regards the characteristics of the typically feminine ego-ideal these reflections show that in this respect its line of development follows closely that of the primary narcissism. The point of departure is the high narcissistic valuation of the genital: the point reached is the narcissistic over-estimation of the child who is detached from the genital—the two points lie close together.

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[18] 'Zur Einführung des Narzissmus.' *Jahrbuch.*

[19] Cf. Ferenczi: 'Über Pathoneurosen', S. 12. 'The painful pleasure associated with the organ through which separation from the body takes place (here the vagina) is also in part transferred to the products of the process of separation (the child). This explains the circumstance that so many women exhibit a preference for the "child of their pain". (*Schmerzenskind*).'

It is obvious that the processes by which the ego-ideal of ' manliness ' is formed are considerably more complicated. We have already traced its development in a certain direction in the case of a woman. Let us now try to learn more about it by the examination of a similar case. In the analysis of a highly-cultivated young girl, who possessed original creative talent (we have come across her before as the patient B), great difficulties were caused by the sensitiveness of her castration complex, which had become the basis of a strong ' masculine protest '. Her intellect was clearly of a masculine cast and her principal work was in a field of mental activity usually entered only by men. This girl appeared never to have experienced the conscious wish, which seems so natural in a young woman, to have a child of her own. The desire had been deeply repressed and manifested itself only in the symptoms of her conversion-hysteria. So far, though the analysis has lasted for a considerable time, there have been only faint traces of such a wish. Her conscious ego conforms to the requirements of an ego-ideal whose ambition it is to produce intellectual offspring. One characteristic detail of her analysis is *a dream of beheading*, the interpretation of which helped her for the first time, after long endeavours, to understand the castration complex (and envy of the penis). She thus discovered that to her unconscious the missing penis was represented by the ' head ', that is to say, the brain or intellect, whose ' masculine ' achievements were intended to compensate her for the male *generative power* which nature denied her.[20]

The results of this analysis are to a great extent in agreement with the facts learnt from the peculiarities of the former case I cited. Besides this they necessitate a special emphasis upon the narcissistic-libidinal significance of the organ upon whose capacity depends the satisfaction or frustration of an ego-ideal cast in this masculine mould. This is a notion which occurred quite spontaneously to me from a consideration of the material I have put before you, albeit in somewhat indefinite outline. Afterwards, on reading what Ferenczi says on this subject in his latest publication,[21] I found a most penetrating theore-

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[20] In a paper entitled ' Intellekt und Sexualität ', read at a meeting of the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Society, E. Simmel described the technical difficulties of a case corresponding to this of mine.

[21] Hollos and Ferenczi : *Zur Psychoanalyse der paralytischen Geistesstörung*, S. 39. Supplement No. V to the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1922.

tical basis for the assumption of a specially high narcissistic cathexis, or valuation, of the brain and its functions. For the purpose of his argument Ferenczi lays particular stress on its organic development, the aim of which is division of labour and differentiation. He therefore contrasts the brain as the *central organ of the ego-functions* with the genital as the *central erotic organ.* I, on the other hand, wish to close my remarks by referring once more to the fact that in the unconscious these two most important executive organs are regarded as equivalent and held in corresponding narcissistic estimation.

SHORTER COMMUNICATIONS

JUS PRIMÆ NOCTIS

The following facts [1] concerning the sexual life of the inhabitants of Easter Island may be of interest to psycho-analysts :

' From their fifth year onwards young girls receive instructions from the old women regarding behaviour in the sexual act, while the defloration of the young women is a privilege of old men. They confide themselves to their mates only after the *prima nox* has been passed with one of the elders of the tribe ; and they steadfastly adhere to this custom even when strongly attracted to a particular young man.'

The deeper significance of this custom is no doubt in agreement with the psycho-analytic interpretation, in particular with that of Storfer,[2] who ascribes the original *jus primæ noctis* to the *father.* Among the Orang-Sakai of Malacca a father is said [3] to enjoy the *jus primæ noctis* with his daughters.

An article by P. Sinitzin (Petrograd) throws an interesting light on this subject and at the same time unintentionally confirms the importance ascribed by psycho-analysis to the incest-complex. After disposing of the superficial material motives at work in the custom of putting the father to death, which prevailed among barbaric races in antiquity as well as to-day, the writer shows that this custom is only prevalent among peoples where a father possesses the *jus primæ noctis* with the bride or wife of the sons, as was until recently the custom among the peasants of North Russia.[4]

According to Ferenczi, there are to this day many fathers of families in Croatia who take to themselves the right of having sexual intercourse with their daughters-in-law, until such time as the young couple, who have married in childhood, reach maturity.

Otto Rank.

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[1] Taken from *Sexualprobleme,* 1913, and from *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* 1912, S. 659 ff.

[2] *Sonderstellung des Vatermordes,* 1911, S. 17.

[3] Schmidt, *Jus primæ noctis,* S. 324.

[4] ' Die Lösung eines Geheimnisses der Volksseele ', *Die Zeitschrift,* März 2, 1912.

A CASTRATION SYMBOL

The duplicating of an object in dreams is known to analysts as a representation (by means of an opposite idea) of its absence. It occurs particularly in reference to castration ideas and with penis symbols. The following instance of this mechanism coming up in a phantasy may point to a possible second motivation by which this form of representation comes to be used (the first being the characteristic unconscious one of representation by opposites).

A young obsessional girl said one day during analysis, pointing to the pattern on a curtain near her : ' Do you see that thing hanging down like a little seal on a man's watch-chain ? I thought of it tied on to your husband's penis, as if he had two penises ; and then I thought the seal would rub against his penis and bruise it, and you would kiss the bruise, and his penis would be all bloody and mangled, and your lips would be covered with the blood.' Unconscious phantasies of castrating a man and of becoming pregnant by biting off a penis were beginning to come out in projection on to the analyst. Rubbing was an important symptom in the neurosis (washing mania).

The second possible motivation referred to above would be the idea that a second object like the first would tend to annihilate the first ; if this motivation is proved to be true, its connection with the oral stage of the libido and with the process of identification is obvious from the above.

Joan Riviere.

PHALLIC SYMBOLISM

Speaking of homo-sexuality between women for the first time in analysis, a woman patient expressed disgust at such a practice. On being asked the origin of this feeling, she said : ' Well, it's not so much disgusting, perhaps, as boring. I mean it seems such a pointless idea, so utterly meaningless—like trying to play tennis without balls ! ' The next moment she herself laughed at the quite unconscious significance of what she had said.

Joan Riviere.

INTERPRETATION OF A PHANTASY CONCERNING THE DURATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TREATMENT

Patients who have been undergoing psycho-analytic treatment for a varying period of time usually prove to have harboured a definite estimate of the duration of treatment in their minds from the very outset, or to have formed some such notion during the course of the analysis. The usual belief voiced is to the effect that the treatment must last nine months, and analysis of this idea regularly reveals an underlying gestation phantasy as responsible. In the case briefly reported in this communication, the patient formed a time estimate differing from the typical one of nine months. Analytic investigation of his thoughts on the subject disclosed an interesting unconscious determinant.

The patient, a Jewish male, 35 years of age, began one of his analytic hours with the statement that he felt his analysis must needs be drawing to a close, for, as he said, the eleventh month of the treatment was about to end, and this impressed him as being exactly the proper length of time for any psycho-analysis. It was evident, however, that he was not entirely convinced of the validity of his opinion, for he begged the analyst for either confirmation or denial of his conclusion. Neither the one nor the other being given, the patient produced the following enlightening material.

He first mentioned the curious fact that, just as he was leaving the analytic hour of the day previous, the words of the Kaddish (a Hebrew prayer recited in memory of dead parents) ran through his mind. This transitory compulsive symptom puzzled him very much. He now added that the Kaddish prayer must be said daily for eleven [1] months. This last free association furnished the key to the situation, and, in conjunction with material previously produced by the patient, permits an interpretation of the phantasy.

The patient was born in an orthodox Jewish home. Being the first son to follow the births of seven daughters in succession, his advent was hailed with great delight by the bigoted father, for no good Jew wishes to die without leaving behind offspring to say the Kaddish, and this prayer is valid only if recited by males. Indeed, throughout the patient's childhood his father constantly reminded him of the importance of observing the Kaddish after his death, usually adding the rather unwise assertion that he anticipated that the boy would fail to carry out his father's request. The patient made good this prediction. Upon the death of the father he failed to say the Kaddish, and, in fact, took to irreligion.

[1] Exactly eleven months and one day according to competent rabbinical authority.

Now post-mortem ceremonies are, in general, motivated by a desire to expiate the unconscious death-wish against the departed love-object which has found actual fulfilment in the death of the loved one. The Kaddish falls into this category of ceremony. At the time of the father's death, the patient, because of factors, a description of which are beyond the scope of this brief paper, failed to make the unconscious expiation for the unconscious death-wish against the father implied in orthodox observance of the Kaddish. But now, in the analysis, he uses the treatment for this purpose. Unconsciously he equates being analysed with saying Kaddish, and, by making the analysis as difficult and as painful for himself as possible, attempts to do tardy penance.

Monroe A. Meyer.

ABSTRACTS

General

W. S. Taylor. Rationalization and its Social Significance. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Jan.–Mar. 1923, p. 410.

Taylor says very little that is new on the subject of rationalization. He attempts to explain the dynamics of the process on a mechanistic basis. He believes rationalizing to be a form of 'compartment mind' believing. 'The rationalizer's reasons are intense beliefs, while other ideas are repressed, i.e. inhibited or dissociated. Complete integration is lacking in it. There are lines of division which separate the motivating causes from the professed reasons.'

He believes that the rationalization process is activated by the desire on the part of the individual to present a unified front to his environment, a desire for that unity which spells success in meeting the problems of life. He sees in an excessive amount of rationalization a loss of energy and directness, and also certain ethical implications.

A. Kardiner.

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Mary O'Malley, M.D. Transference and Some of its Problems in Psychoses. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, p. 1.

A worthless article by a writer whose conception of an analysis would be pretty well fulfilled by an ordinary clinical history narrated with a little more detail than usual and occasionally ornamented with psychoanalytic terms, and whose knowledge of transferences passes little beyond the notion that it may be manifested in a liking or disliking of the physician. The author appears to have no realization at all of what the unconscious is, of the real nature of transference, or of the plain analytic implications of the clinical material she presents. The following sentence is quoted as a good index of the quality of the article:

'The negative transference is likely to make its appearance if the patients lose confidence in the analyst, and when this occurs, they find no relief from their symptoms, and a normal adjustment is replaced by a regressive process.'

H. W. F.

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Edmund S. Conklin. The Definition of Introversion, Extroversion, and Allied Concepts. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Jan.–Mar. 1923, p. 367.

A review of the concepts of introversion and extroversion according to Freud, White, Jung, Hinkle, and Wilfrid Lay (!). He defines extroversion as

'a more or less prolonged condition in which attention is controlled by the objective conditions of attention more than by the subjective, and in which the content of the subjective conditions is most closely related to the objective'.

Introversion is defined as

'a more or less prolonged condition in which attention is controlled more by the subjective than by the objective conditions, and in which the content of the subjective conditions is of a more abstract nature and not so intimately related to the objective conditions'.

There are, however, groups of people who do not conform to either of these two types;

'such people are for a period thoroughly introverted, they are writing books or preparing lectures on some abstract subject, . . . and while so conform perfectly to my definition of introversion; at other times they are so completely absorbed in fishing, hunting, mountain climbing and tales of the same, . . . and while so conform perfectly to the definition given to extroversion'.

These latter he calls ambiverts. There are in addition many other enlightening definitions.

A. Kardiner.

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Alice G. Ikin. The Ontogenesis of Introvert and Extrovert Tendencies. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. III, April 1923, p. 95.

Human civilization tends to increase individual powers of subsistence with relatively small fertility: in other words there is a predominance of ego over sex instincts, or, according to Jung, introversion rather than extroversion. In order to avoid the sacrifice of the race to the individual, nature appears to have supplied man with a stronger sex instinct than required for reproduction. Freud states that the conflict resulting from this is between ego and sex instincts, and Jung believes that it is between introvert and extrovert reactions. There is more in common between the views of Jung and Freud, or the theory of the libido as an essentially psychic force, than the difference in terminology would lead one to expect. Jung does not admit that desexualized primal libido can ever be restored to its original function. Freud and Jung both admit a sexual force capable of sublimation or desexualization, and a force which is *innately*

desexualized, both believing that they are not mutually convertible forces. Jung should therefore refrain from tracing the origin of both of them to one of them. Freud and Jung both believe that evolution is the history of conflict between the non-sexual individualizing derivative and the sexual undifferentiated reproductive force, repetition of this conflict occurring in the individual. The authoress believes that since neither the individual nor the race is to be sacrificed, the compromise must be a new product differing from but including egoism and sexuality. She believes this product to be altruism, and in this respect differs from Freud, who considers that the libido can never be altruistic. She thinks that the term altruism should be reserved for the higher sublimation of both interest and libido, and states that Freud has ignored the fact that libido is responsible for race preservation interests when he states that object interest is the only altruism. She amplifies the definition of sublimation which according to her view should mean '*the deflection of the energy motivating any instinct into social instead of egoistic channels*'.

Neither the school of Freud nor Jung appears to recognize the complementary nature of their views concerning the conflict between narcissistic and object libido. Introvert-extrovert conflict appears to be that existing between narcissistic and object libido. The repressing force appears to be narcissistic libido focussed on the ego-ideal. The force of conscience is derived from libido embodied in the ego-ideal, which ideal is a social product. Freud and Adler fail to see that both egoistic interest and libido are repressed as antagonistic to an ego-ideal, their cases supporting their respective views. The authoress concludes by referring to her own analysis, and states in a foot-note that she suffered from dissociations of personality. She discovered that in the breaking down of transference the ideal of the object was identified with the self. She passed through a stage of the formation of an idealized image of the object, the libido being detached from the object to the ideal, and, secondly, identification of the ideal with the self.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Leonardo Bianchi, La Psicanalisi. *La Scientia*, 1923, Vol. XVII, p. 251.

A polemic against psycho-analysis, which is described as a scientific Bolshevism.

E. J.

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Smith Ely Jelliffe. Paleopsychology: A Tentative Sketch of the Origin and Evolution of Symbolic Function. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, No. 2, April 1923, p. 121.

The 'science of paleopsychology', which Jelliffe wishes to found, is the 'science of symbolic functioning in its paleopsychological aspect'.

Symbols, according to Jelliffe, are dynamic agents.

'They are ever functioning. They produce results acting as stimuli; functioning as effectors they discharge tension and are physiological requisites. They become structuralized with different grades of complexity which are related to their functional capacity. The older the symbol, remaining in its primitive phyletic form, the greater its dynamic content and the greater the affective tensions consequent upon its utilization. The presence, then, of old symbolizations in the present working machinery is an index of specific affective tensions requiring specific symbolic functions at certain stages of their capacity.'

This, one of the more lucid paragraphs from this very unclear article, will serve as a sufficient sample of what Jelliffe seems to be trying to say.

The article is illustrated with diagrams which are as empty of real meaning as is the text.

H. W. F.

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E. Farquhar Buzzard. Some aspects of Mental Hygiene. *Lancet*, Vol. II, 1923, pp. 1127–30.

In this address tribute is paid to the work of Freud, which opens, the speaker says, a new era in psychology. Psycho-analysis, he says, is essentially a method of scientific clinical investigation; it is as necessary for the study of psychiatry as accurate and patient history-taking is necessary for the elucidation of medical problems of organic origin.

As a method of investigation psycho-analysis has been the means of establishing a number of truths and principles which are of great importance in the study of psychiatry. Concerning psycho-analysis as a therapeutic measure Dr. Buzzard is much more reserved.

Warburton Brown.

Clinical

T. A. Ross. Some Points about Repression. *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine*, Vol. XV, No. 6, April 1922.

The author says that before the war he disbelieved the doctrines of Freud, but that since the war he has had to accept the fact of repression in the Freudian sense.

He says that before the war he did not often find a history of sexual trouble in patients, whereas since the war there now comes a stream of

sexual material. This is certainly not the experience of psycho-analysts, who find just the same resistances against recounting sexual details as before.

Dr. Ross writes:

'We know that Freud sometimes makes suggestions, and that the lesser analysts often do so, and it is therefore not only possible but even likely that no independent interpretation of symbols ever takes place, all the symbols being merely Freud's.'

To Freud then are to be ascribed all symbols discovered during an analysis. Now, on page 37, Dr. Ross has either been guilty of making suggestions during an analysis, and in that case his statement that he conducted the analysis by free association and with a single suggestion is incorrect, or the patient was acquainted with Freud's works, for the patient discovered by free association that God was standing as a symbol of his father. Dr. Ross does not point out that this symbol was merely Freud's. The author states that

'free association is an instrument very useful for discovering what is in a patient's conscious mind, but doubtful for discovering unconscious thoughts, and difficult to use'.

We find, however, that the author apparently surmounts the difficulties in the case he reports he analysed by free association (p. 37), and at the same time furnishes proof of its use in discovering what is in the patient's unconscious mind, for we cannot imagine that the author believes his patient was conscious of the fact that God was a surrogate of his father until it dawned on him by virtue of free association.

Dr. Ross remarks:

'If these sexual symbols which are constantly being found in uncured analysed patients are true, their appearance in consciousness has done nothing but harm.'

As is usual in such papers there appear fantastic accounts of enormous sums of money spent on analysis without any result being obtained, whereas a cure is afterwards brought about, usually at the writer's hands, by a simple talk. Thus,

'It was strange to meet an officer, who had been analysed for some years, and be the first person to elicit from him in our earliest conversation the statement that he feared he had been a coward in the war; the discussion of this statement led to his being able to resume work very quickly.'

With the author's remark,

'The light-hearted fashion in which it (Freudian analysis) is employed at present makes one anxious for the whole future of psychotherapy',

we would agree, provided by 'employed' he means 'pretended to be employed'.

D. B.

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Theodore Schroeder. Psycho-analysis and Suggestion. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, p. 26.

A well-written discussion intended to show that psycho-analysis and suggestive therapy are essentially different.

H. W. F.

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S. E. Hooper. Study of a Phobia. *British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section*, 1922, Vol. II, p. 292.

In this analysis of a phobia for thunderstorms in a woman of thirty years the investigator has been content with the success of the patient in establishing a connection between the ideas of sexuality in general and storms.

He has not sought for the origin of the phobia in the amnesias of childhood experiences and phantasies, and, because the symptom cleared up, has concluded that its origin lay in the psycho-sexual traumata, a number of which were experienced by the patient in later years.

The interpretations of her dreams are not based upon the free associations of the patient, but are construed by the investigator from his own imagination.

Warburton Brown.

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J. Lhermitte. La Psychanalyse. *Clinique et Laboratoire*. No. 7, August 30, 1922, p. 123.

Dr. Lhermitte, in an article of six pages, gives a fair and sympathetic account of the libidinal theory of the psychoneuroses. He considers it from an historical point of view as well as in its present form. He does not attempt to criticize it, since his article is intended to be informative; but he points out in one place the practical dangers of inexpert analysis.

A. Strachey.

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James Young. Two Cases of War Neuroses. *British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section*, 1922, Vol. II, p. 230.

This paper had for its origin a brief delineation of the Jungian point of view of the War Neuroses. The paper has no psycho-analytical value, as the interpretations of symptoms and dreams are not based upon the patients' free associations, but are constructed from Dr. Young's own phantasies.

Warburton Brown.

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Henry Devine. The ' Reality-Feeling ' in Phantasies of the Insane. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. III, April 1923, p. 81.

The author starts with a description of a case in which he was able to observe the development of delusions in their early stages. He states that this case throws some light on delusional formation and the belief of these patients in the reality of their phantasies. The patient exhibited memory visions connected with noble birth and associations with the Royal Family. The grandiose delusional attitude developed later from these earlier visions and the patient became a typical paraphrenic. In this case of an intelligent adult the foster-parent phantasy found expression in a delusional form. The difference between the wish-fulfilment foster-parent phantasy of the child or psychoneurotic who enjoys it, although knowing it to be imaginary, and the psychotic, is that the latter knows it to be real. Like the phantasy which is built up from memory images, the foster-parent delusion is probably a massive revival of similar phantasies in childhood. The abnormal character of the phantasy is constituted in the feeling with which it is invested. The difference between phantasy and delusion is important but elusive, and in the case quoted it is just this vague quality of the phantasy which constitutes the difference between insanity and the neurosis. Stress is laid on the non-volitional character of the images in the mind of the psychotic. This patient did not wish to be great, but ' greatness was thrust upon him '. The development of the delusion is compared to the development of an instinct. Delusions symbolize the working of unmoral primitive impulses, and in the case quoted express omnipotence and egoism.

The onset of the delusion often results in a cessation of tension and appears to supply a fundamental need. It is unfortunate that no psychotherapeutic method is able to prevent the development of delusional trends. Examples of the primitive instincts which control the psychotic are found in the hallucinatory personality which overshadows the patient (sadistic impulse) and also in the homosexual impulse of the paranoiac. The behaviour of these patients is the logical outcome of their biological inferiorities.

Robert M. Riggall.

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R. G. Rows. Modern Methods in the Treatment of the Psychoses. *Lancet*, Vol. I, 1922, pp. 522–6.

In his address Dr. Rows says,

' if we follow Freud's advice and go back in the life history of our patients, if we discover the causes which may have led to mental disability, we shall then begin to understand the cases from the biological and the psychological points of view '.

He quotes a number of cases, some of which he states got well as a result of mental investigation and explanation. But Dr. Rows does not employ the technique of psycho-analysis.

Warburton Brown.

Sexuality

Ben Karpman. The Sexual Offender. *The Psychoanalytic Review.* Vol. X, No. 3, July 1923, p. 270.

A study, forty-five pages in length, of a male patient arrested and committed to an asylum for the criminal insane for the offence of writing a series of extremely obscene letters to various prominent people.

These letters, the author explains, could not be presented in their original form 'because of extreme obscenity and vulgarity'. Mere abstracts of some of them are given in the article. This delicacy on the part of the author deprived the article of what chance it had of being of some value as a psychoanalytic document. The letters, unmutilated, might have revealed many symbolic expressions and other material which would have thrown some light on the motives which led to their being written. One may look in vain for such enlightenment in the article itself. It is a typical institutional descriptive anamnesis, with a wealth of meaningless detail, varied here and there with occasional futile attempts to apply analytic interpretation.

The author states that his analysis shows that the writing of the obscene letters was an absolute emotional necessity to the patient to satisfy some of his unconscious strivings. That the letters doubtless were such a necessity, we can readily agree. But that the author has shown them to be such can be denied with almost equal readiness. What the unconscious strivings actually were, and why they made the writing of such letters a necessity, is really not explained in any satisfactory manner. The assertion the letters represent 'an attempt to gain satisfaction from the world of phantasy' which would 'compensate for an inability to effect a normal adjustment in reality,' is a mere truism that explains nothing. If the author had simply said that the patient wrote such letters because he was abnormal, one would have understood the matter almost as well as after reading this lengthy article.

H. W. F.

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Knight Dunlap. Psychological Factors in Birth Control. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology,* Vol. XVII, No. 4, Jan.–Mar. 1923, p. 339.

Mr. Dunlap regards most of the objections to birth control as ration-

alizations of a deep-seated disapproval by the ' social organism ' of the effort to frustrate one of its strongest tendencies. Interference with perpetuation, growth, and expansion of the group arouses the antagonism of those individuals in the group who have the ' group feeling ' well developed. The objections are directed mainly against the universal application of contraceptive practices.

He finds, moreover, that contraceptives are harmful.

> ' Aside from the production of frigidity in women, and chronic irritation and impotency in the male, very serious psychological deteriorations in the subtler emotional relationships of couples . . . are unfortunately common results of the usual contraceptive practices.'

The central problem is, therefore, to find a contraceptive free from psychological objections. He is furthermore interested, as is McDougall, in the spread of the gospel of contraception to the lower races and to the less intelligent members of the group, the reason for this being that, since the more intelligent races and individuals in a group practise contraception with such bad eugenic results (!), balance can somehow be restored by giving contraception greater currency and public approval. In compromising his ' group feeling ' to the purpose of making the world safe for the more intelligent races, and more intelligent members of the group, we smell, alack, a bit of propaganda.

A. Kardiner.

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Robert M. Riggall. Homosexuality and Alcoholism. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, No. 2, April 1923, p. 157.

The article calls attention to the well-known relationship between homosexuality and alcoholism, but brings out nothing new. The case cited at greatest length is really an instance of conscious homosexual and masochistic perversion in which the alcoholism was an incidental and late development. It contributes little, therefore, to the understanding of the typical case of alcoholism, in which the homosexuality is usually completely unconscious.

H. W. F.

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John F. W. Meagher. Quackery de Luxe. A Form of Medical Charlatanism known as Orificial or Constructive Surgery. *New York Medical Journal and Medical Record*, February 21, 1923, p. 224.

In this article Dr. Meagher gives an account of the cult of orificial or constructive surgery. It is carried out by a certain number of people who call themselves orificial surgeons. Many of these people hold medical degrees. The number of ' orificialists ' is increasing, and they conduct sanataria ; in Chicago they publish a medical journal. Dr. Meagher

says these people are especially dangerous to the health of women patients. Apparently one can become a proficient orificialist by taking out their correspondence course of instruction, as is shown by this quotation from their journal:

'Many of our students have become very proficient orificialists merely through their mastery of the correspondence course, and have not even attended an orificial clinic. We have no dissatisfied students. Join us. Sign the blank. You pay $125 for the course; only $100, if cash is paid at once.'

Dr. Meagher adds, 'This payment is the only important requirement to take the course'.

The orificialists only concern themselves with the orifices of the body, and of these the anus and vagina only appear to be of any importance to them. It is true they have had a nose and throat specialist, but he does not seem to be particularly interested in this part of the body. Dr. Meagher quotes from their 'Journal' (Vol. VIII, p. 75):

'His specific work for some time has been troubles of the upper orifices and cavities, but unlike the usual nose and throat specialist, a large part of his treatment for these troubles is pelvic attention . . . the true spirit of the orificialist.'

This nose and throat specialist tells how to examine the female external genitalia.

'Examine the tissue texture as in the male, with the same conclusions in the same existing conditions. If the tissues are full in both labia majora and labia minora, we will have a full-blooded person who accomplishes things, provided the tissues in the rectum are in good condition. . . . If the labia majora are flabby or flat, then the round ligaments are relaxed, and we may look for trouble in all the rest of the ligaments.'

The chief methods of the orificial surgeons seem to be examination and dilatation of the anus, rectum, and vagina, and removal of the clitoris. They also circumcise boys. They have what they call a 'tension' table upon which they stretch their unfortunate patients.

Dr. Meagher mentions the following case that came under his observation:—

'This case I saw was a nineteen-year-old girl, feeble-minded and epileptic, who had already been in the Johns Hopkins Hospital. She was stretched on a table—for what reason it would be hard to say; had autohemic treatment, some of her own blood serum being reinjected into her, and was mutilated by having her clitoris and nymphæ amputated. Her credulous father told me she had been "circumcised". Immediately following this operation, she went violently insane. And yet the "operator" had the audacity and indecency, weeks later, while she was under my care, to leave a pseudo-religious card for her, writing to the little girl, now insane . . . "whose inner self is noble, sweet, and large . . . freed from the earth-time temple . . . no longer bound by the material fetters".'

Dr. Meagher mentions that,

' One of their number who was handy with the knife reports this " interesting " case. The patient was a demented woman of fifty-six, who became perfectly well and rational the day after the operation, which evidently was a sort of field-day affair. This is what she had done to her: " Cæcal readjustment; a subperitoneal fibroid removed; a ventral fixation; circumcised; remnants of hymen and urethral caruncle removed; urethra dilated; the uterus dilated and packed; pockets and papillæ and a hemorrhoid were removed after complete divulsion of the anal sphincters; and to give a new floor to the pelvis, a perineorrhaphy completed the work. . . . This was all done at one sitting." '

The rest of Dr. Meagher's article is taken up with quotations from their ' literature ', which are given to show their gross ignorance of anatomy and physiology. A study of their ' literature ' from a psychoanalytical point of view would certainly be interesting.

D. B.

Applied

Joe Tom Sun. Symbolism in the Chinese Written Language. The *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, No. 2, April 1923, p. 183.

A short but interesting paper in which the author points out that the study of Chinese writing affords an opportunity to gather valuable facts concerning the rôle of symbolism in word formation, and the peculiarities of association occurring in primitive thought. Many of the remarkable and complicated characters in Chinese writing are like instantaneous photographs which caught the primitive mind at work. The article deserves careful reading. H. W. F.

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L. Pierce Clark. The Narcism of Alexander the Great. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1923, Vol. X, p. 56.

The third of a series of papers dealing with the unconscious motives underlying the personalities of great statesmen. The writer promises to interpret the ' wild goose chase ' made by Alexander after the defeat of the Persians and to show how his mental attitude at the time precluded his undertaking what obviously should have been his immediate task, the consolidation of the great empire he had won. Some very interesting and suggestive data are presented relative to the character of Alexander and the forces that went to form it, but the paper ends weakly by attributing to narcism almost everything in Alexander's character and behaviour. The opportunities presented by the material for making a real analysis are ignored. That portion of the paper where the promised interpretation should appear resembles moralizing more than it does analysis.

H. W. F.

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C. Stanford Read. Society and the Criminal. *The Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology*, Vol. IV, May 1923, p. 35.

The author advocates the study of crime from an individual-society point of view. The idea of private revenge has been replaced by the abstract idea of justice according to the law of the land. The prohibitions enforced by the herd are mainly directed against the most instinctive impulses. The unconscious hatred evinced by the herd is a defence-mechanism, identification occurring with the culprit, defence occurring against the instinctive criminality of the individual. By means of identification and projection hatred is the unconscious affect of society to crime. Punishment of the criminal is a rationalisation in that it is concerned with individual sin and not sin in the abstract. It would be advisable for the State to employ psychological knowledge in its methods of dealing with the criminal. Punishment should fit the offender rather than the crime.

Robert M. Riggall.

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William A. White. Psycho-analysis and Vocational Guidance. The *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. X, No. 3, July 1923, p. 242.

A lecture which resumes what has already been said by Brill and by Stekel concerning the rôle of the unconscious in determining the choice of vocation, but without adding anything substantially new.

H. W. F.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Unconscious Mind. By S. Herbert, M.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. (A. & C. Black, Ltd., London, 1923. Pp. 224.)

This book begins with a history of the discovery of the unconscious, with a description of its bearing on the psychopathology of everyday life, dreams, and nervous disorders. The next two chapters deal with the relation of the sexual instinct to the ego and the various theories of the unconscious (Freud, Jung, Maeder, Adler, and Rivers). The last three chapters, on mythology, folk-lore and religion, on wit and art, and the unconscious in the scheme of evolution respectively, are the best in the book.

There is not much to be said about the book. It is not very good and not very bad. In view of the numerous introductory books on psychoanalysis now available, such a book as this could justify its existence only if it were written with special skill, which it certainly is not. We have not found any serious error in it, and yet on reading it one has the constant feeling that things are not just as the author depicts them. The author seems to have grasped in a facile way the outer aspects of many problems without possessing a sufficiently fundamental comprehension of them.

In the discussion of rival theories the author might have pointed out the derivation of Maeder's views on dreams from Adler's. He controverts Jung's views by expressing a subjective preference for a materialistic rather than a spiritual conception of the universe, instead of dealing with them in a purely technical way. Faith in the author's general trustworthiness will be shaken in the minds of many readers by the constant stream of minor inaccuracies and misquotations, which indicate a lack of care in exact observation.

On the other hand, it must be said that the book is well arranged and also that it indicates wide reading on the part of the author. Let us hope that it will serve a purpose in interesting a further circle in its subject-matter.

E. J.

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Medical Psychology and Psychical Research. By T. W. Mitchell, M.D., President of the Society for Psychical Research, Author of *The Psychology of Medicine.* (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1922, pp. 244. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Medical Psychology and Psychical Research approach the mental phenomena here discussed from such incongruous standpoints that the task of dealing with both in the same volume must impose a severe strain on the equilibrium of the writer's interests, even when he possesses Dr. Mitchell's well-known qualifications as an authority on both subjects.

The scientific reader need not apprehend one of the possible consequences of this dual rôle: Dr. Mitchell states a case for the recognition of so-called supernormal factors in the problems he discusses, but he does not seek to advance it by discrediting the results of scientific inquiry.

His argument is that of the 'unexplained residuum,' but he seeks everywhere to give full value to scientific hypotheses before confronting the reader with this implication of the unexplained. Scientific readers in general will take the view that Dr. Mitchell's unexplained residua constitute excellent starting-points for further investigation, rather than reasons for admitting the existence of factors of a transcendental order; and the psycho-analytical reader cannot help feeling in addition that he has not sufficiently considered the bearing of later psycho-analytical research on the problems in question. (For instance, references to Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* might have been strikingly supplemented by mention of more recent work highly relevant in the same context.)

Two discussions may be selected, both as illustrating the trend of his argument and in support of this criticism.

The first deals with the 'Appreciation of time by Somnambules'. Dr. Mitchell dismisses as satisfactorily explained by 'subconscious' observation or counting all performances short of 'true time appreciation' (i.e. the power of marking the passage of time without any reliance on the guidance afforded by changes in the external world). Such a capacity he regards as 'supernormal' (p. 58).

In support of the existence of this power, he quotes the performance of a hypnotic patient in whose room there was no clock. He regrets the absence of sufficiently rigorous and prolonged experiments, but even if such experiments were to prove more decisive, surely investigation thereby receives merely a new impetus and perhaps a new direction. Dr. Mitchell himself admits all that is necessary as a justification for further inquiry, namely, the possibility of a co-relation having been established between artificial divisions of time and organic rhythms, so that a 'subconscious watcher' (to use his phrase), in closer touch with these rhythms, would have a 'time measurer' at his disposal. His own view is that 'the process must be carried on below the threshold of hypnotic consciousness,

or by some *fragmentary portion of this consciousness* [1] temporarily dissociated from the hypnotic stratum as a whole.'

It would seem to the reviewer a much more fruitful and intelligible hypothesis to ascribe all the phenomena described in this chapter, unconscious observation of external indications, unconscious counting, unconscious internal time-measurement alike in hypnotic subjects and in specially gifted waking subjects, to variations in the functioning of a mental system *normally present.* In his *Introduction to Narcissism* Freud regards time-appreciation as specially associated with the self-observing activities of the ego-ideal, and here we would have a more systematic version of Dr. Mitchell's 'subconscious watcher'. Moreover, this ego-system is in closer touch than the real ego with the most primitive levels of mental activity (cp. *Das Ich und das Es*).

The second discussion selected is that of 'Multiple Personality', in which the writer finds grounds for rejecting, or at least maintaining an exception to, the psycho-analytical view that regards consciousness as a unitary function, one which may accompany psychical activity under certain conditions, but which is not a necessary accompaniment of even the most complicated psychical processes. In other words, psychical processes are in themselves unconscious, but are capable under certain conditions of attaining the functional state of becoming conscious—this state being unitary for any given moment of consciousness.

In earlier chapters (cf. quotation italicized above) Dr. Mitchell speaks of 'consciousness' in what is clearly a systematic sense identical with the system BW. Indeed, the significance of his remarks would not be altered if for the word 'consciousness' we substituted 'the system BW.' A 'limitation of consciousness' would then be the same thing as a limitation of the mental field capable of becoming conscious (*bewusstseinsfähig*). Moreover, since Dr. Mitchell has elsewhere criticized Dr. Rivers for limiting the term dissociation to cases in which the dissociated system is as it were 'conscious' on its own account, it seems probable that he himself does not credit minor 'dissociations' with consciousness in this sense, and is using the word consciousness here in its wider systematic sense, but when it is a question of the more extensive dissociations of multiple personality, he definitely asserts that the dissociated systems are co-conscious, i.e. that the dissociation is not only topographical but involves a sharing of the function of consciousness. He definitely rejects Freud's view that at *different times* subsidiary ego-nuclei of personality (i.e. organized identifications) may under certain rare conditions take over the functions of a conscious centre, and based this rejection on the phenomena of the 'Doris Fischer' case.

It is necessary to point out here that if Freud's view be correct, no

[1] Reviewer's italics.

conceivable experiment could prove the occurrence of ' co-consciousness ', and further that as he points out in his paper on the unconscious, the alternative is to assume even in the normal individual perhaps an indefinite number of ' consciousnesses '.

The main objections to the theory of co-consciousness are: (1) that the facts can be explained without it, and (2) that it introduces greater difficulties than it solves. For instance, it reintroduces under another guise certain difficulties satisfactorily disposed of when ' conscious ' and ' mental ' ceased to be equated, and one cannot help feeling that the tendency to resort to terms like subconscious and co-conscious in part arises from a reluctance to abandon this equation.

Our admiration for Dr. Mitchell's careful and detailed case-records is tempered by regret that many clues of obvious analytical importance were not as far as possible followed up, in particular that the ' personalities ' of the patient were not scrutinized with a view to ascertaining the identifications behind them. The part played by the transference in strengthening and modifying these identifications suggest another fruitful field for research. But although in these and other respects his histories show gaps highly provocative of analytical curiosity, they are nevertheless full of interest and food for reflection, and should be read in the original, a pleasant task which becomes a duty in the case of medical psychologists who have not encountered such cases in their own practice.

One might adduce as explanation of the points here criticized the consideration that most of the chapters comprising the book are some years old, for one has the suspicion that Dr. Mitchell has not revised it in line with the latest knowledge as thoroughly as might have been done ; we may hope that this omission will be rectified in a future edition.

James Glover.

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Character and the Unconscious. A critical exposition of the psychology of Freud and Jung. By J. H. van der Hoop. (Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London, 1923. Pp. 223. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*)

' This book,' says its author, ' is the result of nine years' intensive study of the theory and practice of psycho-analysis,' and it is intended to improve on previous expositions, by paying attention to the causes of divergence between Freud and Jung. We cannot help thinking that if he had paid sufficient attention to these causes, he would never have written it. He does not tell us whether he spent a similar period on the intensive study of Jung's theory and practice, and we are left with the supposition, which is supported by internal evidence, that he has merely been attempting to combine the two methods. This supposition, if correct, would of course negative his claim to have had nine years'

experience of psycho-analysis, but it would go far to explain his mental attitude at the end of this period.

The author's curious ambivalence to Freud's teaching is best understood if we correct the element of projection in the following remarkable sentence :

' Generally the patient will be able to tell by intuition whether a psycho-analytical treatment will suit his inner powers and disposition.'

Other dicta betray the nature of this resistance.

' The character of Freud's theories clearly shows a pathological basis. It is true he has studied the unconscious life of normal persons, but this has formed only a small fraction of his material (the *Traumdeutung*, for instance !), and he has been apt to treat normal and pathological cases from the same point of view ' (p. 98).

This won't do. ' Normal persons are *unpleasantly affected* ' when symptoms ' transitional between normal and abnormal are regarded as faults and frailties '. ' If they are candid they will admit these shortcomings, but they *object to being judged and classified by means of them*.' . . . ' They are right when they maintain that pathological psychology and normal psychology should be studied from *different points of view*.[1]

Surely the author has lost his bearings in ventilating this grievance. It is no part of a psycho-analyst's function to judge and classify his patients, whereas Jung's type classifications contain an element of judgment which has caught the popular fancy and enriched the vocabulary of domestic recrimination. Moreover, the author inconsistently complains (p. 135) that Freud has concerned himself very little with the classification of ' character types '.

We cannot help asking what preferential treatment for the normal does the author claim when he complains that psycho-analysis fails to discriminate betwixt the sheep and the goats. Respect of persons would surely constitute a comical complication in an investigatory process which studies the instinctive sources of conduct presumably present in all human beings however classified. But the author labours under such strong feeling on this point that one experiences an absurd impulse to soothe him by pointing out that psycho-analysts are not in the habit of twitting their patients with their frailties, symptomatic or otherwise, and that a normal person can be analysed without any humiliation other than that involved in recognizing his common share in the instinctual inheritance of his fellows, normal and abnormal.

But besides resenting the application of psycho-analytical theory to normal persons, the writer is further apprehensive of the effects of psycho-analysis upon them. Even a self-analysis

' is not without danger because the conscious content of his mind is apt to grow

[1] Reviewer's italics.

vague and chaotic,[1] and so may seriously threaten his organized spiritual life and lead to insanity. . . . This may explain and justify the objections which many healthy people entertain against their stirring up of the unconscious. They usually feel remote from such things, and are content to remain so ' (p. 203).

The mechanism of his sympathy with these ' many healthy people ' is so transparent that one wonders why the writer himself was not content ' to remain remote from such things ', especially when he experiences such obvious relief in turning to what he himself calls ' the more interesting ' aspects of human mentality. We must, however, do Dr. van der Hoop the justice of recognizing that his account of psycho-analytical theory, although written in a pedestrian style and burdened by unnecessary apologetics, is nevertheless fairly accurate in essentials. But occasionally curious statements catch the eye and give one pause ; e.g. :

' Thumb-sucking is also one of the ways by which some infants try to satisfy themselves ; probably this replaces the gratification of being fed ' (p. 52) ;

and we open our eyes when, discussing symbols, he says that

' Jung and Maeder adopt a wider point of view than Freud when they relate the significance of these symbols to the history of civilization. Thus they sometimes discover a similarity between the problems both of individuals and of the human race.'

Really !

After so much concern over the evil effects of ' stirring up the unconscious,' it is a relief to note that the technique of the author's dream analysis is in no danger of influencing this dangerous region of the mind.

James Glover.

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Duality. A Study in the Psycho-analysis of Race. By R. N. Bradley, 1923. (George Routledge & Sons, London. Pp. xi + 186.)

The human race, Mr. Bradley maintains in this book, consists of two main types—the long-heads, who came from Africa, and the short-heads, who came from Asia. Although absolutely pure representatives of these types are, he admits, rare, the long-heads are on the whole distinguished by a predominance of the feminine over the masculine aspects and of the unconscious over the conscious, while in the short-heads the predominance is of the opposite nature. The short-heads arose as a quasi-pathological variation, and there would appear to be a tendency to revert to the more assimilative long-headed type—a tendency which is hastened by a difficulty which the short-heads have in being born from mothers of the long-headed type. The conflict between the two types has sometimes crystallized in great wars, of which the recent world war was the

[1] Reviewer's italics.

last. Nevertheless, the two types are complementary, and a properly balanced individual requires an admixture of the characteristics of both types (Goethe was such an individual, having inherited the short-headed elements from his father and the long-headed elements from his mother).

Connected with, and largely dependent on, the three major oppositions of Long-head—Short-head, Female—Male, Unconscious—Conscious are a great number of other distinctions which emerge gradually in the course of Mr. Bradley's exposition; distinctions affecting individual character or racial institutions. Without attempting to be in any way exhaustive, we may append a list of some of them:

Dolicocephalic	*Brachycephalic*
Unsystematic	Systematic
Instinctive, Impulsive and Emotional	Logical
	Disciplined
Sensual	Voluntary Control
Perceptual rather than intellectual	Intellectual rather than perceptual
Concrete	Abstract
'Bohemian'	Puritan
Extravagant	Economical
Acute sensitivity	Bad eyesight (but good teeth)
Imaginative sympathy ('other conscious')	Lack of insight into other minds
Phantastic	Truthful
Individualistic	Sacrifice of individuals to community ('cannon fodder peoples')
Religion more public	Religion more private
Catholicism	Dissent
Tendency to Polytheism	Monotheism
Art	Philosophy
Sea Power	Land Army
Matriarchy or Feminism	Patriarchy or Male Dominance
Law *ad hoc* (e.g. English)	Law *a priori* (e.g. Roman)
More true to type (as with women)	More liable to variation (as with men)

This list is particularly interesting in its extensive agreement with that of a good many other recent writers. Mr. Bradley himself refers to Geley, Tansley and Trotter in this connection. He might have referred as well to the more definite and systematic work of Webb ('Character and Intelligence,' *British Journal of Psychology*, Mon. Suppt., Vol. I), Jung ('Psychological Types'), McDougall ('National Welfare and National Decay,' reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. III, p. 403), and Rorschach ('Psychodiagnostik,' reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. III, p. 85). Webb in particular has endeavoured to provide the essential statistical foundation for some such division into two main types. Much further work is necessary, however, before any distinction of this kind can be regarded as more than an interesting suggestion or (at best) as affording a useful working hypothesis for future research. Mr. Bradley's list, as it stands,

is not free from certain *a priori* difficulties, which may or may not be resolved by closer analysis, but which certainly require further elucidation. Thus an explanation seems to be required for the apparent contradiction between the short-head's submissiveness in politics and independence in religion, or again between his aptitude for herd morality on the one hand and his lack of psychological insight on the other. Again, we are told (p. 122) that economy is women's province, and yet it is the extravagant Bohemian who, in Mr. Bradley's scheme, finds himself on the dolicocephalic feminine side, while the economic Puritan is ranged on that of the short-headed male. It may be that to explain these and similar anomalies it will be necessary to split up the factors underlying the two main types into a number of smaller factors, such as McDougall's hypothetical unitary instincts, or the definite combinations of influences that underlie Jung's sub-types.

In any case types such as these can only be satisfactorily erected on a statistical foundation, a foundation which Mr. Bradley makes no attempt to supply here (the absence of adequate evidence for the supposed correlation between the respective groups of mental traits and the corresponding shape of head being particularly striking). Even were a satisfactory basis supplied, the conception of types, though useful in some ways, is still not without danger, as erroneously suggesting a bimodal distribution instead of (what will almost certainly be found) a 'normal' distribution between two extremes—the 'typical' individuals being the very rare ones encountered at either end of the scale.

Psycho-analysts have therefore probably acted wisely in avoiding reference to types (except in cases where there appears to be involved a fairly clear-cut *qualitative* distinction, as in the narcissistic and anaclitic types of love). Nevertheless, psycho-analysis may well be able to render valuable service in the interpretation of such types as may eventually be proved to exist. Thus in the present case it is highly probable that some of the principal factors underlying Mr. Bradley's two types are connected with a difference in the relative preponderance of the anal-erotic components of the individuals concerned; the systematic, controlled, dissenting, puritanically minded short-head, on the one hand, and the more impulsive, extravagant 'Bohemian' long-head on the other, corresponding to a predominance of the retentive and productive aspects of anal-erotism respectively.

The use of the word 'psycho-analysis' in the sub-title is to be regretted, since very little use is made of psycho-analytic conceptions in the strict sense. Mr. Bradley is inclined to claim for the Unconscious a greater influence than that which most psycho-analysts have hitherto ventured to suggest, as when he supposes (p. 117) that the preponderance of male over female births is due to women's unconscious desire 'to create a

lover'. The 'Unconscious' is taken in a very wide sense, corresponding to the usage of Jung and Geley rather than that of Freud. Mr. Bradley has been especially impressed by the work of Geley, and a certain element of mysticism that pervades the later chapters of the book is perhaps due to some extent to the influence of the latter author.

J. C. F.

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Talks on Psychotherapy. By William Brown, M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Lond.), Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. (University of London Press, Ltd., London, 1923. Pp. 96. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*)

Another volume by this prolific writer. We are not told to what audience it is addressed. On psycho-analytical topics the author is guilty of a number of confused and inaccurate statements. Thus, in speaking of war shock, he says (p. 30) that many of the cases (i.e. patients) 'merely suffered from fear'. Yet on the very same page we gather that the patients' fearfulness was itself the 'cause of the repression'. The author's conception of the technique of free association is indicated in the word italicized in the following passage (p. 49):

'Letting the patient say what comes uppermost in his mind in relation, say, to his symptoms, or to different parts of his dreams or to anything *you* may like to start off with.'

In the same way one word is enough to indicate the author's knowledge of the mechanism of transference in analysis (p. 38):

'It (i.e. the transference) enables the patient to live again through earlier experiences of his life in relation to the physician and *thus* become freed from their harmful effects.'

The following passage (p. 79) is wildly untrue:

'Freud claims to have proved determinism. He claims that that is one of the three advances that he has made in psychological science.'

Apart from its not being Freud's manner to 'claim' anything in regard to his writings, anyone who has read these must know that Freud merely *assumes* determinism as the only possible working hypothesis for science, in exactly the same way as every other scientific man does.

E. J.

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Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature. By William Fielding Ogburn, Professor of Sociology at Barnard College. (B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1922, pp. xi + 365. Price $2.00.)

This is a thoughtful and suggestive book, which deserves to be widely read among students of social psychology. Though abounding in significant statements of fact and interesting points of view, there is in it

a very refreshing absence of dogmatism or onesidedness—two frequent vices which are particularly ill-becoming in a very youthful science, such as sociology.

The book is divided into five parts. In the first two parts the author treats of ' The Social Heritage and the Original Nature of Man ' and of ' Social Evolution ' respectively. He here emphasizes the importance of culture (taken in a wide sense to include the material aspects of civilization) as compared with original nature as determinants of social change. There is, he maintains, a rather widespread tendency to overstress the purely biological causes of change, and he makes some interesting suggestions as to the probable reasons for this overestimation of biological and the corresponding underestimation of cultural factors. Human nature, he is inclined to think, has changed but little since the last ice age ; but human culture has changed enormously and is accumulating rapidly. The rate at which culture advances at first suggests the compound interest curve, but further examination shows it to be more complex than this. The frequency with which similar inventions are made independently at or about the same time is further impressive evidence of the influence of culture, as distinct from that of native ability, in promoting social change. (A list of 148 such inventions and discoveries is appended.)

Professor Ogburn is not inclined to attribute much importance to eugenic or dysgenic factors. His outlook is thus very different to that of such a social psychologist as McDougall, who has recently drawn attention, in such a striking way, to the possible significance of these factors, especially upon their psychological side. It is to be regretted in this connection that Professor Ogburn has not dealt more fully with the *decay* of cultures in the course of history, as it is on this not always easily explicable process of decay that McDougall, in common with certain other eugenists, has laid most stress, considering that it is due in large part to a decline in average ability or character. Another, but in some respects allied, factor which, in the opinion of the present reviewer, would have deserved more extended treatment, is the probable influence on human progress of the diminution of the struggle for existence due to the widespread adoption of birth control.

In Part 3 Professor Ogburn deals with ' Cultural Inertia and Conservatism '. There is here a most striking treatment of some of the factors that prevent social change and therefore impede social progress ; a treatment which could, however, have been carried a little further here and there by reference to the findings of psycho-analysis, particularly to the influence of early rebellion and self-assertion on the one hand and submission on the other, as first manifested in the various aspects of the Œdipus complex. The somewhat striking correspondence between social conservatism and the authority of the family (particularly of the

head of the family) has more than once been pointed out by psycho-analytic writers. In this matter of conservatism also those who are inclined to attribute greater social importance to the original nature of man could probably make out a plausible case for a somewhat greater influence of inborn racial factors than Professor Ogburn is inclined to admit.

In Part 4 on ' Social Maladjustments ', there is developed the hypothesis of ' Cultural Lag '. Changes in material culture, it is maintained, are frequently not followed until after a considerable interval by corresponding changes in the non-material or ' adaptive ' culture. An elaborate illustration of this is taken from the facts of Workmen's Compensation for Accidents. The rapid increase of industrialism caused the social problems arising from accidents to assume very serious dimensions, but in the United States it was about half a century before even a partial solution of these problems was found by a change in the common law with regard to employers' liability. Similar cultural lags are more briefly dealt with in the case of reforestation, taxation, the family, the foreign relations and representative government of the United States and the mode of life of the Hopi Indians of Arizona. Some of the principal reasons for this cultural lag are also considered. It is evident that implies a period of maladjustment, which may be productive of many social evils and much individual suffering. In view of the increasing rapidity of the changes in material culture, there is probably also a serious tendency towards an accumulation of these lags and maladjustments.

In the last Part, Professor Obgurn deals with the lack of adjustment between human nature and culture (as distinguished from the lack of adjustment between different aspects of culture, which was considered in Part 4). There is here a very illuminating and suggestive discussion of the ways in which a lack of adjustment may really be considered to exist and a number of suggestions for better adjustments ; these last, unfortunately, rather vague and sketchy, as the author himself admits.

It is particularly in the careful and suggestive analyses of certain important social phenomena (such as the discussions on the importance of cultural as distinct from biological causes of progress, on the reasons for the underestimation of the former causes, on the psychological and social factors underlying conservatism and cultural lag, and on the nature of the possible maladjustments between human nature and modern culture) that the student of the social sciences may well find in this book a source of considerable illumination and inspiration.

J. C. F.

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Mother and Son. By C. Gasquoigne Hartley, author of *The Truth about Woman, Motherhood,* etc. (Nash & Grayson, London, 1923. Pp. 294. Price 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This volume, addressed to a purely popular audience, will no doubt be useful in introducing to a family class some of the newer ideas of modern clinical psychology. The book is very cautiously written, and the feat is achieved of writing 300 pages on the relations between mother and son without mentioning the word incest. Much of this caution we understand to have been imposed on the author by the publisher. The same excuse can hardly be adduced for the lack of critical capacity evident in many parts of the book. One example will suffice. The reader is advised to study psycho-analysis by perusing a volume by Freud and one by Tridon, as though they were similar authorities on the subject.

E. J.

Le Cerveau et la Pensée. By Henri Piéron. (Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1923. Pp. 326. Price 10 Frs.)

This is an excellently written account of cerebral physiology. The problems of aphasia in particular are dealt with at length. On the other hand, although the book purports to represent a *rapprochement* between psychology and physiology, the former subject comes off very badly indeed, and the discoveries of modern clinical psychology are nowhere referred to.

E. J.

The Hope of the Variant. By John George Gehring, M.D., Sc.D. (Charles Scribner & Sons, 1923. Pp. 252. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Dr. Gehring regards a ' variant ' as one who varies from the normal, because of nervous or physical disorder, habit, or training. He attends first to the physical side, and then to the psychical by suggestion and re-education. We cannot accept as a serious contribution to psycho-pathology a book where such phrases occur as on page 38, where he says :

' It is not his mind nor his soul that is at fault, it is his disturbed chemistry, the absorption of toxic products, pressure and pulling incident to disturbed or congested viscera, and often his physician that are to blame.'

Or again, on page 90 :

' And here the Author wishes to place himself on record as implying that in the large majority of cases somewhere in the functioning of abdominal organs his mental distress has its origin.'

The book has a savour of the doctrine of Christian Science, e.g. page 84 : ' Fear is at the bottom of obsessive ideas '. Page 183, in speaking of anger, he says : ' No emotion save fear is so stupid and unpardonable '.

He characterizes the nervous symptom as an automatic habit, and on page 110 he talks of ' correction of undesirable automatic habits which should not be argued with on the analogy of " Christian Science " people, who deny evil and affirm the good '. One is reminded more of theology than of psycho-pathology by such phrases as (page 32) : ' His soul is out of health ' ; page 33 : ' We should not be afraid to talk to a sick man about his soul '. He affirms (page 51) that ' consciousness of self means Neurosis,' and on page 185 he says :

> ' Once his consciousness awakened to the perception of himself, there may be released a host of possible fears: brain-fag, neurasthenia and other spectres rise up before him.'

His terminology is loose and unconvincing. Throughout his book he uses such terms as ' objective consciousness ', ' objective mind ' and ' consciousness ' interchangeably instead of the usual term ' the conscious mind '. While his use of the terms : ' subjective mind ', ' subconscious mind ', ' subjective instincts ' and ' vegetative ' used interchangeably seems to refer to what we understand by the ' subconscious '.

We note that the work of Professor Freud on the Unconscious is not once mentioned in the book.

The chapter on the importance of the training of children is useful.

The book is pleasantly written, but a therapy that does not take into account the working of the true unconscious in dealing with mental troubles will not carry us very far in our study of psycho-pathology.

Cyril Wilson.

REPORTS

SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY

The Seventh International Congress of Psychology was held at Oxford from July 25 to August 1, 1923. The previous one had been held at Geneva in 1909. There were many signs that the status of psycho-analysis had materially changed between these two dates. It was represented on the Executive Committee of the Congress by the President of the International Association, and the Secretary of the Association was one of those invited to attend the Congress as a representative of German psychology (the only psychiatrist in this position). The tone of the numerous references made to psycho-analysis in the course of the Congress, on the part of the various chairmen as well as the speakers, and the reception accorded to the papers and speeches made by psycho-analysts, showed clearly that the subject was generally regarded as an integral and important branch of scientific psychology. Among the papers dealing with psycho-analysis may be mentioned the following:

Dr. Karl Abraham read a paper on 'Aspects of Infantile Mental Imagery'. Contrasting the thought of children with that of adults, he pointed out characteristics peculiar to the former and indicated that these were again found in the unconscious mind of the adult. He laid stress, for instance, on the fact that what appears to the adult as a mere resemblance was often treated by the child as a literal and absolute identification, this being in its turn often the basis of subsequent symbolism.

A Symposium took place on the 'Classification of the Human Instincts', the two *rapporteurs* being Dr. J. Drever and Dr. Ernest Jones. The former criticized Freud's dualistic conception on the supposed score of its small empiric value. The second speaker defended this conception on exactly the same grounds, and made a number of sceptical remarks on the lists of unanalysed 'instincts' drawn up by academic psychologists. An animated debate followed.

Dr. MacCurdy read a paper on 'Visual Imagery in Phantasy,' which was acutely criticized by Mr. J. C. Flügel on psycho-analytical grounds.

Mr. F. C. Bartlett, Lecturer on Psychology at Cambridge, read a paper on 'Symbolism', to which one evening was devoted. The considerations brought forward were superficial, dealing only with the more conscious strata of the mind and ignoring the relationship of symbolism

to the unconscious proper. A severe criticism followed from Dr. Ernest Jones.

Canon Streeter and Mr. Thouless read papers on the relation of psychology, particularly psycho-analysis, to religion. The former was less unsympathetic than the latter. Adverse and successful criticism followed from the psycho-analytical side. Two other opponents, whose papers were not followed by any discussion, were Dr. William Brown, of Oxford, and Dr. Alfred Adler, of Vienna. The latter spoke on ' Fortschritte in der Individualpsychologie ', but the evidence of progress was not very obvious. Drs. Morton Prince and Janet also read papers, but only remotely connected with psycho-analysis.

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BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY THE

GENERAL SECRETARY, DR. K. ABRAHAM

Editorial Announcements

As the Branch Societies of the Association have already been informed by circular, the *Bulletin* is now appearing for the first time in a different form. Present conditions have made it necessary to reduce it to a smaller compass, and this can only be done if the reports of the separate Societies are revised by the General Secretary. This plan has the additional advantage of securing a greater uniformity in the length of the reports. Editorial alterations are confined to what is absolutely necessary.

Branch Secretaries are requested to limit the abstracts of papers to a short outline of their contents, not to exceed a few lines in length. In future the names of those present at meetings or taking part in discussions should be omitted.

The Central Executive was authorized at the last Congress to decide on the place and exact date of the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, to be held in the spring of 1924. In view of the present situation in Germany it seems advisable to hold it in Austria. The Central Executive therefore invites members to the Congress, which will probably last three days, at Salzburg, on Easter Monday, April 21, 1924. Further details will be sent as soon as possible to the various Secretaries.

AMERICAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

June 3, 1923. Annual Meeting. In place of the President, Dr. Wholey, who was prevented from attending, Dr. Clark took the chair at the scientific proceedings, and Dr. Oberndorf at the Business Meeting.

Election of Officers:

President: Dr. Oberndorf (New York).

Secretary: Dr. Stern (New York).

Members of Council: Drs. Coriat and Emerson (Boston).

Honorary Member: Dr. G. Stanley Hall.

New Members: Drs. A. Kardiner and M. Meyer (New York).

The new Statutes conform to those of the New York Society. The degree of M.D. is a necessary qualification for full membership; on the other hand a course of analysis is not obligatory.

The following papers were read:

Dr. S. E. Jelliffe, New York: Psychogenesis in bone disease.

Dr. L. P. Clark, New York: Further study of mental content in the transitory deliria of epilepsy.

Dr. T. H. Ames, New York: Fatalism.

Dr. L. E. Emerson, Cambridge, Mass.: Psychic organization.

Dr. I. H. Coriat, Boston, Mass.: Some notes on active therapy in psycho-analysis.

Dr. A. Stern, New York: The counter-transference in psycho-analysis.

BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

April 10, 1923:

a. Dr. Koerber: Phallic symbolism.

b. Frau Dr. Horney: The discovery of childhood traumas by psycho-analysis.

c. Frau Klein: The 'doctor-game' played by children.

d. Dr. Simmel: A picture-puzzle in a dream.

e. Dr. Sachs: Notes on the Œdipus complex.

f. Dr. Alexander: Bisexual organization and sublimation.

April 24, 1923:

a. Debate on Dr. Alexander's remarks at the previous meeting.

b. Dr. Harnik: Symbolism of the photographic apparatus in dreams.

May 8, 1923:

a. Dr. Simmel: On the functional element in a transitory symptom-formation.

b. Dr. Abraham: The process of introjection in homosexuality. (To be published shortly.)

The following members made short communications with reference to isolated phenomena observed in neurotics and children: Dr. Balint, Dr. Liebermann, Dr. Simmel, Fräulein Searl, Dr. Sachs, Dr. Koerber and Frau Klein.

May 15, 1923:

Dr. Simmel: Intestinal control of the libido.

May 29, 1923 :

Continuation of the discussion on Dr. Simmel's paper given at the previous meeting.

June 5, 1923 :

a. Dr. Simmel : Concluding remarks on the subject of discussion at the two previous meetings.

b. Frau Dr. Deutsch (guest of the Society) : Phantasies of castration by biting.

c. Dr. Abraham : Additional notes on the subject of Frau Dr. Deutsch's communication.

d. Dr. Radó (guest of the Society) : A dream throwing light on the psychology of the revolutionary leader. (To be published in the *Zeitschrift.*)

June 12, 1923 :

a. Continuation of the discussion on Dr. Radó's remarks at the previous meeting.

b. Dr. Müller : Mechanism of the development of a case of homosexuality.

c. Fräulein Schott : Notes from analyses of children.

June 22, 1923 : Business meeting.

1. A committee of six having at Dr. Simmel's suggestion drawn up a plan of instruction and training in psycho-analysis, their proposals were approved by the meeting and will be issued in a printed form.

2. On a motion of Dr. Abraham's the conditions of admission to the Berlin Society were altered as follows :

§ 5. The Society shall consist of ordinary members, associate members and honorary members. Associate members shall take part in all the scientific meetings of the Society, but are excluded from business meetings and from voting.

§ 6. The following are the general conditions of admission to membership :

a. The completion of a psycho-analytic training as far as possible on the terms laid down by the Society.

b. Attendance as a guest of the Society at a considerable number of the scientific meetings, together with the contribution of an original scientific thesis (lecture or paper). As a general rule intending members will be admitted first as associate members, but as soon as their contribution to the work of the Society is judged to be

sufficient they may be admitted to full membership by a general meeting. The Society reserves the right to modify the above conditions in special cases, for example if candidates for membership have rendered special service to psycho-analysis. Election to membership shall take place by secret ballot at a business or general meeting, members having been notified by the President at the previous meeting. A majority of two-thirds is required. The same procedure shall be observed in admitting associate members to full membership.

3. Report by the committee appointed to administer the funds of the Polyclinic. It was decided to continue the voluntary subscriptions of members as before and to try to obtain donations for the work of the Polyclinic.

June 30, 1923: Short communications.

a. Frau Dr. Benedek, Leipzig (guest of the Society): The symbolism of the spider.

b. Dr. Foerster: Clinical communication on a gastro-intestinal neurosis.

c. Dr. Harnik: Respiratory type and bisexuality.

d. Dr. Abraham: Notes from the analysis of an asthmatic patient.

e. Dr. Alexander: An alphabet puzzle in a dream.

f. Dr. Schultz-Hencke: The symbolism of numbers in dreams related to the fear of castration.

g. Dr. Abraham: 1. Notes on the psychology of melancholia. 2. Notes on the 'examination' situation in dreams. (Both to be published.)

During the second quarter the course of Lectures announced previously was held. The Berlin Society announces another course for the coming quarter.

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BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

April 18, 1923. Miss Ella Sharpe: A psycho-analytical appreciation of the life and work of Francis Thompson. The paper dealt with: (1) The main events in Thompson's life. His relationships to father, mother, and sisters was correlated with the later friendships with the Meynell family. The significance of the poet's addiction to opium, of the derelict

years in London, and of the attempted suicide was elucidated in the further study of the poems. (2) The psycho-analytical study of the poems led to the following conclusions: *a*. The poet's almost complete feminine identification. *b*. The conflict between pagan (prostitute) and virgin identifications. *c*. These types illustrated as aspects of the mother-imago. *d*. The comparison of imagery from different poems led to the inference of a strongly marked penis-nipple phantasy. *e*. The conclusion that weaning was the traumatic event which led to the building up of the castration phantasy. *f*. The poet's conception of the 'cyclic me', i.e. the Self as omnipotence.

The paper concluded with reference to different aspects of the poet's life in illustration of both the castration and omnipotent phantasies. The poems as productions express symbolically the poet's characteristic phantasies. They are symbols of castration; they are children; they are compared by the poet with God's own creation of the universe; they are the poet's immortality.

May 2, 1923. Dr. W. J. Jago: Boehm's papers on homosexuality. Boehm puts forward three views. That the greater the homosexual component the greater the inclination towards polygamy. That the homosexual attempts to have intercourse with the parent of the same sex through the intermediary of the parent of the other sex. That in every homosexual there can be found the phantasy that the woman has a penis which, like that of the horse, can be withdrawn into the body, and which can be protruded in order to grasp and so remove the penis of the man with whom the woman is having intercourse.

In the discussion that followed it was generally considered that Boehm's paper did not throw great light on the genesis of homosexuality.

Third Quarter, 1923

July 25, 1923. This Meeting of Members and Associate Members had been specially convened in order to welcome Dr. Karl Abraham, who had been elected an Honorary Member of the Society.

Dr. Ernest Jones addressed a few words of welcome to Dr. Karl Abraham and Frau Dr. Abraham, to which Dr. Abraham replied.

Dr. Jones then gave his paper on 'Cold, Disease, and Birth'. Reasons were given for thinking that the greater part of the present belief in the pathogenic effects of cold air is superstitious and of unconscious origin. The belief was traced to the castration effect induced by the experiences of birth of which cold air is to the infant the obvious sign.

Dr. Abraham accepted the probability of Dr. Jones's theory, and quoted several observations from his own experience in support of it. One, for instance, was that of a lady with a pathological dread of draughts,

who spent much of her life in reproducing intra-uterine conditions in various ways; she was a seven-months child.

Douglas Bryan,
Hon. Sec.

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DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

April 4, 1923. Dr. Adolph F. Meijer. A further contribution to the subject of homosexuality.

The writer contrasts with other conceptions of this subject the psycho-analytical standpoint, namely, the origin of homosexuality in the development of the individual. Rank's exposition is considered and the idea is advocated that the differences between perversion and neurosis are based rather on the nature of the repressed wishes than on any essential difference between the two conditions. Stress is laid on regarding homosexuality invariably as a neurotic symptom.

June 16, 1923. Dr. F. P. Muller. Analysis of an anxiety-neurosis. A detailed account was given. Discussion was postponed.

June 28, 1923. Dr. J. Varendonck (Ghent) was elected a member of the Society and delivered a paper on Aesthetic Symbolism. His dissertation was wholly in accordance with the spirit of psycho-analysis, and the theories propounded were for the most part psycho-analytical in content.

Third Quarter, 1923

No meetings of the Society were held.

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HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

April 4, 1923. Dr. J. Hollós. Psycho-analytical interpretation of a case described.

April 21, 1923. Frau Dr. Bálint (guest of the Society). Mexican hieroglyphics (being a paper originally read at a meeting of the Berlin Society).

May 5, 1923. Dr. S. Ferenczi. Further exposition of the tentative formulation of a ' genital theory '.

May 26, 1923. Dr. S. Ferenczi.

1. A case in support of the psycho-analytical theory of hypnosis.
2. Supplement to the history of 'little Hahnemann'.
3. A new contribution to the subject of active technique.

June 9, 1923. Dr. J. Hermann. Cases of (subjective) evidence in the light of psycho-analysis. An analysis of examples of subjectively conditioned evidence occurring in philosophic thought, in neurotic behaviour, etc.

Third Quarter, 1923

No meetings of the Society were held.

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INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1923

January 6, 1923. Major Owen Berkeley Hill, M.A., M.D., I.M.S. The Gandhi movement from a psycho-analytic standpoint.

January 27, 1923. Annual Meeting. The Secretary's Report of the working of the Society for 1922 was laid on the table, and the Council for the year 1923 was elected as follows:

President: Dr. Girindrashekhar Bose, D.Sc., M.B.

Secretary: Mr. Manmatha Nath Banerji, M.Sc.

Members of Council: Dr. Narendra Nath Sen Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., and Mr. Gobin Chand Bora, B.A.

March 3, 1923:

a. R. C. McWatters, I.M.S. A modern Prometheus.

b. Discussion on 'Examination dreams' opened by President.

Second Quarter, 1923

May 22, 1923:

a. Mr. Haridas Bhattacharyya, M.A. Completion mania: a single personality trait.

b. Discussion on Flournoy's paper on 'Siva Androgyne' opened by Captain N. C. Mitra, M.B., who translated the paper into English for the members of the Society.

June 9, 1923:

a. Major Owen Berkeley Hill, M.A., M.D., I.M.S. The colour question from a psycho-analytical standpoint.

b. Dr. Sarasi Lal Sarkar, M.A., M.B. Swapna Tatva (on dreams) in Bengali.

The interest in psycho-analysis is daily increasing in India. Some of the members have been writing popular articles in the local Press, and the response from the public is very encouraging. Magazine articles and daily newspaper editorials contain references to psycho-analysis, and articles from foreign Press on this subject are being quoted frequently by the daily Press here. Patients in increasing numbers are seeking psycho-analytic treatment. On the request of the principal Detective Training School under the Government of Bengal, the President delivered a course of lectures on Crime and Psycho-Analysis. Police officials from all parts of Bengal attended the meeting and took lively interest in the subject. We are being approached by other educational, theistic and reformatory bodies with various requests for pamphlets, etc., on psycho-analysis.

M. N. Banerji.

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RUSSIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

In October, just as this report was being concluded, our Association succeeded in establishing relations with the Russian Psycho-Analytical Society. We had learnt a year previously, at the International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Berlin, that a Society had been founded in Moscow, but hitherto it had remained independent of our own Association. Recently a member of the Russian Society visited the General Secretary in Berlin in order to arrange with him directly for their admission to the International Association. This was granted provisionally by the President, Dr. Ernest Jones, since the Russian Society conforms to the requirements laid down at the Congress. Dr. Jones's decision has been communicated to that Society, but still awaits final confirmation at the next Congress. We take the opportunity of welcoming the new Branch Society into the Association, and hope to be able to give a full report of their activities in the coming quarter.

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NEW YORK PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

March 27, 1923 :

a. Dr. M. Meyer. An unusual method of dream-representation.

b. Dr. A. Gardiner. Psycho-analytical observations of war-neuroses. The paper and the discussion were concerned with the agreement in the structure of the war and the

peace neuroses, together with the part played in the last by the self-preservative instinct; further with the problem of repetition of a traumatic experience as regarded by Freud in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

April 24, 1923:

a. Dr. M. Meyer. The analysis of a phantasy of the duration of the treatment.

b. Dr. Polon. Sexual trauma and the disposition to dementia præcox.

c. Dr. Frink. A mistake in writing. The symbolism of base-ball. The symbolism of riding on horse-back. Two screen memories.

May 29, 1923. Dr. Lehrmann. An attempt at psycho-analysis of a conversion hysteria in a child. Report of a fragmentary analysis of a nine-year-old girl. Spastic paralysis of the legs and pains in the trunk proved to be in part a representation of parturition, in part the expression of other phantasies.

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SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

No meetings were held in the second and third quarters of the year, 1923.

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VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1923

April 18, 1923:

a. Doz. Dr. Paul Schilder. Psycho-analysis and encephalitis.

b. Dr. Paul Federn.

1. A case of disturbance in the sexual life.
2. A short dream.
3. Remarks on narcophobia.

c. Doz. Dr. Paul Schilder. On the question of personal consciousness.

May 16, 1923. Frau Dr. Salomea Kempner. Oral sadism.

May 30, 1923. Frau Beate Rank (guest of the Society). The part played by women in the evolution of human society.

June 13, 1923. Doz. Dr. Paul Schilder. Sources of psychic energy.

Frau Beate Rank, Wien I, Grünangergasse 3, was elected to membership.

M. Eitingon.

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